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Mature manhood: that means to have rediscovered  
the seriousness one had as a child at play. 
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Chapter 1 
What is Maturity? 
 
  
THE AIM OF THIS BOOK 
The expressions ‘mature’ and ‘immature’ appear very frequently in our daily talk 
about morality: Not only do we say that a certain person, judgement, or action is 
‘good’ or ‘bad’, we also say that he/she/it is ‘mature’ or ‘immature’. Interestingly, no 
philosophical research has yet been done to clarify the concept of maturity and its 
relevance to morality, despite its actuality and importance in everyday moral 
thought. 
  Academic philosophy should always keep an affinity to everyday life. Philosophy 
should not be done by researchers only, and philosophical texts, including doctoral 
dissertations, should be understandable to anyone without any previous knowledge 
of a certain philosophical terminology. In his Philosophy and Ordinary Language. The 
Bent and Genius of our Tongue, Hanfling says: 
[I]f there is vagueness or inaccuracy in a philosopher’s statements, then he can be 
asked to clarify his meaning in ordinary language; and we might become suspicious 
if he is unable or unwilling to do this.1 
 
  With the expression ‘ordinary language’ Hanfling means a language which lacks a 
special terminology. And he adds: 
                                                 
1 Hanfling, Philosophy and Ordinary Language p. 2. 
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When people – ordinary people or philosophers -  ask questions about the extent of 
human knowledge, the reality of free will and the nature of happiness, we must as-
sume that the meanings of these words are to be understood in accordance with their 
ordinary use. And even if these meanings are set aside in the course of a philoso-
pher’s discussions, they cannot be altogether disregarded. At least the philosopher 
should be able to tell us why the ordinary meanings were set aside, and how the an-
swers that he proceeds to offer are related to the original questions with the original 
(ordinary) meanings.2  
 
  We will have more to say later in this introductory section about ordinary language.   
  In this work we will analyse the different meanings of the everyday expression of 
maturity and other related everyday expressions: morality, sympathy, autonomy, 
and mature judgement. As a name for the everyday meanings of expressions we will 
make use of the expression common sense. 
  ‘Common sense’ can be used in different ways. It can mean a basic human reason or 
understanding, as in the German gesunder Menschenverstand, which is the way of rea-
soning of ‘the plain man’, unschooled in logical thinking and unbiased by scientific 
standpoints and by ideological concerns. Further, instead of such a basic human rea-
son, it can mean most men’s moral intuitions: Without having reflected on a certain 
matter, something can seem obviously morally right or wrong to one, like a certain 
distribution of goods, or the killing of an innocent person. Thirdly, it can mean the 
actual moral views currently held by most people in a community.  
  But when it comes to important moral questions like abortion, euthanasia, or capital 
punishment, most people tend to become confused and insecure, which shows that 
they are not really sure of their own moral views. And people’s current views con-
cerning morality are easily influenced by the way information is presented through 
newspapers, television, etc., and they tend to change very rapidly, and it is also un-
certain whose moral views are to be considered as representing ‘common sense’ – are 
we to include the views of children, of people who are old and confused, of crimi-
nals, of political extremists and of religious fundamentalists, and of people suffering 
from various forms of mental illness? These objections are valid also concerning 
                                                 
2 Hanfling, Philosophy and Ordinary Language pp. 4-5. 
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moral intuition: What ‘we’, i.e., people in general, find morally right or wrong at a 
first glance, before having considered the matter thoroughly, is a product not only of 
our upbringing but also of current influence by authorities. And the reasoning of the 
‘plain man’, although being based on an immediate experience of everyday moral 
issues, tends to be burdened with prejudices and generally with unreflected dogmas 
inherited from parents and other authorites due to personal relations. 
  In this work we will use ‘common sense’ not in the meaning of a basic human rea-
son, nor as moral intuition, nor as the actual views of most men, but instead in the 
meaning of the ways in which the expressions are used in daily speech, which de-
termines their everyday meanings. The expressions relevant for the study are used in 
the way in which the author understands their use in everyday life today, and in 
such a way that no pretentious theoretical assumptions are connected to these uses 
prior to the analysis.  
  Usually we have no difficulties in using a certain expression correctly, i.e., in the 
right context, which means that we understand what the expression means in a prac-
tical sense. But when it comes to explaining what the expression means, i.e., how it is 
actually used, we easily become confused, which shows that although we are able to 
use the expression correctly, we are not aware of its exact meaning. This is not at all 
surprising, since our everyday expressions are vague, i.e., they have many different 
meanings, which can even be contradictory, since some of the different meanings of 
an expression may exclude other meanings. As we will see, ‘maturity’ is used both as 
the moral development at a certain stage of life, which means that there are different 
kinds of maturity, one for each stage, and as meaning mental adulthood as such, 
where maturity is just one. And we tend to use ‘autonomy’ as the capacity to care for 
oneself which makes it possible for one to fulfil one’s social tasks, one’s role in soci-
ety, instead of just living from others, and this we consider a good thing, but we also 
use ‘autonomy’ in the meaning of being able to question one’s social roles and the 
tasks which these roles imply, and this may mean questioning one’s own responsibil-
ity and therewith one’s social ties to other people: to family members, to friends, to 
working colleagues, etc., which may prove to be a danger to others.  
  A philosophical analysis of common sense in this sense may raise the question how 
such an enterprise relates to the philosophical tradition from the 20th Century which 
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is called ‘ordinary language philosophy’. The term is mainly associated with the so-
called Oxford School of philosophy which existed mainly during the 1950s and 
1960s. We will use Hanfling’s exposition of ordinary language philosophy from his 
Philosophy and Ordinary Language. 
  Hanfling uses the term in a wider sense than just as meaning the philosophical 
method used by Austin, Ryle, and others; he does not hesitate to include the later 
Wittgenstein, and he defends this kind of philosophy as being highly valid today, 
and he uses it himself to criticise theories put forward by Quine, Putnam, and 
Kripke.  
  Hanfling identifies ordinary language philosophy with what he calls ‘linguistic phi-
losophy’, which is the investigation into ‘what we say’:3 
The typical method of linguistic philosophy is… to compare the use of it [an expres-
sion] with claims or assumptions that have been made.4 
 
  Concerning the question how the ordinary language philosopher can know what 
we actually say in ordinary life, Hanfling claims that our knowledge of words such 
as ‘know’, ‘free’, ‘think’, or ‘cause’ is participatory: We participate with others in the 
activity of using the words, and each of us is subject to pressure coming from the 
others to normalise his or her usage if he or she uses words abnormally. This means 
that language is constantly fine-tuned in interaction with others: 
Being himself a speaker of the language, the philosopher already knows what the 
word in question means; hence his position, unlike that of an empirical researcher, 
cannot be one of ‘finding out’. The answer he seeks is one that – in a sense – he knows 
already. What he is trying to find out – or rather, to find – is a formulation of his 
knowledge: a statement of the conditions under which the word is used by those, in-
cluding himself, who know how to use it.5 
 
  Hanfling speaks of making explicit a kind of knowledge that is constantly being en-
acted in practise. The philosopher’s task is not to point out individual usages which 
differ from person to person or from one locality to another, but instead features of 
                                                 
3 Hanfling, Philosophy and Ordinary Language p. 143. 
4 ibid. p. 60. 
5 ibid. pp. 57-58. 
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language that all participants can recognise. When the question is about the meaning 
of a word, and the word belongs to a language that the enquirer shares with his inter-
locutors, the enquirer is not in the position of finding out; the way to find out indi-
vidual usages is empirical, for example by using questionnaires. Hanfling thereby 
distinguishes philosophical from empirical enquiry. The conceptual kind of enquiry 
is the province of philosophers, not of empirical linguists, he says.6 
  Still, today the use of the term ‘ordinary language philosophy’ is very strongly asso-
ciated with the Oxford School. Nowadays there is no such school of philosophy, and 
this with good reason, since there are clear limits to the method of ordinary language 
philosophy. 
  Hanfling admits that ordinary language philosophy has but a limited and indirect 
application on the philosophy of science and of mathematics, in which considerations 
of the language of science and of mathematics take priority over that of ordinary life, 
although an enquiry into how these uses of language are related to those of ordinary 
life may still be of interest. Further, for evaluating arguments, a comparison of prem-
ise and conclusion is required rather than reflection on the meanings of words. This 
means that disputes concerning the validity of arguments cannot be solved by the 
method of ordinary language philosophy. And thirdly, ordinary language philoso-
phy is not applicable on the area of meta-philosophy, i.e., philosophising about phi-
losophy itself. The claim that the question about knowledge, for example, is essen-
tially about language and to be tested by reference to what we say cannot itself be 
tested by reference to what we say, Hanfling says.7 
  Philosophy cannot make a halt at the everyday use of expressions and be content 
with just studying these uses. As we have noted, everyday language is often vague 
and therefore confusing. Hanfling points to one of the problems with our everyday 
semantic practice: 
The word ‘rights’ has recently become prominent in moral discourse, where it is often 
used freely in any situation in which there is, in the moral sense, right and wrong. 
Such expressions as ‘animal rights’, ‘children’s rights’, and ‘human rights’ are some-
times used in this way. But to this usage it may be objected that the word has, or 
                                                 
6 Hanfling, Philosophy and Ordinary Language pp. 58-59. 
7 ibid. pp. 5-6. 
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originally had, a more specific meaning, involving certain kinds of moral obligations 
as distinct from others. (Typical examples are those in which a right is bestowed, by, 
say, a promise or a legal enactment.) If the word is applied more loosely, then, it is 
argued, moral perception may be distorted and inappropriate reasons given for what 
ought or ought not to be done. Now this is a contentious matter, which cannot be 
cleared up simply by asking people what they mean; and neither, of course, can it be 
settled by describing how the word is used in ordinary language, for the objector will 
claim that ordinary language – what has now become an ordinary use of ‘rights’ – is 
here at fault.8 
 
  Hanfling claims that in discussing this issue, we would certainly have to consider 
what one would say if an alleged right were challenged, comparing different utter-
ances involving claims to rights. This may lead one to give names to different kinds 
of rights, which would mean introducing a terminology. 
  But it is doubtful whether this is enough for obtaining full clarity in moral delibera-
tion. Certainly philosophers are right not only in introducing new terms for familiar 
uses of words, but also in re-defining familiar expressions. These new definitions 
may become generally accepted not only by other philosophers but with the time 
also by ordinary people, which would mean that our everyday language would in-
crease in clarity.  
  This is a foundational work on the problem of maturity, building on no previous 
philosophical analyses dedicated especially to a study of this concept, and as such we 
will confine ourselves to a study of common sense. And according to the way we 
have chosen to use the expression common sense, this means that it is a study of the 
meanings of certain expressions in everyday language today. In addition we will 
analyse the semantic relations of these expressions due to their different meanings.  
  We will offer no new philosophical theory, and we will make no metaphysical 
claims. We will not claim that there ‘is’ maturity, and consequently we will not claim 
that there are mature human beings, nor that there ‘is’ such a thing as a mature 
judgement or a mature action. This work is no study of phenomenal objects and their 
                                                 
8 Hanfling, Philosophy and Ordinary Language pp. 2-3. 
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causal connections, but of the logic of linguistic expressions, of their meanings and 
their semantic connections. 
  However this does not mean that this study can be said to continue the tradition of 
the Oxford School, and thus to be a work in ordinary language philosophy. Unlike 
Hanfling, we will not use the method of ordinary language philosophy to criticise 
any academic philosophers. Our hope is that what we have to say here may serve as 
a starting-point for further philosophical thought, which may well result in defini-
tions which are more exact than the everyday uses of these expressions allow for, 
which means going beyond the method of ordinary language philosophy. This hope 
clashes with the intentions of ordinary language philosophy. In his essay Ifs and Cans, 
printed in Philosophical Papers, Austin writes: 
In the history of human inquiry, philosophy has the place of the initial central sun, 
seminal and tumultuous: from time to time it throws off some portion of itself to take 
station as a science, a planet, cool and well regulated, progressing steadily towards a 
distant final state. This happened long ago at the birth of mathematics, and again at 
the birth of physics: only in the last century we have witnessed the same process once 
again, slow and at the time almost imperceptible, in the birth of the science of 
mathematical logic, through the joint labours of philosophers and mathematicians. Is 
it not possible that the next century may see the birth, through the joint labours of 
philosophers, grammarians, and numerous other students of language, of a true and 
comprehensive science of language? Then we shall have rid ourselves of one more part 
of philosophy (there will still be plenty left) in the only way we ever can get rid of 
philosophy, by kicking it upstairs.9 
 
  Surely such a ‘science of language’, being empirical, would mean something quite 
different than offering exact definitions of everyday expressions. 
  For these reasons we will not use the term ‘ordinary language’ in this study, but 
instead ‘everyday language’ or ‘daily language’, although meaning the same as ‘or-
dinary language’ as the expression is used by Hanfling.  
  In this work we will analyse the ways in which the expressions ‘morality’, ‘matur-
ity’, ‘sympathy’, ‘autonomy’, and ‘mature judgement’ are used in daily language, 
and we will concentrate on certain uses of these expressions which are of special in-
                                                 
9 Austin, Philosophical Papers p. 232. 
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terest to our project, namely to show the nature and moral relevance of the everyday 
expression of maturity. We will show that certain uses of ‘maturity’ are connected to 
certain uses of these other expressions, and that this points to the semantic connecti-
ons between the everyday expressions of maturity and of morality. This will make it 
clear that a certain use of the expression ‘sympathy’ is connected to a certain use of 
the expression ‘autonomy’, which is connected to a certain use of ‘mature judge-
ment’. We will analyse the common sense expression of maturity in terms of an 
autonomy formed by sympathy, which can be interpreted as a morally relevant 
autonomy, one that gives a competence in judging and in acting well morally. 
  Referring to philosophical definitions of sympathy, autonomy, and moral judge-
ment will help clarify how we use these expressions in daily language, and it will 
also help clarifying certain semantic connections between these everyday expres-
sions. We will examine what the classics – Aristotle, Hume, and Kant - have to say, as 
well as some of the arguments made by modern authors. But since this is a work on 
common sense, we will refer to philosophical definitions only as far as this can help 
us in our task of clarifying common sense, and we will not argue against any phi-
losophical positions. 
  The philosophical achievement of this work will be having clarified the meanings of 
the everyday expressions of morality, maturity, sympathy, autonomy, and mature 
judgement, and having pointed out certain semantic connections between these ex-
pressions, of which people may not be aware, although they are fully capable of us-
ing these expressions correctly in different contexts. Pointing out the different mean-
ings of these everyday expressions and certain of their semantic connections may 
give a deeper understanding of the ways in which we use these expressions and of 
their importance to our daily moral practice. This may not only help clarifying the 
way we reason concerning morality: Not only offering new definitions of well-
known expressions can change the way we reason and express ourselves concerning 
morality; such a project as that which we will undertake, of clarifying common sense, 
may also change our way of reasoning and expressing ourselves for the benefit of 
greater exactness, which would change the everyday meanings of these expressions. 
  Although it may be difficult to grasp the exact meaning of maturity in daily lan-
guage, its use is not very problematic, and people clearly mean similar things when 
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talking about maturity. According to the way we use the expression, maturity is 
something which is good and valuable. It refers to some kind of norm to which we 
are expected to conform; one ought to be mature, and we blame someone for not be-
ing mature, and praise others for being mature. According to Coan in his Hero, Artist, 
Sage, or Saint? A Survey of Views on what is Variously Called Mental Health, Normality, 
Maturity, Self-actualization, and Human Fulfillment, the conception of maturity found 
in classical psychology – Freud, Jung, Erikson, Fromm, and others - is based on two 
traditions: the Judaeo-Christian love ethic, with the ideal of the humanitarian or al-
truist who is devoted to the welfare of others, and who is showing social concern and 
social competence, i.e., being able to relate successfully to others; and the individual-
istic tradition in the West from the Renaissance onward, with the ideal of the objec-
tive scientist or creative artist, characterised by intellectual competence, independ-
ence, emotional self-control, perseverance, and productivity.10 We will show that 
these two traditions join in the common sense expression of maturity as an autonomy 
formed by sympathy.  
  We use the expressions ‘morality’, ‘maturity’, ‘sympathy’, and ‘autonomy’ in a so-
cial context. ‘Morality’ as the expression is used in daily language connotes different 
conceptions of how to live as to support other individuals both directly, in personal 
intercourse, and indirectly by supporting society as a whole for the sake of its mem-
bers. ‘Maturity’ in the moral sphere in the everyday meaning of the word, as distin-
guished for example from aesthetic maturity, is a quality which gives the competence 
to live according to morality. ‘Sympathy’ means taking an interest in others and ex-
periencing friendly feelings, which provides the agent with the means to a life ac-
cording to morality. ‘Autonomy’ as influence and thus as authority over oneself 
gives one the capacity to form one’s life in a social sphere, in a community of people, 
and an autonomy formed by sympathy gives one the capacity to form one’s life ac-
cording to morality. 
  The basic claim in this work will be that maturity can be described as an autonomy 
formed by sympathy. Autonomy we will describe as authority over one’s self, where 
the self consists of the mind as well as of the body, and where authority over this self 
means executing an overriding influence over oneself, thus dominating oneself. This 
                                                 
10 Coan, Hero, Artist, Sage, or Saint? p. 76. 
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authority over oneself is made possible as well as limited by sympathy in a certain 
meaning of the everyday expression of the word, namely what we will here choose to 
call a continuous, universal sympathy, directed towards all other men, consisting 
mainly of a certain mental attitude and of certain feelings, which allow for a morally 
relevant knowledge and which motivate one to use one’s authority over oneself in 
the service of morality, in the ordinary sense of this expression. Thus an autonomy 
formed by a universal sympathy means dominating oneself with the aim of living 
according to morality, and this is what we mean by the expression maturity in eve-
ryday language. This allows for a competence in making mature judgements, which 
are good moral judgements which may lay claim to a certain objectivity, which 
means that they are trustworthy, that one has good reasons to assume them to be 
correct, and in acting accordingly.  Good moral judgements are judgements which 
when acted on realise the aims of morality in the everyday sense, i.e., the good of 
others and the stability and thus permanence of society for the sake of all its mem-
bers. 
 
 
MORALITY AND MORAL JUDGEMENT 
We will have to further clarify what we mean by morality in everyday language to-
day. Aristotle’s approach to morality in the Nicomachean Ethics, of declaring his pro-
ject to be to find out what is best for man and how to obtain this for oneself, may 
make us modern readers confused. Aristotle’s ethics contains two aspects which are 
both highly controversial today; first, his defence of self-love, and second, his claim 
that the ultimate aim of the good man’s, the man with excellence of character (ηθικη 
αρετη), acting is his own self-fulfilment (ευδαιμονια). Aristotle states that everyone 
most of all wishes what is good for him- or herself, and since a man is his own best 
friend, he ought to love himself the most. Aristotle’s morally good man loves himself 
because he loves his intellect (νους). For Aristotle, the intellect or human reason is the 
highest or best part of man, and for this reason it is man’s true self. The good man 
gratifies his true self, which means that he wishes and does what is good for himself. 
In fact this means acting morally, since in doing so, the good man secures the highest 
good for himself, which is his self-fulfilment, which is social in character. Thus al-
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though the good man supports others, the ultimate motivation for his moral acting is 
his own good. This points to the whole Aristotelian approach to morality: All men 
aim at what they believe to be the supreme good for themselves, but the opinions 
differ concerning the nature of this supreme good. The task of ethics is to clarify what 
is best for people themselves and how to obtain this. Morality ultimately is a means 
to one’s own self-fulfilment. 
  Aristotle defends his position with the argument that good deeds are always re-
warded in some way, so that one always has personal reasons to act in a way that 
supports others, and that therefore his good man is always useful to society:  
Hence those who are exceptionally devoted to the performance of fine actions receive 
the approval and commendation of all. And if everyone were striving for what is fine, 
and trying his hardest to do the finest deeds, then both the public welfare would be 
truly served, and each individual would enjoy the greatest of goods, since virtue 
[αρετη] is of this kind. So it is right for the good man to be self-loving, because then 
he will both be benefited himself by performing fine actions, and also help others.11 
 
  We should not forget that what is best, including most pleasant, for the Aristotelian 
good man is exercising his excellence of character, not obtaining external goods. Of 
course Aristotle’s good man is not a direct egoist who is prepared to treat others 
badly to secure wealth and fame for himself. The direct egoist is the bad man, who in 
fact will harm not only others but eventually also himself by his acting. 
Aristotle’s morally good man certainly will be of great use for the city-state in sup-
porting its citizens. So why be upset about the ultimate aim of his actions, since this 
aim motivates him to do good to others? Undoubtedly life in the city-state would be 
much more pleasant to most people if people would consciously try to follow A-
ristotle’s advice, pleasant not only to the followers themselves but also to those who 
would not care for Aristotle and his theory. But still we are left with the feeling that 
the morally bad man, the direct egoist, is in possession of a kind of naïve honesty 
which the morally good man lacks, since he does not conceal his selfishness in the 
way the good man does. The fact that the good man is always ultimately working for 
his own highest good may make us feel uneasy, since we know that the ultimate rea-
                                                 
11 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1169a7-13. 
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son for his helping us is because it helps himself, and if something else would help 
him better, he would not help us. This points to the fact that the good man does not 
act out of the right reasons, which makes it obvious to us that the Aristotelian ‘ethics’, 
as it is usually called by philosophers today, is no ethics, no moral philosophy, in our 
modern sense of the word. Barnes says in his introduction to the Nicomachean Ethics: 
[T]he Ethics is not primarily or directly about moral philosophy: first, the chief end of 
the Ethics is to discover and delienate the life and character not of the morally good 
man, but of the man who is an expert human, successful and fulfilled qua man; and 
secondly, the most perfect human fulfilment is found to lie not in moral action at all 
but in intellectual contemplation – morality is, so to speak, a pis aller; we should fol-
low it only insofar as we cannot travel the high road of thought.12 
 
  Human fulfilment is a possible conception of what might be called ‘personal matur-
ity’: In this perspective, a mature man is a person who fulfils himself, and conse-
quently all who fulfil themselves are mature. But can one’s own personal fulfilment 
serve as the ultimate standard for morality? Somehow we who live today find such a 
claim dissatisfying: Moral maturity must consist in something more than just fulfill-
ing oneself, although the process of fulfilling oneself may well prove to be – indi-
rectly and incidentally - helpful to others. And it is by no means certain that self-
fulfilment is so strongly connected to morality as Aristotle suggests: According to the 
way we use the expression ‘self-fulfilment’ today, it means procuring for oneself 
things like pleasure, feeling secure and well, cultivating one’s interests, and experi-
encing that what one does is important to one and that it makes sense. 
  A different conception of morality, one which is not based on self-fulfilment, is pre-
sented by Habermas. We will here discuss his thoughts as they are put forward in his 
Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik. 
  Habermas defines morality as a defence system which compensates for a vulner-
ability which is built into the socio-cultural forms of life. Morality must secure both 
the individual’s integrity (Unantastbarkeit) and the stability of the mutual relations 
between the members of society, since the persons can stabilise their vulnerable iden-
                                                 
12 Barnes, Introduction p. 40. In the Politics (1324a28) Aristotle says explicitly that a purely intellectual 
(θεωρετικος) life is devoid of all activity directed outwards. 
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tities only in co-operation with others. This demands respect for their dignity, i.e., 
equal respect and equal rights for all – Habermas also speaks of respect for their 
autonomy - and further that their intersubjective relations of mutual acceptance 
through which they preserve themselves as belonging to society are protected. This 
requires solidarity on the part of the individuals as members of a community, and 
this solidarity refers to the good of the other members, their weal and woe (Wohlerge-
hen), and to the preservation of this form of life of intersubjective relations. Practi-
cally this requires the overcoming of one’s egocentric perspective, and the acceptance 
of all of this solidarity. Both these aspects, the rights of the individual and the good of 
the community, are motivated by the vulnerability of persons. Men individuate 
themselves, become individuals, through their socialisation, and thus caring for the 
good of one’s neighbour and caring for the good of the community (das allgemeine 
Wohl) are connected, and morality must secure both aspects. And Habermas claims 
that it is possible to respect everyone’s interests without tearing apart the social bond 
which connects each person with all the others: Our moral intuitions inform us how 
we shall act for working against the extreme vulnerability of persons.13 
  According to the way we commonly use the expression today, morality means a 
system of views concerning how to behave as to support other individuals according 
to their needs and wishes, with the aim of securing mutual support for the members 
of a community. It is not as strongly oriented towards the vulnerability of persons as 
Habermas’s ethics is. Morality today prescribes supporting others for their sake, and 
not, not even indirectly, for one’s own sake. It concerns one’s behaviour towards 
other people only, and thus it does not give any guidelines concerning self-support. 
The probable reason is that people tend to support themselves anyway, and so there 
is no need for any moral obligations to support oneself. Morality concerns one’s 
treatment of oneself only in so far as this treatment may violate any direct responsi-
bilities which one has for other people. Such responsibilities are dependent on prom-
ises and on human relationships, for example on parenthood. Thus we would not use 
the expression of morality in the case of a person ruining his own life, calling him 
‘immoral’, with the exception of a case where the person has made a promise not to 
ruin his life, or when ruining his life makes it impossible for him to take care of his 
                                                 
13 Habermas, Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik pp. 14-16, 70. 
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children or other close relatives, for whom he is thought to be responsible without 
having made any promises. The same holds true concerning self-mutilation or sui-
cide. This means that one cannot act ‘morally’ or ‘immorally’ towards oneself. With 
such a conception of morality, the ultimate standard for moral maturity cannot be a 
self-related phenomenon like self-fulfilment or authenticity; it must be directly, not 
only indirectly, related to other people.  
  Thus, and contrary to Aristotle, ‘morality’, as we use the expression in everyday 
language, is exclusively concerned with one’s behaviour towards others, either di-
rectly, or indirectly: directly for example in helping another person who is about to 
drown; indirectly by providing persons with the means to their own self-fulfilment 
and by removing obstacles to this aim. This means that whereas Aristotle would say 
that one shall be moral for the sake of fulfilling oneself, the way we use the expres-
sion morality today indicates that one shall be moral for the sake of supporting oth-
ers. 
  Morality demands that we consider the good of all men when making a moral 
judgement. Primarily this means the persons directly affected, secondarily all present 
and even future members of society. Indirect support of all present and even future 
members of society, by providing others with the means to their own self-fulfilment 
and by removing obstacles to this aim, includes supporting institutions which are 
needed for the order and thus stability and therewith permanence of society. This 
means that similarly to Habermas, morality demands not only taking the persons 
involved in the actual situation into regard, but also the community of men, what is 
good for society as a whole. Long-term support of other individuals requires perma-
nence and prosperity of society, and this requires taking the laws of the state and the 
customs of society into consideration when making a moral judgement. Promise-
keeping and truth-telling, for example, may gain in importance when considering the 
preservation of society for the sake of its members. This implies that morality re-
spects people’s preferences as long as these do not clearly endanger the persons 
themselves or other persons or the whole of society. 
  But although morality, according to the way we use the expression in daily lan-
guage, demands of us to act in favour of others, instead of acting in favour of our-
selves, still it does not demand of us that we ruin or destroy our own lives in order to 
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assist others. No-one would call a man who refused to sacrifice his own life ‘im-
moral’. Instead, morality demands of us only to fulfil certain minimal criteria of good 
citizenship in the everyday sense of the expression; of not harming others through 
physical or mental violence, of helping fellow citizens in need, and, as we have 
noted, of supporting the possibilities of self-fulfilment for all present and future 
members of society. Morality in the everyday sense of the word allows for taking 
care of oneself to a certain extent, to protect one’s own life and to pursue one’s own 
self-fulfilment to a certain extent, which means that morality allows for a certain 
prudence in the everyday sense, i.e., deliberating on and acting for one’s own good. 
This means that although heroic actions, notably of self-sacrifice, are not forbidden 
by morality, they clearly are beyond what morality demands. 
  Whereas Aristotle does not distinguish between prudential and moral judgements, 
since Aristotelian prudence is an excellence of character, i.e., a moral quality, and 
since the ultimate aim of moral deliberation is to support oneself in the best possible 
way, the everyday meaning of ‘moral judgement’ today as meaning a particular 
moral judgement differs not only from what we commonly mean with a factual 
judgement, but also from what we mean with a prudential judgement. The factual 
judgement just states what is the case, whereas the prudential judgement says what 
is good for oneself, which is an evaluation, and what one should do to obtain this 
good, which is a normative statement; the particular moral judgement finally says 
what is good or bad for others, or what is right or wrong, either generally or in a spe-
cific situation, or which rights people have or do not have (an evaluation), and/or 
what ought or ought not to be done (a normative statement). 
  The moral judgement may but must not say who is to act. A good moral judgement 
tells one how to support other people, directly or indirectly, and what is good for a 
person is basically what keeps him alive and what makes his life worth living to him-
self, which is his own self-fulfilment. Of course this tends to vary between people 
depending on what they think is important to themselves, but in fact people tend to 
want much the same things; and we have already explained the everyday expression  
of self-fulfilment as being connected to pleasure, feeling secure and well, cultivating 
one’s interests, and experiencing that what one does is important to one and that it 
makes sense. Morality aims at securing the possibilities for individual self-fulfilment, 
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in intercourse with others, making life worth living to everyone in society. We are 
not always ourselves the best judges of what keeps us alive, and we are not even al-
ways the best judges of what makes our lives worth living, since we may have for-
gotten or simply neglect considering what is important to us, while others may be 
aware of this and being prepared to support us with it, and when we receive it, we 
feel joyful, relieved, satisfied etc. If we do not react positively in any way at all, then 
this something does not make our lives worth living, although it may be something 
which most people enjoy. This means that although we may not ourselves know 
what makes our lives worth living, what makes our lives worth living is still de-
pendent on what we like when we actually experience things. After having suffered 
a considerable brain damage through an accident, a person of 40 can take pleasure in 
playing with dolls, and although we may pity him or her, thinking that a person of 
his or her age ought to engage in more meaningful activities which would give him 
or her a deeper sense of satisfaction, we must admit that playing with dolls is what 
makes his or her life worth living in his or her present condition since this is what he 
or she enjoys doing, and so we should provide him or her with dolls, even if between 
his or her playing sessions he or she cannot remember having been playing with 
dolls, so that he or she is only aware of the fact that he or she enjoys this activity 
when he or she is actually engaging in it. This means that a person with enough psy-
chological insight will know what makes the lives of others worth living to them, a 
knowledge which may be used in moral judgement-making.  
  
 
STAGE THEORIES AND WHY THEY FAIL 
In everyday language we use the expression maturity both in the meaning of mental 
adulthood as such, and as related to a certain biological age, with a different kind of 
maturity for each age group. For example there can be a maturity of childhood, an-
other of adolescence, a third of adulthood, and a fourth of old age, and a person is 
called mature if he reasons and behaves in a way which could be expected from 
someone of his own age group. Persons are thus to fulfil certain age-specific criteria 
for passing as mature. But we also seem to relate our everyday conception of matur-
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ity to how we expect a mentally adult person to be, which is not directly age-specific: 
We tend to imagine an ideal man or woman who fulfils certain criteria. 
  When we say that a person behaves in a mature way, we mean that he or she be-
haves in a way which we expect either from a person of his or her own age or from 
someone who is biologically older than the agent him- or herself, or which we expect 
from a mental adult in general; when we say that a person behaves in an immature 
way, we mean that he or she violates certain basic demands which we make either on 
a person of his or her own biological age, or on a mental adult in general. With a con-
cept of maturity relative to age, children can be mature in the meaning of being intel-
lectually and emotionally more developed than what can be expected of children of 
their age; in the meaning of mental adulthood, of course children cannot be mature at 
all. We will see that it is not possible to construct a stage theory of moral develop-
ment and thus of moral maturity relative to age defined by the contents of different 
stages, which can be confirmed in psychological examinations where all persons ex-
amined can be assigned a stage with full certainty, and such theories also fail to give 
a convincing description of the character of moral development as such, i.e. how de-
velopment takes place from one stage to another. This means that the expression 
‘stage of life’ is vague and that it cannot be used convincingly in academic psychol-
ogy to describe the maturity of human beings. In the light of such difficulties it seems 
more fruitful to analyse maturity in the meaning of mental adulthood. 
  We will examine the most famous stage theory of moral development, namely that 
of Kohlberg, and we will show why the concept of stage of life cannot be given an 
adequate explanation. 
  In his The Philosophy of Moral Development. Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice, Kohl-
berg distinguishes between three phases, the pre-conventional, the conventional, and 
the post-conventional.14 Each phase contains two stages. In the pre-conventional 
phase, stage one means that the agent is oriented towards punishment and obedi-
ence. The agent acknowledges only the literal meaning of the moral demand, not its 
meaning or function. Might is right, and to be good means to obey. On stage two, the 
agent is directed towards instrumental goals and interchange. Here morality is a 
question of doing people services for the sake of getting favours in return. The aim is 
                                                 
14 Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development pp. 51-54. 
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the satisfaction of one’s own needs, but the other person’s right to satisfaction is ac-
knowledged. In the conventional phase, the first stage means a concentration on in-
terpersonal expectations, relations, and conformity. The agent is characterised by a 
turning towards other people, and by wanting to fulfil the needs and wishes of oth-
ers. Confidence, respect and gratitude in relations are keywords, and the other per-
son is now regarded as a subject. On the next stage, the agent is directed towards the 
preservation of the social system. He or she entertains a conscious relation to the so-
cial order. Institutions are regarded as norms, and the other is now the system. The 
keyword is respect for the law. In the last phase, the post-conventional, the first stage 
means that the agent formulates a social contract. The agent now has attained an 
even wider social perspective. This is the situation of the law-giving subject, con-
scious of concrete demands as well as of wider social requirements of society as a 
whole. The final stage means that the agent formulates universal moral principles. 
On this highest possible stage of human moral development we will find persons like 
Martin Luther King and Mahatma Gandhi, people who proclaim universal principles 
which give a motivation for the contract ethics of the previous stage. In practice, this 
highest kind of ethics is characterised by the taking over of roles: The agent imagines 
him- or herself as being in the roles of each of the persons in the situation, taking 
equal notice to the demands of each, and acting as if he or she had no knowledge of 
which person he or she actually were in the situation. The morality on the post-
conventional stages is not supported by society, which makes it more difficult to at-
tain. 
  There are a great number of other stage theories. One of the more well-known is 
that of Erikson as put forward in his Childhood and Society, where the stages are basic 
trust, autonomy, initiative, industry, identity, intimacy, generativity (by which Erik-
son means productivity or creativity), and ego integrity. Ego integrity includes all the 
earlier qualities, but primarily implies a sense of meaning and acceptance of one’s 
life, Erikson says: 
It is the ego’s accrued assurance of its proclivity for order and meaning. It is a post-
narcissistic love of the human ego… as an experience which conveys some world or-
der and spiritual sense, no matter how dearly paid for. It is the acceptance of one’s 
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one and only life cycle as something that had to be and that, by necessity, permitted 
of no substitutions…15  
 
  Unfortunately, there are a lot of problems with the stage theories. Kohlberg’s own 
theory was not supported even by his own examinations: On the Turkish country-
side, no results above stage 4 could be established,16 and stage 6 could not be verified 
in any of Kohlberg’s examinations.17 In later life, Kohlberg chose to abandon both 
stages 5 and 6 as the goal of education, and confined himself to an educational aim 
on stage 4: People should be educated to becoming good citizens.18 
  In her Ego Development: Conceptions and Theories, Loevinger discusses the 
psychological concept of ’ego development’ or ’character development’, which she 
claims to be the same as moral development in ethics. According to Loevinger, the 
defenders of stage theories of moral development want to assume one single source 
for all the suggested developmental sequences, thus claiming that all stage theories 
give their own versions of one single developmental sequence, but there is no crucial 
evidence for the postulate of one single source.19 Though of course there are similari-
ties between the theories, they also differ in important respects, and the choice of cri-
teria for the stages is highly subjective. It is difficult to compare different stage theo-
ries, since it is difficult to say how the stages in one theory are related to the stages in 
another theory. The so-called ages are theoretical constructions; in practical life there 
is no sharp line between childhood and adolescence or between adolescence and 
adulthood. Humans continuously change, and they act differently from time to time, 
whereas the stage theories are static and imply a permanence that does not exist. In 
tests of so-called ego development, a kind of stage theories which come close to those 
of moral development, results give at hand that there are no absolutely certain signs 
of any stage, only probabilistic ones, and a certain behaviour may reflect more than 
one kind of development. Everyone displays behaviour at more than one stage.20 
                                                 
15 Erikson, Childhood and Society p. 268. 
16 Garz, Lawrence Kohlberg zur Einführung p. 98. 
17 ibid. p. 62. 
18 ibid. p. 127. 
19 Loevinger, Ego Development pp. 187-188. 
20 ibid. pp. 183-184. 
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What Loevinger does not mention in her study but which is still of relevance to us 
here is that the norm is unclear: Some people are late in their intellectual and emo-
tional development, some are very early. Should we base our model on those who 
are the most developed in a certain ‘age’, or on the average? If we choose the first 
alternative, only very few will fulfil the requirements; if we choose the second, we 
have to decide what to do with those who are vastly ‘before their age’ in mental de-
velopment and thus do not correspond to the model, since they have already left this 
‘stage’, that is, they have fulfilled the requirements for higher stages. If the maturity 
of adolescence is, say, to create an identity of one’s own, then we will certainly have 
some problems with a 17 year-old who does not consider this since he or she is occu-
pied with taking care of his or her offspring and fulfilling his or her responsibilities 
as a company worker and in his or her other social relationships, which some psy-
chologists would probably describe as the central questions of adulthood. 
  According to Loevinger, difficult cases have been treated differently by different 
theorists; some have broadened their definitions of the stages, others have postulated 
substages, but most of the researchers have simply ignored the problem. If everyone, 
without exception, shall be assigned just one stage, then the stages must be given an 
abstract, not specific meaning, and things that are different must be treated as 
equivalent. The so-called Conformist Stage for example can be defined as including 
all those for whom conformity or nonconformity is the central issue of life. Then the 
Bohemian who tries to be nonconformist will appear at this stage.21 The problem 
with this kind of solution is of course that one broadens the concepts until they are 
too broad to be practically useful, and the move from one stage to another turns into 
a very wide leap. If one introduces more stages or substages, it is difficult to know 
where to make a halt, since the substages could be further divided into second order 
substages, etc. More stages which are more specific only makes it more difficult to 
categorise a person on a certain stage concerning different questions and in different 
situations. The same person is scored on different stages for specific circumstances 
concerning things like impulse control, interpersonal relations, and conscious preoc-
cupations, for example at work and in private.22 And even with substages defined in 
                                                 
21 Loevinger, Ego Development p. 195. 
22 ibid. pp. 199-200. 
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detail, the problem remains how the stages are connected to each other, how one 
stage can lead to the next. This is possible only through abstractions, and it was to 
avoid abstractions that the substages were introduced. And how does the step from 
one stage to another takes place – as leaps, or continuously? Different analyses of the 
same test material show both continuity and discontinuity. A person's behaviour 
cannot reflect stages that have not yet been reached. Does the next stage represent a 
latent ability? There is no consensus among the researchers concerning substages, 
even less than concerning the main stages.23 
Another possibility mentioned by Loevinger is that all persons represent all stages 
in their mental lives but that some characteristics, the criteria of a certain stage, cur-
rently dominate in a certain person. Development then means that other psychologi-
cal entities become dominant, which means that one fulfils other criteria.24 But it is 
doubtful whether even this can be said to make justice to the complexity and subtlety 
of human psychology (apart from the fact that ‘stage’ here has a very odd meaning); 
perhaps two or more criteria dominate, from different stages. Yet another concept 
type sees the stage in terms of the core functioning of a structured or organised 
whole. This third conception is supported by the view of the ego as an organisation, 
of structural conceptions, or of the idea of equilibration, where there might be a cer-
tain divergence over or under the level of core functioning. Unfortunately the con-
cept ‘core function’ cannot be translated into a unique scoring algorithm, Loevinger 
says.25 
It is not possible to create a stage theory which satisfies all psychological research-
ers, one which contains stages which all would say correspond to real moral devel-
opment. Although it may seem reasonable to think that human moral development 
runs from selfishness, as intentionally working for one’s own good at the costs of 
others, over conventionalism as described by Kohlberg, related above, to a responsi-
ble autonomy, where one is able to reflect oneself on what is correct in a certain situa-
tion and to act accordingly, this scheme is much too simple. Different persons can 
develop intellectually and emotionally through different lines of development, some 
                                                 
23 Loevinger, Ego Development pp. 207, 209. 
24 ibid. p. 209. 
25 ibid. pp. 209-210. 
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through conventionalism, others through idealism and revolution and the disap-
pointment that follows. Most probably not even the developmental process of one 
man can be covered by one single stage theory. And some people continue to de-
velop mentally during their whole life, whereas others loose their mental flexibility, 
become more one-sided, even fanatical in their unwillingness to see and accept dif-
ferent possibilities, which may be seen both as a personal and as a moral failure. 
There is no general continuous development, and it is by no means certain that ma-
turity comes by itself with rising age without a conscious effort. 
  In addition, one may ask why one should strive to fulfil the criteria on one stage 
when one could strive to fulfil those on the next, or even those on the highest stage. 
And even if one possesses the virtue or principle on a certain stage and on earlier 
stages or in several spheres not hierarchically ordered, one cannot be said to be genu-
inely mature before having fulfilled all criteria, all aspects of maturity. According to 
the way we use the expression maturity in the meaning of mental adulthood, matur-
ity is just one, and forms a unity. But if only the persons on the highest stage can be 
considered mature, then the stage theories are useless. 
  This shows that the everyday expression of maturity as relative to age cannot be 
verified in psychological examinations; it does not allow for a clear description, but 
instead it must remain vague. But as we have noted, ‘maturity’ is also used in the 
meaning of mental adulthood as such.  
 
 
GOODNESS 
Now that we have chosen to analyse the everyday expression of maturity in terms of 
mental adulthood as such, we must examine in which way this expression differs 
from the everyday expression of goodness, which will help clarifying the everyday 
meaning of maturity as mental adulthood. 
  Aristotle’s theory of goodness will shed light on the different meanings of goodness 
as the expression is used today. 
  We have noted that Aristotle’s ethics is a theory of excellence of character, which 
means that it is a theory of the morally good man. The good man as presented to us 
in the Nicomachean Ethics is in possession of certain dispositions which make him per-
 27
form his function well, which means acting in the best way in the actual situation. 
Aristotle lists a number of such dispositions, intellectual and moral; the intellectual 
ones are dependent on instruction, the moral ones on habituation, and he claims the 
good man to have all of these. This means that Aristotle’s ethics is based on the indi-
vidual’s own moral competence rather than on general moral rules which are to be 
acted on by everyone. This competence, which is theoretical as well as practical – 
knowing what is good and judging how best to realise this good, and acting on this 
judgement - is dependent not on age but on training and on experience. 
  For Aristotle, the essence of being good or bad is doing right or wrong,26 which 
means that being good primarily means acting well, and so in the definition of good-
ness, acting is prior to knowing what is good and prior to judging what to do. On the 
other hand just incidentally or compulsively doing good does not mean being good. 
Goodness requires knowing what one is doing, i.e., having full knowledge of the ob-
ject involved, the action itself, and its result, and it requires acting with intention, and 
choosing what is good for its own sake.27 
  Aristotle assumes the existence of the good as an absolute value: What is by nature 
good is in itself good and pleasant to the good man, and the good man feels pleasure 
in the consciousness of what is in itself good, he says,28 and the good man wishes 
what is good as such, the true good, not simply the apparent good. The good man 
judges every situation correctly, and in every situation what appears to him is the 
truth.29 
  Aristotle’s concept of excellence of character or moral goodness is used in the mean-
ing of a moral efficiency, that is, judging and acting well morally, which means that it 
is a concept of goodness which is oriented towards success: The one who manages to 
live according to morality for the right reasons is a good man. We have already noted 
that Aristotle’s concept of moral goodness as the competence to fulfil oneself through 
social activities differs from the way we use ‘morality’ today, since today’s everyday 
expression of morality is exclusively concerned with one’s treatment of others. But 
there is yet another problem with Aristotle’s concept of moral goodness, namely the 
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27 ibid. 1105a30-32. 
28 ibid. 1170a14-15, b4-5. 
29 ibid. 1113a22-26, 29-33. 
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fact that Aristotelian moral goodness seems to be identical with technical goodness 
or skilfulness. In his introuction to the Nicomachean Ethics Barnes says:  
[M]oral goodness is treated as though it were a skill of some sort – a skill at being 
human --- [W]e might suppose that Aristotle is dealing, primarily, not with moral 
goodness but with human expertise or the technique of being a good man; the imme-
diate aim of the Ethics is to make us ‘good men’ – not morally good men, but expert 
or successful human beings.30  
 
  In daily language today we use the expression ‘good’ for people as such, for their 
intentions, for their different qualities, for their judgements, and for their actions. An 
act is called good if it is considered useful, either to oneself or to others. Intentions 
are called good if they aim at realising good, i.e., useful, actions for the sake of others, 
and a judgement if it correctly tells one how to perform such actions. 
  We have noted that Aristotelian goodness primarily connotes successful acting. To-
day what comes closest to Aristotle’s concept of moral goodness is the everyday ex-
pression of being a good citizen. The good citizen performs his social tasks as a 
member of the community: towards his family, his friends, his working colleagues, 
and towards other citizens with whom he is not acquainted, which means that like 
Aristotelian goodness, good citizenship too is oriented towards success, namely in 
performing one’s social tasks. 
  In everyday language, ‘rational’ means that something is appropriate, i.e., adapted, 
suited, to its purpose. A rational judgement in the everyday sense of the expression is 
a judgement which says how best to realise certain intentions, i.e., with the least ef-
fort, with the least risk of injury, and with the highest chance of success. The good 
citizen is rational in the sense of having a competence in fulfilling his social tasks, in 
judging and in acting according to what is demanded of him. Being a good citizen 
requires some reflection, on what is demanded of one and of what one must do to 
fulfil these demands, which means that it requires a certain understanding of priori-
ties, of who is in most need of support in the situation and of which action best 
serves the purpose of supporting the person who is in most need of help. But never-
theless good citizenship allows for a considerable degree of habituation: What counts 
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is successfully performing one’s social tasks, even if this is done unreflectedly and 
thus rather mechanically. 
  The everyday expression of good citizenship is connected to a certain meaning of 
the everyday expression of autonomy, namely in the basic sense of being able to care 
for oneself, to support oneself without the continuous help of others. This shows that 
the everyday expression of good citizenship is also connected to the everyday ex-
pression of prudence, in the meaning of judging correctly what is good for oneself 
and acting on this judgement. 
  The Aristotelian good man is not dependent on support from others, but still he is 
not autonomous in the wider sense of being able to choose the way he wants to be, to 
modify himself according to his own wishes. He is raised to goodness and this is 
what he is: The same things always please or displease the good man, since he virtu-
ally never changes his mind,31 and good men wish and pursue the same things, hav-
ing the same outlook.32 Likewise, good citizenship as the expression is used in daily 
language today does not require autonomy in this wider sense, since what is re-
quired of the good citizen is simply that he lives according to law and custom, not 
that he is able to choose what kind of man he wants to be. 
  But the good citizen is no ideal man in the Aristotelian sense of possessing a num-
ber of virtues like courage, wittiness, or hospitality. Being a good citizen simply 
means performing one’s social tasks; it says nothing about any personal characteris-
tics. Thus, and again contrary to Aristotle, the good citizen might act against his own 
wish, which means that good citizenship does not require having good intentions, 
which as we have noted means aiming at realising good actions for the sake of oth-
ers. The reason for the good citizen’s acting according to law and custom is his own 
affair; he must not necessarily intend the good of others for their sake. What is rele-
vant is simply that he acts in support of others and therewith of his community. He 
may well act with the (ultimate) aim of fulfilling himself. But as far as he is perform-
ing his social tasks successfully, for what reason whatever, no-one can accuse him of 
not being a good citizen. And he must not intend to do more than what his social 
tasks require of him, that is, he must not intend any actions which are supereroga-
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32 ibid. 1167b5-9. 
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tive, which go beyond what morality demands. As distinguished from Aristotle, be-
ing a good citizen also does not require knowledge of moral truths, of what is right 
or wrong absolutely, only of what is required of one as a member of society, which is 
what the law and the more important customs prescribe. This has nothing to do with 
a conception of the good as being an absolute value with an objective existence, as in 
Aristotle.  
  But the good citizen according to our everyday expression is still not what we mean 
with human goodness: Human goodness, as we use the expression in daily language, 
is goodness of the heart, which means that it requires taking a certain mental attitude 
and experiencing certain feelings towards other people, notably of love of man as 
meaning an attitude of care for the individual immediately involved in the moral 
problem situation, as well as an intense feeling towards him or her. This implies hav-
ing good intentions in the everyday sense, of supporting others for their sake, and 
the more supererogative the intentions, the more human goodness. Just intending to 
do what is demanded of one and nothing more is ‘good’ simply as being acceptable, 
as not being blameworthy, nothing more.  
  When we say that someone is a good person, we do not call him or her morally 
good, but simply ‘good’, and most probably ‘good’ here is not a shorter from of 
‘morally good’, but instead of ‘humanly good’, which is not as strongly oriented to-
wards success as Aristotelian goodness and as good citizenship are.  
  In the way we use goodness concerning humans, saying that a certain person is 
good, ‘a good man’ or ‘a good woman’ rather than ‘a good citizen’, we do not mean 
that he or she is a moral expert in the Aristotelian sense, theoretically, in judgement, 
and practically, in action. As distinguished from good citizenship, human goodness, 
goodness as a man, as a human being, does not require rationality in the everyday 
sense of efficiency. Although the humanly good man’s or woman’s moral judgement 
always aims at what is good for some individual person, his or her moral judgement 
must not necessarily take all morally relevant aspects of a situation into regard. Hu-
man goodness only requires taking certain individuals into consideration, perhaps 
only one single individual; it does not require considering the group or society as a 
whole. This implies that human goodness does not require critical reflection, and 
thus no understanding of correct priorities.  
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  A child can have an attitude of care and a loving feeling as well as good intentions 
towards others as well as an adult can, and thus we can well accept that children can 
possess human goodness, goodness of the heart, but since they do not have the 
adult’s capacity for critical reflection, they do not have the adult’s capacity for mak-
ing mature judgements, which are good moral judgements which not only corre-
spond to the demands of morality, in which case they might be good accidentally, as 
will be explained in Chapter 4; they are based on true factual judgements which take 
all or most morally relevant aspects of a situation into consideration. This implies 
that we do not associate human goodness with intellectual development. This points 
to the fact that although the man or woman with human goodness, who has good 
intentions, will make moral judgements, these moral judgements must not necessar-
ily be mature moral judgements, since mature (moral) judgements are always based 
on morally relevant, true factual judgements, or else they are only accidentally good. 
A person can well be a ‘good man’ or a ‘good woman’ without understanding how 
he or she must act so as to support other people; he or she can fail to understand how 
best to help others because he or she makes factual judgements concerning the situa-
tion, e.g. concerning what a person needs, which are false. And he or she may neglect 
the context, which ultimately means that his or her moral judgement does not take 
the possible effects of the action, and other similar actions, on society as a whole into 
consideration. This means that a person with good intentions is not necessarily a 
good moral judge.  
  A ‘good man’ or a ‘good woman’ today, i.e., a man or woman with human good-
ness, is not necessarily courageous, witty, generous, and what else Aristotle attrib-
utes to his man of excellent character.33 He or she loves his or her fellow-men and 
intends to do good to them, but if he or she fails to do good, because of a bad judge-
ment or because of personal weakness – fear, for example – we would still call him or 
her a good man or woman as long as we are sure of his or her feelings and intentions. 
We would call a person good who helps another person who is in need of help, al-
though a third person may be in more need of help and although the first person 
would be able to help this third person, would he or she only consider the situation 
                                                 
33 Barnes offers a list of the Aristotelian moral virtues on p. 104 in the Nicomachean Ethics in the transla-
tion by J.A.K. Thomson, revised by Hugh Tredennick. 
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somewhat more thoroughly. And in fact we would call a person ‘good’ although he 
or she is trying to help a person who is in no need of help, and although there are 
others present who actually need help. For example, we would surely call a person 
‘good’ who spent an hour on carrying a wounded man to a place where he could re-
ceive medical treatment without having checked whether he were still alive, so that 
in fact he or she would be carrying a dead corpse instead of helping other wounded 
men nearby who were still alive. And in fact we might even call a man or woman 
‘good’ although he or she acts badly, doing harm to others. A fictional example is 
Prince Myshkin in Dostoyevsky’s The Idiot. 
  Prince Myshkin comes back to Russia after four years of mental treatment in Swit-
zerland - uncured. In St. Petersburg he makes the acquaintance of some far relatives, 
including the twenty year-old Aglaia Epanchin, but also of Nastasya Filippovna, a 
woman of bad reputation. Although 26 years old, Myshkin is mentally much of a 
child, and he confesses that he does not like being with grown-up people, because he 
feels oppressed, and that his companions have always been children. He has a child’s 
spontaneity and honesty, which makes a good first impression on many people. 
Aglaia says that she has never met anyone with more noble simplicity and boundless 
trustfulness, and according to Nastasya Filippovna, Myshkin is the first person she 
has ever met whom she has believed in as a sincere friend: 
‘Here’s a find!’ she said suddenly, turning again to Darya Alexeyevna. ‘And simply 
from goodness of heart, too; I know him. I have found a benefactor!’34 
 
  And a certain general calls Myshkin ideally generous and says that he has complete 
confidence in Myshkin’s sincerity of heart and in the nobility of his feelings. And he 
exclaims: 
‘Prince! you are so kind, so good-hearted, that I’m sometimes positively sorry for 
you.’35 
  
  Myshkin is always full of compassion for those who suffer, and he is even filled 
with pity at the sight of a sad face on a photograph, as when he sees the picture of 
                                                 
34 Dostoyevsky, The Idiot p. 152. 
35 ibid. p. 470. 
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Nastasya Filippovna, and his compassion for her never leaves him. Yevgeny Pav-
lovitch, Myshkin’s friend, says to him about his returning to Russia: 
‘As a youth in Switzerland you yearned for your native country, and longed for Rus-
sia as for an unknown land of promise. You had read a great many books about Rus-
sia, excellent books perhaps, but pernicious for you. You arrived in the first glow of 
eagerness to be of service, so to say; you rushed, you flew headlong to be of service.’36 
 
  Myshkin is often day-dreaming. Alexandra, Aglaia’s sister, calls him ‘very discon-
nected’,37 and Dostoyevsky writes:  
 He was perhaps prejudiced and predisposed to favourable impression.38 
 
  Myshkin cannot understand the subtleties of human relations; he takes the aristo-
cratic acquaintances of Aglaia’s family to be just what they seem to be to him, namely 
elegant, simple-hearted, and clever, and he does not understand that they think they 
are doing Aglaia’s family a great honour by paying them a visit. He is not observant 
of other people, and his absent-mindedness makes him incapable of noticing their 
reactions - when people are about to start laughing at him, or when someone tries to 
avoid his company, or when someone wants to ask him a question but is too shy or 
sensitive to ask, he simply does not notice this and therefore fails to react correctly. 
  Myshkin’s naivety further makes him behave much too personally towards people 
he hardly knows. He tells strangers and new acquaintances about his personal his-
tory, his illness and his social difficulties, to their great embarrassment. In addition 
he openly insults others without understanding what he is doing, among others 
Aglaia’s parents and their friends. 
  Both Aglaia and Nastasya Filippovna fall in love with Myshkin because of his sim-
plicity and honesty, but he ends up with making both women deeply unhappy. 
Myshkin is himself guilty of their falling in love with him: Already at his second 
meeting with Nastasya Filippovna, and enchanted by her beauty, he tells her that he 
loves her and makes her a proposal of marriage. Later he writes a short letter to 
Aglaia from Moscow which lets Aglaia suspect that he is in love with her: Of the 
                                                 
36 Dostoyevsky, The Idiot p. 544. 
37 ibid. p. 54. 
38 ibid. p. 500. 
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three sisters he saw only Aglaia, he writes, and he adds that he needs her very much, 
and that he has a great desire that she should be happy. But Myshkin takes no re-
sponsibility for any of these actions, since he does not understand their effects on the 
two women. And he does not understand the women’s jealousy of each other, for 
which reason he repeatedly hurts them by approaching first the one, then the other, 
then the first once again, etc. 
  His indecisiveness is a great burden to both women. When asked directly by Aglaia 
in front of her parents if he wants to marry her, he says yes, but he does nothing to 
make the marriage come true. Without noticing the effect of his words on Aglaia, he 
had told Aglaia that he would be prepared to sacrifice his own life just to make Nas-
tasya Filippovna happy, and that he came to Pavlovsk, where Aglaia’s family as well 
as Nastasya Filippovna spend their holiday, just for the sake of Nastasya Filippovna. 
And when at the end he has to choose between the two women, he does not under-
stand the importance of the situation. Out of pity for Nastasya Filippovna he simply 
blames Aglaia for speaking harshly to the other woman, and when Aglaia is running 
away in despair, he tries to run after her. When Aglaia is gone he agrees to marry 
Nastasya Filippovna, but he does it somewhat casually, and later he says to his friend 
Yevgeny Pavlovitch that the marriage means nothing; she wants him to marry her. 
  This makes it obvious that Myshkin has agreed to marry Nastasya Filippovna out of 
pity. To his friend, Myshkin confesses that he wants to love both Aglaia and Nasta-
sya Filippovna, but Yevgeny Pavlovitch comments that Aglaia loved him as a 
woman, like a human being, not like an abstract spirit, and that Myshkin has proba-
bly never loved any of the two women. Myshkin confesses that this may be true.  
  Myshkin’s love for the two women is not, or at least not primarily, erotic. It is a 
Christian love, love of man, exhibiting itself in pity: Especially in his love for Nasta-
sya Filippovna there is something of the tenderness for a sick, unhappy child. For 
this reason he cannot respond to these adult women’s needs.  
  Even after having agreed to marry Nastasya Filippovna, Myshkin still tries to visit 
Aglaia to console her, but this is prevented by her family, who renounces all friend-
ship and acquaintance with him. Aglaia is in a nervous and even hysterical state. 
When the wedding day approaches, Nastasya Filippovna becomes increasingly mel-
ancholic, and on the day before the wedding she is in despair, even in hysterics. On 
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her way to the wedding she elopes and is eventually murdered out of jealousy by 
Myshkin’s rival Rogozhin. 
  In spite of his love of man and his pity, and in spite of his good intentions of being 
of service to others, Myshkin knows very little about life, and he does not understand 
his fellow men well enough for being able to judge competently what best to do, and 
his acting has devastating consequences for those who mean the most to him. The 
topic of the novel is the tragic personal and social failure of a genuinely good man. 
  All these examples point to the fact that ‘human goodness’ according to the way we 
use the expression in daily language connotes certain feelings and having good in-
tentions, but not necessarily good judgement and good acting. 
  Since the everyday expression of human goodness does not imply making morally 
relevant, true factual judgements, it also does not imply prudence as judging cor-
rectly what is good for oneself and acting accordingly, which is something which we 
associate with mental adults. Human goodness is even negatively related to pru-
dence: The more prudence, the less one’s intentions are exclusively directed towards 
supporting others for their sake, and the less human goodness. 
  Human goodness thus is exclusively directed towards others, and it implies intend-
ing to support others for their sake, without any thought of personal gain. The hu-
manly good man’s or woman’s intentions often go beyond the mere fulfilling of his 
or her social tasks: Because of his or her love of man, which contains very intensive 
feelings, he or she often intends to do more than what is required of him or her, 
namely what morality in the everyday sense of the word demands. This means that 
his or her intentions are supererogative. He or she may intend to give away every-
thing he or she possesses, by which he or she would ruin him- or herself, or to sacri-
fice his or her life for the life of another person, like taking that person’s place at an 
execution. The highest form of human goodness is a love of man which takes the 
form of self-sacrifice. This means that human goodness can be self-destructive, and 
as we have seen, this is not demanded by morality: Morality demands of us to act in 
favour of others, instead of acting in favour of ourselves, but it does not demand of 
us that we ruin or destroy our own lives. 
  Like good citizenship, human goodness does not require autonomy in the wider 
sense of being able to choose the way one wants to be, to modify oneself according to 
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one’s own wishes. The humanly good man or woman may well be so involved in 
thinking of what is good for others that it never even occurs to him or her to question 
his or her way of living. A humanly good man or woman is highly emotional, ex-
periencing a strong love for mankind, whose intensity makes it impossible for him or 
her to take a rest from his or her judging and acting. But since human goodness does 
not imply critical reflection, and since it is contrary to prudence, it does not even nec-
essarily imply autonomy in the basic sense of being able to support oneself inde-
pendently. Contrary to the good citizen, the humanly good man or woman may well 
be dependent on continuous support from other people to the extent that he or she is 
not able to live according to morality, i.e., to fulfil his or her role in society.  
 
 
MATURITY AS MENTAL ADULTHOOD 
The discussion of goodness in the previous section will help us clarify the everyday 
expression of maturity as mental adulthood. Maturity as mental adulthood avoids 
the vague concept of stage of life, which makes it much easier to define than the eve-
ryday expression of maturity relative to age. Now we will try to give a more specific 
picture of what mental adulthood means in the moral sphere according to our every-
day semantic practice.  
  In the light of the three concepts of goodness discussed above, the Aristotelian one, 
that of the good citizen, and that of human goodness, it is clear that our everyday 
expression of maturity comes closest to the concept of the good citizen. We do not 
associate moral maturity with a project of personal self-fulfilment, as in Aristotle, but 
also not with just having good intentions, as in the case of human goodness. On the 
other hand, the everyday expression of maturity also means more than just perform-
ing one’s social tasks successfully by adjusting oneself to law and custom, as in the 
case of the good citizen. 
  Officially, adulthood begins when a person comes of age, when he reaches majority 
and thus lawful age. In many countries this official adulthood begins at the age of 18. 
On reaching this age, one is accepted as an adult: by other individuals who have al-
ready reached this age, which means that one is accepted as an equal, and one is now 
expected to conform to the social customs of adults. But one is also accepted as an 
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adult by the bureaucratic system, which means that one can be sentenced to full pun-
ishment for having broken the law. This acceptance by society shows that one is now 
supposed to be able to understand and adjust oneself according to the laws and so-
cial customs of one’s society, which means that one is seen as being responsible for 
one’s actions, and thus that one can rightly be blamed and punished for not adjusting 
oneself as expected. This means that an official adult is supposed to be a mental adult 
at least in the basic sense of being able to understand and adjust him- or herself ac-
cording to official law and to the more important customs. This means being able to 
function in ways which are seen as being appropriate for adults in a basic or minimal 
sense. 
  According to Coan, we call that ‘normal’ what we judge as desirable in our society, 
which includes acquiring a certain social façade, playing roles, learning skills for suc-
cessful social interaction.39 This conception of maturity corresponds to the everyday 
expression of the good citizen as described above, and certainly the everyday mean-
ing of maturity and that of being a good citizen partly overlap: The way we use ma-
turity in daily language implies that the mature person actually fulfils his or her role 
in society in practical action, i.e. in contributing to the good of the community, and 
therewith to all its members, as a good citizen, as a good member of society. 
  That adults are expected to be good citizens in the everyday sense of the word 
means that they are supposed to exhibit a social competence, which means mastering 
skills for social interaction in a social roleplay which makes it possible to relate suc-
cessfully to others. This may make one suspect that maturity is orientated towards 
practical action, focusing on social adjustment, i.e., behaving in the way expected by 
others, notably calmly, slowly, without showing much feeling, without showing 
much interest, behaving in a way which we interpret as careful for avoiding causing 
irritation, and performing those tasks which are expected of one by others – by fam-
ily members, friends, working colleagues, etc. Such a social competence may come 
close to a kind of social virtuosity which allows for successful interactions with oth-
ers; such a person fulfils his or her social tasks but does nothing more than what is 
demanded of him or her. 
                                                 
39 Coan, Hero, Artist, Sage, or Saint? pp. 74-75. 
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  This meaning of maturity, as good citizenship, implies that anyone can pass as ma-
ture who adjusts him- or herself to a social role of being useful to others instead of 
harming them. If maturity were simply the same as good citizenship, then everyone 
who lived according to law and the more important customs would be classified as 
being mature. But is this the way we use the expression in daily language? The rea-
sons for adjustment are not taken into consideration: Does one really hold the views 
shared by the group to be correct, or perhaps one is simply adjusting oneself with the 
aim of better obtaining one’s own aims? 
  As distinguished from the case of the good citizen, where good citizenship consists 
only in acting, maturity connotes also certain inner qualities. From a man’s or 
woman’s judgements and behaviour, we make a judgement concerning his or her 
inner life, and this inner life we judge as mature or as immature. ‘Maturity’ is used in 
connection with intellectual and emotional development, and what we judge as ma-
ture or immature is a human mind. In addition, we often say that a person’s judge-
ment or acting is mature or immature. What we mean is that a ‘mature judgement’ is 
a good moral judgement, one which points to a good moral action, and which fulfils 
certain criteria of objectivity other than just being good, whereas a ‘mature action’ is 
a good moral action performed by a mature person, which means that it is the reali-
sation of a mature judgement. Such an action fulfils the demands of morality, which 
means that it is useful to other people, either directly or indirectly. The nature of ma-
ture judgement and of mature action will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
  With mental adulthood we associate not only a certain way of behaving, but also a 
certain way of reasoning, of feeling and wanting. We often say that people who are 
far beyond the age of majority are ‘no adults’, and by this we mean that they lack 
what we expect to find in an adult person: A certain way of feeling and of wanting, 
of reasoning, believing, intending, and judging. Mental adulthood as we use the ex-
pression in daily life excludes strong emotional outbursts, wanting things which one 
can never hope to obtain, having destructive intentions concerning oneself and oth-
ers, assessing the importance of things completely erroneously, unimportant things 
as important and vice versa, and having more important beliefs which do not corre-
spond to reality, for example that everyone intends to hurt one, or forms of grave 
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superstition, like believing that the fact that one just saw a black cat means that the 
world is soon coming to an end. 
  When trying to grasp the meaning of the everyday expression of maturity as mental 
adulthood, we may note that ‘immaturity’ as the expression is used in daily language 
today may be easier to outline than that of maturity. Immaturity we can compare to 
childishness. Childishness is not directly related to the moral sphere: Although we 
tend to blame people for being childish, we use the expression in the meaning of 
holding unreflected, ‘naïve’ views which do not correspond to reality, and of being 
interested in, and of engaging in, activities which cannot give one a deeper sense of 
satisfaction as a sense of meaning of life. This means that we tend to associate child-
ishness with incapacity for a ‘higher’, i.e. fuller, more valuable, kind of self-
fulfilment. But this must not mean that the person has no good intentions and that he 
or she lacks certain morally relevant knowledge, and he or she may well be able to 
judge and act morally well, which means that we do not associate childishness di-
rectly with immorality. As distinguished from childishness, immaturity means being 
introvert and selfish, whereas the childish person can be extrovert and unselfish. 
With ‘introversion’ we mean self-reflection overriding reflection on other things so 
that the person is unduly occupied in his or her thoughts with his or her own inner 
life; with his or her own feelings, memories, beliefs, views, and judgements. With 
‘selfishness’ we mean having selfish intentions, i.e., intending one’s own good, either 
directly or indirectly, by supporting others with the hope of receiving help in return 
or by profiting from one’s action in some other way. An introvert person is not nec-
essarily very selfish: Although he or she is occupied by reflecting on his or her own 
inner life, he or she may not be very interested in supporting his or her own good, 
and he or she may even want to be helpful to others. Nastasya Filippovna in The Id-
iot, already discussed, is an example of this:  
Whether she were a woman who had read too much poetry as Yevgeny Pavlovitch 
had said, or simply mad, as Myshkin was convinced, in any case this woman – 
though she sometimes behaved with such cynicism and impudence – was really far 
more modest, soft, and trustful than might have been believed. It’s true that she was 
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full of romantic notions, of self-centred dreaminess and capricious fantasy, but yet 
there was much that was strong and deep in her…40 
 
  On the other hand the selfish person can be interested in others and he or she can be 
very communicative, but his or her interest is no concern for others, i.e., it is not in-
terest in others for their sake, but an interest in others for his or her own sake, with 
the motive of benefiting him- or herself. Immaturity implies both introversion and 
selfishness; as we commonly use the expression immaturity, an introvert person is 
even more immature if he or she is also selfish, and a selfish person is even more 
immature if he or she is also introvert. 
  Introversion and selfishness both imply a continuous mental attitude towards one-
self, introversion of taking a mental attitude of interest in oneself, which is not af-
firmative, it is no attitude of liking oneself, but an attitude of wanting to understand 
oneself, which reduces one’s interest in understanding others, although one can still 
want and therefore intend to do good to others. Selfishness on the other hand implies 
taking a mental attitude of affirmation towards oneself, i.e., of liking oneself. Intro-
version and selfishness together implies continuously taking an attitude of concern 
for oneself, which means taking an interest in oneself for one’s own sake, which is 
stronger than one’s concern for others. Recalling Dostoyevsky’s words about Nasta-
sya Filippovna’s ‘self-centred dreaminess’, quoted above, we can widen this defini-
tion of self-centredness as introversion to one which combines the two aspects of 
immaturity we have described, since in everyday language today, being self-centred 
connotes not only being introvert, but also being selfish.  
  Consequently the mental attitude of concern for oneself equals an attitude of self-
centredness, which thus means directing one’s attention towards one’s own mental 
life, particularly towards one’s own wishes and the thoughts and feelings: fear, sad-
ness, anger etc., which these give rise to, thus being occupied with one's own per-
sonal interests, and being concerned for oneself, i.e., being interested in oneself for 
one’s own sake, for which reason one wants things for one’s own sake even though 
one knows that the satisfaction of these wishes would mean disrespecting the (more 
important) interests of others.  
                                                 
40 Dostoyevsky, The Idiot pp. 533-534. 
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  For this reason immaturity, as distinguished from childishness, is related to the 
sphere of morality: An immature person who is both introvert and selfish lacks good 
intentions, which are intentions to support the good of others for their sake, and be-
cause of his or her lack of interest in others, he or she is unable to judge well morally.  
  In ordinary life we also use the expression immaturity for people who react with 
violent outbursts of anger, exalted joy, or otherwise sudden and violent changes in 
their mood. The reason is probably that a person who is highly emotional is unable 
to do what he or she wants: He or she is not able to be attentive to information rele-
vant for judging how to obtain what he or she wants, and his or her feelings also tend 
to raise wishes which point in other directions than his or her more important priori-
ties. This means that strong emotionality makes one not only incapable of being mor-
ally useful, but also of being useful to oneself, i.e., of being prudent in the everyday 
sense of the word. 
  The fact that an immature person who is both introvert, selfish, and highly emo-
tional, lacks prudence means that he or she may well act so as to hurt himself in 
his/her striving to benefit him-/herself. Since he/she is not rational enough to un-
derstand that acting in support of others as a good citizen does may well be profiting 
for oneself, he/she has no wish to judge and act morally well, not even with the aim 
of supporting him-/herself, and since he/she lacks this wish, he/she does not bother 
to inform him-/herself of the morally relevant aspects of a certain situation, which 
means that he/she lacks a morally relevant knowledge, and for this reason he/she 
cannot make good moral judgements other than accidentally. This is the reason why, 
like with childishness, we use the expression immaturity in the meaning of holding 
unreflected, ‘naïve’ views which do not correspond to reality, although in the case of 
childishness these views are no views of direct moral relevance, while in the case of 
immaturity these views are directly relevant for moral judgement and thus for mor-
ally relevant acting. 
  An immature person according to everyday language is either introvert, selfish, or 
highly emotional, and in most cases he or she is all of this at once. In all three cases 
he or she is self-centred. Such a person can still be fairly autonomous in the basic 
sense of being able to take care of him- or herself without continuous external sup-
port, but he or she is not necessarily useful to him- or herself in a deeper sense, and 
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he or she does not live up to the more important demands from the external world, 
as expected of an adult in society, which are the demands expressed by morality. 
This means that the immature person’s – very limited while basic or minimal – 
autonomy has no moral relevance, since it does not serve a life according to morality. 
And since the immature person lacks prudence, he or she is not even motivated to 
fulfil the criteria of being a good citizen for his or her own sake. For this reason, the 
immature man or woman is not of much help to either to him- or herself or to other 
people, and he or she may even be a danger to him- or herself and to others. And 
although in the case of self-centredness as meaning just introversion and strong emo-
tionality, the immature person may in fact have good intentions, wanting and intend-
ing to support others for their sake, in which case he or she may fulfil the criteria for 
human goodness, he or she is still not able to make mature judgements and act on 
them other than accidentally. 
  Since we tend to use the expression of immaturity as the opposite of maturity, this 
description of immaturity would imply that ‘maturity’ is used in the everyday mean-
ing of being extrovert and unselfish, i.e., being interested in and concerned for other 
people for their sake, and being calm, i.e., being free of strong emotionality. Lacking 
self-centredness requires lacking both introversion, selfishness, and strong emotion-
ality. Lacking selfishness implies having good intentions, and lacking introversion 
and strong emotionality are basic requirements for being able to make mature 
judgements in the everyday sense of the expression.  
  But a complete lack of self-centredness would mean never being occupied with one-
self in one’s thoughts and never wanting anything for oneself, and never experienc-
ing any strong feelings whatever, and such a man would be like a machine or a kind 
of otherworldly saint. Maturity must allow for some self-centredness, since without 
self-centredness one cannot live. As a human being, one is not able to overcome all 
one's needs, and all men have their own personal interests and likings – and their 
bad days. A certain self-centredness is needed either to overcome immediate per-
sonal problems or to avoid future problems which will inhibit one's thinking and 
acting and thus one’s theoretical and practical moral competence. But the less self-
centredness, the better the conditions for maturity. Such a necessary self-centredness 
we do not call ‘selfishness’, since it does not mean the striving to support oneself at 
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the direct costs of others, but only at the indirect costs of others, i.e., one’s self-
support steals time and energy which theoretically, although hardly practically, 
could have been used to support others. The selfish person on the other hand strives 
to support him- or herself much more than what is necessary to satisfy one’s basic 
needs and to overcome immediate personal problems and to avoid future ones which 
will inhibit one’s moral competence. If we compare this to the Aristotelian good man, 
we find that although the Aristotelian good man takes an interest in others, and al-
though he is emotionally controlled, and although he takes an active part in social 
life and supports the good of the community, the fact that he loves himself the most, 
and that the ultimate aim of his moral acting is to benefit himself means that he is 
clearly more self-centred than what is necessary for leading a moral life. 
  In Chapter 2 we will show that the opposite of self-centredness corresponds to a 
certain use of the everyday expression of sympathy, which contains friendly feelings 
of joy at human intercourse and an attitude of concern for others, i.e., of interest in 
others for their sake. Sympathy directs the agent’s attention towards others and 
makes him or her receptive to morally relevant information, which allows for making 
morally relevant, true factual judgements, judgements which provide the agent with 
a knowledge of the different aspects of the situation and of how these aspects are 
connected, which gives an overview of the moral situation, and it also gives an in-
sight in how the situation at hand relates to other situations. This shows which pos-
sibilities are offered, and thus the different alternatives for action, and thus what can 
be done and by whom. But sympathy for others also makes the situation, the moral 
problem, important to the person, through the fact that the lives of the others in the 
situation and what makes their lives worth living to them becomes important to one. 
As will be explained further in Chapter 2, the mature person’s dominating attitude 
and emotional state is not love of man, as is the case in the humanly good man or 
woman, but sympathy, which lacks the intensity of love of man. In Chapter 3 we will 
show that a certain meaning of ‘sympathy’ implies a certain meaning of ‘autonomy’ 
according to the way we use the expression in everyday language, namely one which 
is morally relevant, which makes it possible for the agent to make mature judge-
ments, and which motivates him or her to judgement-making and to acting. An 
autonomy formed by sympathy of a certain kind thus gives a moral competence in 
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judging and in acting according to morality. The intensity in love of man on the other 
hand, according to the way in which we use the expression ‘love of man’ in everyday 
language, excludes sympathy. As will be shown in the next chapter, sympathy in the 
everyday sense is not compatible with intensity, since it is used for human relations 
which allow for, perhaps even necessitate, a considerable distance socially and emo-
tionally. Thus love of man excludes the kind of autonomy which makes up maturity. 
  Maturity makes it possible for one to fulfil one’s role in society, for taking one’s re-
sponsibility as a member of the community, which means that it secures good citi-
zenship. But as mental adulthood, maturity means not only adjusting oneself to the 
current custom in society, which could mean acting on other persons’ judgements 
without having considered their correctness, or acting with the sole aim of fulfilling 
oneself. The mature man or woman must intend to do good to others for their sake. 
But although the Prince in Dostoyevsky’s novel can be a good man according to the 
everyday meaning of human goodness today, in spite of the fact that the Prince’s act-
ing, although motivated by the wish to be of service to others, finally leads to the 
ruin of those whom he loves, he cannot be mature according to the way we use the 
expression in daily language. For maturity, as the expression is commonly used, 
good intentions are not enough. Like Aristotelian goodness and like good citizen-
ship, maturity is oriented towards success: A mature man or woman must make 
good moral judgements which are founded on morally relevant knowledge, which 
excludes that they are done accidentally, and he or she must actually live according 
to morality, i.e., act on his or her judgements. 
  The fact that the humanly good man’s or woman’s intentions are supererogative 
makes him or her into quite another kind of model, another kind of ideal, than the 
mature man or woman is. Sacrificing one’s life for another person is a sign of human 
goodness, but it is not a sign of maturity: Earlier in this chapter we noted that we 
would not call a person who refused to sacrifice his or her own life to save others 
‘immoral’, and now we may add that neither would we call him or her ‘immature’. 
As being supererogative, i.e., more than what morality demands, self-sacrifice is nei-
ther mature nor immature, since maturity is concerned with the sphere of morals 
only. 
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  As distinguished from human goodness, but on the line with being a good citizen, 
maturity allows for prudence; whereas love of man may motivate one to sacrifice 
one’s own life, no-one would sacrifice his or her life for another just because of sym-
pathy, which shows that sympathy allows for prudence. In fact maturity, as we 
commonly use the expression, even seems to require prudence. Maturity is not com-
patible with self-destructive behaviour; prudence includes being careful not to harm 
oneself unnecessarily, and we would not always, concerning all situations, say that a 
man or woman who supports others at the costs of him- or herself is more mature 
than a man or woman who does not: We would hardly call a person mature who ru-
ins his or her own life in an attempt to help another person. The mature man or 
woman may give some money to the poor, for example, but not as much that his or 
her own financial situation is seriously threatened, which would be imprudent. This 
means that our everyday use of ‘maturity’ implies that a mature man or woman must 
necessarily make good prudential judgements and act on them, to secure a certain 
good for him- or herself. 
  The fact that prudence is a necessary requirement for maturity does not mean that 
the ultimate aim of the mature person’s moral judging and acting can be self-
fulfilment, as in Aristotle’s ethics. The mature man or woman must intend the good 
of others solely for the sake of these others; there can be no ultimate aim of fulfilling 
oneself.  
  The mature person’s prudence aims at protecting his or her own life and at securing 
that his or her life is worth living to him- or herself, which is necessary for a continu-
ous moral competence over a longer period of time. Since maturity implies moral 
competence, the mature person’s prudence restricts itself to what is necessary for 
keeping this moral competence, which means that the mature person’s prudence 
serves his or her moral competence. For this reason, the mature man or woman is 
prepared to refrain from supporting his or her own good for the sake of supporting 
the good of others, except for in cases where the mature man’s or woman’s own life 
and/or what makes his or her life worth living in a basic sense are threatened. And 
since moral competence requires prudence, our mature man or woman, like the good 
citizen, will be prudent. 
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  A mature man or woman must intend to fulfil his or her role in society instead of 
just living from society. This means that like the good acting required for good citi-
zenship, the good acting required for maturity means fulfilling certain basic moral 
demands which means that the action is morally good in the limited sense of being 
morally acceptable, of not being blameworthy. 
  This means that like good citizenship, maturity does not require supererogative in-
tentions; it is enough to intend to live according to the demands of morality. And 
consequently it does not require supererogative action; but as distinguished from the 
good citizen, who may do what is required of him or her with the ultimate aim of 
benefiting him- or herself, the mature person wants to live morally for the sake of 
others only. This means that whereas good citizenship does not require good inten-
tions, maturity does. 
  Since maturity requires prudence, it requires critical reflection, and like good citi-
zenship, it requires the capacity to take care of oneself without continuous external 
support, which corresponds to a basic autonomy as we use the expression in daily 
language. But unlike good citizenship, maturity implies autonomy as more than just 
being able to take care of oneself without continuing external support: The mature 
person is able to choose the way he or she wants to be, to modify him- or herself ac-
cording to his or her own wishes, to question his or her own way of living. 
  Except for being able to make good prudential judgements, a mature man or 
woman must be able to judge how to realise his or her good intentions, which means 
that maturity requires being able to make mature judgements. A person who just 
intends to do good but who has no idea of how to bring this about we would not call 
mature, and likewise, a person who acts on the judgement of another person, thus 
doing what is morally right, but without understanding why, cannot be said to be 
mature. The mature person must make his or her own moral judgements, and these 
must be good judgements, which tell him or her how to realise his or her good inten-
tions, i.e., how to apply morality to actual cases. Maturity makes one able to make 
mature judgements concerning one’s own acting, what one should and should not 
do, and in addition it makes one competent in acting as a moral advisor to others. 
  As distinguished from human goodness, but like good citizenship, maturity re-
quires rationality in the everyday sense of being appropriate, i.e., adapted, suited, to 
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its purpose. This means that maturity requires the capacity to make correct assess-
ments of priorities, and of which actions will serve to realise a certain aim. We would 
not call the person earlier mentioned who was carrying a dead corpse instead of 
helping wounded men nearby who were still alive mature. This shows that maturity 
requires not only having good intentions concerning others and being prudent, i.e., 
judging and acting so as to protect one’s own life and to secure that one’s life is 
worth living to oneself; it also requires a morally relevant knowledge and thus mak-
ing morally relevant, true factual judgements on which the good moral judgements 
are based: The fact that a person does not take all morally relevant aspects of a situa-
tion into consideration when making a moral judgement does not mean that he or 
she lacks human goodness, since he or she intends to do good, but it indicates that he 
or she lacks maturity. We demand more reflection from a mature man or woman 
than from a humanly good person, since the humanly good person may in fact be a 
child, whereas the mature person cannot.  
  This means that maturity requires understanding a moral problem situation, taking 
all or most kinds of morally relevant information into consideration. 
  As distinguished from the humanly good person but like the good citizen, the ma-
ture man or woman does not neglect the context in a moral problem situation, which 
means that his or her moral judgements take not only the individuals directly af-
fected but also society as a whole into consideration. We have seen that in a case 
where a person’s life is in danger, a humanly good person would not necessarily take 
the stability and permanence of society into consideration when judging how to act, 
i.e., whether to try to save the person or not; a mature person would, and as a result 
he or she could decide not to save the person’s life. A typical example would be a 
case of stealing something to save the life of someone, which is against the law, and 
breaking the law may de-stabilise the society in which one lives, but if one does not 
steal, the person will die. 
  This means that whereas the morally good man according to Aristotle makes good 
moral judgements whose ultimate aim is the agent’s own self-fulfilment, that is, 
whereas Aristotle does not distinguish between prudential and moral judgements, 
and whereas according to our everyday semantic practice, the man or woman with 
human goodness must have good intentions but he or she must not be able to make 
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either good prudential or good moral judgements, and whereas the good citizen 
must judge and act well but not necessarily with good intentions, the mature man or 
woman must both have good intentions, he or she must make both good prudential 
judgements and mature moral judgements, and he or she must act both prudentially 
and morally well.  
  By now it is clear that maturity in the everyday sense of the word is a complex phe-
nomenon consisting of a multitude of aspects – feeling, taking certain attitudes to-
wards certain objects, wanting, intending, judging, and behaving in ways appropri-
ate for adults. Such a person is a man or woman who furthers morality in judging 
and in acting, and as we have noted, the aim of morality is to support the good of 
others and the stability of society. But in many cases, it may be impossible for the 
competent moral judge to follow his or her own judgement, even though it would be 
good for him- or herself if he or she would do so: he or she cannot make a try be-
cause he or she lacks the means – physical or mental strength (energy, courage etc.) 
the money necessary, and so on. This is not seldom the case in good moral advice 
given by old or sick people. The ‘wise man’ as traditionally conceived is old, and 
probably physically weak, perhaps even somewhat frightened, as long as this does 
not darken his exceptional insight in human matters. And in fact in many cases it will 
not even be good for the advisor himself to live according to the way he or she pre-
scribes. He or she may come to a conclusion concerning right action which is recom-
mendable to others, but which it would be devastating for him- or herself to act on. 
Here we must distinguish between immediately good for the person him- or herself, 
good for the person him- or herself in the longer perspective, immediately good for 
others, and good for others in the longer perspective. A good moral advice, accord-
ing to the way we use the expression in everyday language, is always good for some 
human being, either immediately or in the long perspective, but this must not be the 
person who is to perform the action. In fact a good moral advice may be lethally dan-
gerous for the correct receiver of the advice. We must note that such an advice is not 
the same as simply ‘a good advice’ in the meaning of a recommendation that is nec-
essarily profitable for the receiver of the advice him- or herself. The mature person 
strives to support other men and society as a whole either directly, through his or her 
own acting, or indirectly, by acting as a moral advisor to others, and the person who 
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in a certain situation best fulfils the moral demand of supporting others and society 
is the person who rightly should act. 
  The individual interpretation of what supports other people and society is of course 
dependent on the cultural norms in the current society, and further all men have an 
individual personality and a unique life history with unique experiences which inevi-
tably will affect the moral judgements they make. For this reason the moral judge-
ments of different mature persons will differ. But still the moral judgements of ma-
ture men and women from different cultures will show a certain similarity, since 
there are some basic human needs and thus preferences which will always remain 
the same; above all to go on living and to engage in activities which make one’s life 
worth living.  
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Chapter 2 
Sympathy 
 
 
UNIVERSAL SYMPATHY: AN OVERVIEW 
In this work we have chosen to study the nature of five everyday expressions: moral-
ity, maturity, sympathy, autonomy, and mature judgement, as well as their semantic 
connections. In this chapter we will analyse the different meanings of the everyday 
expression of sympathy, and in the next chapter, in our discussion of the everyday 
expression of autonomy, we will show how these two expressions are connected to 
that of maturity.  
  We do not use the expression ‘maturity’ in direct connection with the expression 
‘sympathy’ in daily language, saying that a mature person has sympathy for others 
or that a person with sympathy for others is mature, but still in everyday language 
we do use ‘maturity’ in a way which implies sympathy in a certain everyday mean-
ing of the word. We will show that there is a connection between certain meanings of 
‘maturity’ and certain meanings of ‘sympathy’ through the other everyday expres-
sions which we have chosen to study, namely morality, autonomy, and mature 
judgement. In Chapter 3 we will show that certain of the everyday meanings of 
‘sympathy’ cover what is needed for a morally relevant autonomy, i.e., an influence 
over oneself which is used for realising the aims of morality in judging and in acting, 
which is the way we use the expression ‘maturity’ in everyday language.  
  As we saw in the last chapter, maturity must be connected both to extroversion in 
the sense of being interested in others, and to unselfishness as something active, i.e., 
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as taking an interest in others for their sake, with the aim of supporting these others. 
Extroversion and unselfishness are provided for by sympathy in a certain sense of 
the everyday expression, namely what we have chosen to call a universal sympathy. 
  In everyday language today, sympathy is used in the meaning of taking an interest 
in another person for one’s own sake, an interest which is motivated by the striving 
for pleasure. Such a kind of sympathy is dependent on the agent’s own preferences, 
what he or she likes and dislikes, and thus on the other fulfilling certain criteria like 
being attractive or funny. But we will also show that one of the meanings of the eve-
ryday expression of sympathy is as taking an interest in the other for his or her own 
sake, which is a concern for others. This means that the other, what supports him or 
her, i.e., what protects his or her life and what makes his or her life worth living to 
him or her, is important to one. Such an interest is not motivated by the striving for 
pleasure, and thus it is not a personal interest: it is not dependent on the agent’s own 
preferences, what he or she likes and dislikes, and thus it is not dependent on the 
other fulfilling certain criteria. The other is the object of one’s sympathy simply as 
being a fellow human being in a brotherhood of men. This also allows for sympathis-
ing with future generations of yet unborn human beings.  
  A sympathy of this kind is more stable than an interest motivated by the striving for 
pleasure: It will not easily vanish in the face of a sudden disappointment, which 
means that it can be continuous. And it can be universal, directed towards all men, 
since individual differences in looks or manners do not matter. Everyone with whom 
the agent comes into contact immediately becomes the object of his or her sympathy, 
and it is as strong towards all men. Such a universal sympathy, as we have chosen to 
call it in this work, can be directed towards several individuals at the same time, i.e., 
not only towards one single individual who is in need of help, but towards all who 
are involved in a certain situation, and in addition it allows for taking also society as 
a whole into regard for the sake of all its members. In everyday language we call this 
kind of sympathy too simply ‘sympathy’, but for matters of convenience we have 
chosen to call it universal sympathy in this work. 
  We will show that this universal sympathy consists mainly in an affirmative mental 
attitude and in friendly feelings, which are feelings of joy at human intercourse. And 
in the next chapter we will show that a universal, continuous affirmative mental atti-
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tude and a continuous friendly feeling give an autonomy of a certain kind, namely 
one which is used for fulfilling the aims of morality, which means that a universal 
sympathy allows for a moral competence in judgement and in action, which means 
that it allows for maturity. 
  Before we go on to study the everyday expression of sympathy in more detail, we 
will have to specify the meaning of the everyday expression of feeling. 
 
 
FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS 
According to the way we use the expression in daily language today, a feeling con-
sists of a feeling experience, i.e., a certain kind of mental state, an experienced and 
therefore conscious state of the mind of a certain duration. There are feelings as bod-
ily sensations like physical pain, feelings as moods, being in good or being in bad 
mood, i.e., feeling well or unwell generally, and feelings which are casually con-
nected to a certain thought, perception, or activity without being directed towards it, 
like joy at the thought of someone whom one finds funny, at the sight of a painting 
which one finds beautiful, or at having an interesting conversation with others. In 
addition there are feelings as presentiments, like in having a bad feeling that some-
thing terrible is going to happen, which is a feeling which is related to an imagined 
future event without being directed towards it, i.e., it is casually connected to certain 
beliefs. 
  Further there is a distinction between ‘feeling’ and ‘emotion’ in everyday language 
today. Emotions are feelings which are directed towards a certain human being or 
animal, and the classical examples are love and hatred. Emotions mostly are more 
intense and often of longer duration than other feelings, and they often influence the 
agent’s mental life more strongly and over a longer period of time than other feelings 
do: A love experience can change one’s whole life; an experience of joy hardly does. 
The difference in daily language between the three feeling phenomena joy, having a 
feeling that something good is going to happen, and love, is shown by the fact that 
we say that one loves someone, which is an experience of a certain duration; one 
does not simply love, and one does not suddenly feel love at the thought of some-
thing; whereas one does not joy someone or something, but on the other hand one 
 53
can feel joy either in general, i.e., at nothing at all: one simply feels joyful, or at some-
thing: a thought, a material object, or an activity. Having a feeling that something 
good is going to happen is a pleasant feeling which is dependent on a more or less 
conscious belief about the future. One does not ‘feel’ the future, or ‘feel’ one’s belief 
concerning the future like one loves one’s wife; one has a pleasant feeling, and this 
pleasant feeling is caused by, not directed towards, one’s belief. This makes it clear 
that as distinguished from joy and from the pleasant feeling which makes up a pre-
sentiment, love as we use the expression in daily language implies a relation to an 
object, as a directedness towards the object, which is not caused by the love experi-
ence but instead part of the love experience itself: According to the way we use the 
expression ‘love’ in everyday language, loving someone means having an affective 
relation to a certain living object. But whereas love necessarily is directly connected 
to an object through its character of being a relation to something, since it cannot ap-
pear without this directedness, joy and a presentiment like a pleasant feeling as we 
use the expressions in daily language are only indirectly connected to an object, 
namely casually. The experience of joy is not directed towards for example the 
thought of someone whom one finds funny, the material object, e.g., the beautiful 
painting, or the activity, e.g. the interesting conversation, but rather caused by it and 
experienced simultaneously to (further) thinking, perceiving, or acting, and the same 
is true of the presentiment in relation to the belief that everything is going to turn out 
well. 
  The everyday use of the expression ‘feeling’ is distinct from the everyday use of the 
expressions for all other mental phenomena, like beliefs, memories, views, percep-
tions, wishes, and judgements. According to Steinfath in his Orientierung am Guten. 
Praktisches Überlegen und die Konstitution von Personen, the feeling is a special class of 
the mental due to the unique quality of the felt experience, which is a special quality 
of consciousness which is to be found in no other mental phenomena, neither in 
wishes, nor in views.41 
  According to our everyday language, the sense perception of touch is not identical 
with a bodily sensation like physical pain; instead, the sense perception of touch 
gives rise to bodily sensations. That these are distinct is shown by the fact that bodily 
                                                 
41 Steinfath, Orientierung am Guten p. 121. 
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sensations are not caused by sense perceptions only; all kinds of feelings which we 
have mentioned can be caused by other mental phenomena like memories or beliefs. 
The belief that one is in danger may make one experience both fear and being cold, 
and feeling cold is a bodily sensation. 
  The meaning of the everyday expression of feeling also differs from that of mental 
attitude and view. According to the way we use the expression in everyday lan-
guage, mental attitudes are no states but a relation of the mind, actively created by 
the mind itself, to itself or to something else, which takes the form of attention and 
concentration. In the feeling experience, on the other hand, the mind is essentially 
passive: Rather than actively taking a position, in the form of taking an attitude to-
wards something or forming a view concerning something, the mind is suddenly 
caught up by, filled with, the feeling as an experienced state. Joy is a feeling, not a 
mental attitude; interest is a mental attitude, not a feeling, although it is casually 
connected to different feeling experiences. 
  Like all feelings, the emotions too, according to the way we use ‘emotion’ in daily 
language, are essentially passive, and thus they are no mental attitudes in the strict 
sense, although they are directed towards an object. One cannot force oneself to ex-
perience a feeling; people often exclaim that it is impossible to force oneself to love 
someone, for example. One can just intently influence factors that hopefully will lead 
one to experience a certain feeling state: One can directly, through an effort of the 
will, take a mental attitude, for example in forcing oneself to become interested in 
another person, which may raise certain feelings in one which in time may develop 
into the emotion which we call love. The everyday expression of love is semantically 
connected to the everyday expression ‘attitude’ in the meaning of a mental attitude 
towards the other, namely one of taking an interest in the other for his sake, but ‘atti-
tude’ in this meaning of the word does not mean an experience, and thus no feeling 
experience. We will discuss this issue in more detail later. 
  Steinfath claims that the feelings can occupy our attention in different degrees due 
to the intensity of the experienced feeling states, which means that they can be more 
or less conscious.42 This corresponds to the way we use the expression feeling in 
daily language. As experienced states of mind, the feelings always demand a certain 
                                                 
42 Steinfath, Orientierung am Guten p. 123. 
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attention from the mind, therewith turning the mind’s attention towards itself, which 
means that all feeling experiences imply a certain self-centredness. And since one 
always has feelings, the human mind is always to some extent self-centred. The more 
intense the feelings, the more the mind is occupied by these felt experiences, and the 
more self-centred. We will have reason to return to this fact later. 
 
 
LOVE OF MAN 
In everyday language, ‘love’ consists not only of the emotion of love, i.e., of a feeling 
experience; it also includes a mental attitude of taking an interest in the other for his 
or her sake, and other aspects as well. Steinfath rightly notes that love can appear in 
many forms, and in most of these, love is not only, and not even primarily, a feeling, 
but instead a complex pattern of feeling, thinking, wishing, and behaving.43 
  Today, ‘love’ is used in a multitude of ways: as feeling experiences, for example of 
joy and occasionally of pain, as beliefs that the other has certain qualities which one 
evaluates highly, depending on certain judgements made concerning the other and 
on one’s own views concerning what is preferable, as mental attitudes, for example 
of interest and admiration, as (psychophysical) wishes, of wanting to be with the be-
loved one, and of wanting to support him or her, and even as acting: seeking the 
other’s company, actively striving to help the other, etc. Thus when talking about 
love, we mean not only a feeling experience, or a feeling experience and a certain 
mental attitude, but a complex pattern of feelings, thoughts, judgements, beliefs, atti-
tudes, wishes, and behaviour. These different meanings of the expression of love do 
not exclude each other, but instead they point to the fact that ‘love’ is commonly used 
in the meaning of a form of life, a human practice: According to the way we use the 
expression in daily language, one does not simply ‘feel’ love, one lives it. But this is 
not the way we use the expression ‘emotion’ in daily language: As we have noted, 
the feeling according to the everyday sense of the word consists of an experienced 
state of the mind, and the emotion is a feeling which is directed towards another liv-
ing creature. The ‘emotion of love’ cannot mean the whole complex which we call 
love; no-one would in his or her semantic practice include physical action in an emo-
                                                 
43 Steinfath, Orientierung am Guten p. 122. 
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tion, for example. Thus ‘emotion’ must mean a certain aspect of the complex phe-
nomenon which we call love in everyday language, namely the feeling aspect. 
  Sympathy in the everyday sense of the word certainly contains feeling experiences 
of some sort, and it is always directed towards something; one does not just ‘sympa-
thise’, one always sympathises with something, with a person or with a certain po-
litical view, for example. According to our description of the everyday use of the ex-
pressions of feeling and emotion, this might make us assume that sympathy is an 
emotion. But this is not the way we use the expression of sympathy in everyday lan-
guage: We do not speak of ‘the emotion of sympathy’. Instead, sympathy means an-
other kind of relation to another person than the emotion does, namely a relation 
which takes the form of actively taking sides with the other, and this is not included 
in the everyday meaning of emotion as a feeling which is directed towards an object. 
We have noted that a feeling experience is always something passive, it comes over 
one, one does not choose it oneself, whereas one can actively, intently, take a certain 
mental attitude towards something. This makes us suspect that sympathy means tak-
ing a mental attitude towards the other person, which is something much more ac-
tive than just passively experiencing a feeling, whether directed towards an object or 
not. But we have seen that a feeling or feelings which has/have an object and a men-
tal attitude towards something are both covered by the everyday expression of love, 
and this may make us assume that sympathy is simply a form of love in the everyday 
sense, or at least that the meaning of the everyday expression of sympathy shows 
interesting similarities to that of love, in which case sympathy would consist neither 
just in a feeling, nor in an emotion, but instead in a form of life, a human practice. 
  For being able to clarify the meaning of the everyday expression of sympathy, we 
must further specify what we mean by love in everyday language.  
  In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume uses many different names for the feelings: 
‘impression’, ‘emotion’, ‘affection’, ‘sentiment’, and ‘sensation’, but his central feeling 
expression is ‘passion’. He admits that the passion cannot be defined accurately – he 
calls it a ‘violent impression’44 - but he claims that everyone knows what a passion is 
from experience and that everyone is able to form a correct conception at least of the 
                                                 
44 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature p. 276. 
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passions appearing more frequently. Examples of passions are joy, suffering, love, 
pride, humility, shame, pity, hatred, and contempt.45 
  Hume’s concept of love is very wide, and consists of tenderness, friendship, inti-
macy, esteem, and good-will, among other things. These are all basically the same 
passion, though with small variations, Hume says.46 
  Humean love is possible not only between people who have a close relation, like 
brothers. It is also possible between people who have never met, if they are mutually 
affected by the other’s advantage or loss, like in the case of tradesmen who do busi-
ness. Business partners who have never met are still pleased with the other’s advan-
tage and displeased with his or her disadvantage, since this is good/bad for them-
selves. In this case their concern for their own interest gives them pleasure because of 
the pleasure and pain because of the pain of the partner. 
  Such a concept of love clearly differs from the everyday concept of love of our time, 
which includes an intimacy and intensity which forms no part of the relation be-
tween business partners who do not even meet personally. We have already noted 
that love is always directed towards a living thing, and in love for persons we can 
distinguish between love of the sexes, love for one’s close relatives like one’s own 
children, and love of man. All these kinds of love imply intimacy and intensity, and 
the intensity contained in the love experience may even motivate one to sacrifice 
one’s life for the other, something which we would not expect from business part-
ners. 
  What interests us here is not love between the sexes or for one’s close relatives, but 
love of man, since we are looking for a expression of sympathy with moral relevance, 
and this requires a sympathy which is characterised by continuity and universality. 
Love of man differs from love between the sexes in several ways as the expressions 
are used in daily language. Love of man has nothing to do with the other person’s 
current feeling: It does not matter whether the other loves one back, whether he or 
she is indifferent to us, or even hates or despises us. This means that love of man has 
no relation at all to reciprocity: It is not strengthened by being returned, since it has 
as its single source the agent him- or herself. Love of man is not dependent on the 
                                                 
45 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature pp. 276-277. 
46 ibid. p. 448. 
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other fulfilling certain criteria other than being a living human being, whereas erotic 
love is dependent on the other being in some certain way (attractive, kind, etc.). To-
day’s everyday expression of love of man connotes a continuous feeling, thinking, 
and acting; it is nothing which is practised in one individual situation and then never 
again. And whereas erotic love is directed towards a certain person, love of man is 
universal: it is exhibited in one’s feelings for, mental attitude towards, and way of 
treating all other men. And there is nothing self-centred in love of man, except of 
course, as in all feeling experiences, for the fact that the feeling experience included 
occupies part of the agent’s attention. It cannot be directed towards the agent him- or 
herself; although there can be love for oneself, what we call self-love in everyday 
language, there can be no love of man for oneself; and it cannot be restricted to cer-
tain individuals: There is no love of man for one’s close relatives only.  
  Now we have outlined the meaning of the everyday expression of love of man to-
day: It is continuous, universal, and characterised by intimacy and intensity in the 
feeling experiences, and it may motivate to self-sacrifice. This makes it obvious that 
sympathy in the everyday sense of the word must be something different from love 
of man: as we use the expression of sympathy in daily language, it is often neither 
universal nor continuous, since we tend to sympathise with individual persons in 
individual cases, and it is characterised neither by intimacy, since we may well sym-
pathise with people whom we do not know well, nor by intensity, since sympathy, as 
distinguished from love of man, is used for human relations which allow for, per-
haps even necessitate, a considerable distance socially and emotionally. And for 
these reasons it is questionable whether sympathy as we use the expression in daily 
language can motivate to self-sacrifice.  
  By now we have reason to assume that not only love, but also sympathy consists in 
a form of life rather than just in a certain feeling or feelings, but that it consists in an-
other form of life than love does, one which lacks the intimacy and intensity of love 
of man, and one which is not necessarily continuous and universal. ‘Sympathy’ is 
used as meaning pleasant feeling experiences, above all of joy at human intercourse, 
as beliefs, that the other has certain qualities which one evaluates as being good, de-
pending on certain judgements made concerning the other and on views of what is 
preferable, further as a mental attitude of being affirmatively disposed towards the 
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other, as wishes, to share the other’s company and to support the other, as external 
attitudes, i.e., body language, and as acting: seeking the other’s company and ac-
tively striving to help the other. This means that like that of love, the everyday ex-
pression of sympathy connotes a complex pattern of feelings, thoughts, judgements, 
beliefs, attitudes, wishes, and behaviour, of which several join in a certain human 
practice, a form of life, whereas others join in another form of life, due to their differ-
ent meanings. In this chapter we will concentrate on two aspects of sympathy which 
are especially relevant for our purposes, namely mental attitude and feeling. 
  We will further clarify the nature of the everyday expression of sympathy today by 
referring to Hume’s concept of sympathy. 
 
 
HUME AND SYMPATHY TODAY 
Hume defines sympathy as the process of transforming an ‘idea’, i.e., a conception, 
into an impression, which as we have seen is one of his feeling terms.47 By using our 
imagination, we form a conception of the other’s current passion, or of his or her 
character, or one based on a perception of his or her action, or on reflections on the 
tendency of the other’s character or passion to the happiness of mankind and of par-
ticular persons. This conception is pleasurable or painful to us, and this pleasure or 
pain gives rise to certain passions in us. For example, another person’s pleasure and 
that in him which is agreeable, i.e., pleasant, to us, namely a certain quality, both 
make us love him. We sympathise with a person’s pleasure for example because of 
his wealth and power. Through sympathy we can experience all the passions of oth-
ers. In sympathy there is nothing which fixes one’s attention on oneself: Our own 
person is not the object of any passion, and our personal interest is not concerned. 
  Sympathising only with pain is a limited sympathy: Complete sympathy, what 
Hume calls ‘extensive sympathy’ requires being sensible to the other’s good and bad 
fortune.48 According to Hume, benevolence, which is a desire for the happiness of 
another person, and an aversion to his misery, arises when a person’s happiness or 
misery is dependent on the happiness or misery on another person. This must mean 
                                                 
47 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature p. 317. 
48 ibid. p. 386. 
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that one’s benevolence is dependent on one’s sympathy. Hume further defines pity 
in the same way as he defines benevolence.49 And he says that we sympathise also 
with what we imagine to be a person’s future passion, and by using our imagination, 
we sympathise with the passions of people who are not ‘in being’.50 
  But this is not the way we use the expression sympathy in daily language today. 
Sympathy in the everyday sense of the word does not consist in the process of trans-
forming a conception into a feeling experience; not even as transforming a concep-
tion of the other being attractive, funny, interesting, or nice into a feeling of pleasure. 
  Humean benevolence resembles the way we use the expression fellow-feeling in 
everyday language today, namely as fellow-joy and as fellow-suffering, i.e., pity, al-
though today we do not use the expressions pity and fellow-joy in the meaning of a 
wish, what Hume calls a desire, but rather as a feeling experience which is casually 
connected to wishes. Today we do not use the expression ‘sympathy’ in direct con-
nection with ‘fellow-feeling’, neither as meaning fellow-joy, nor as pity. Hume’s ex-
ample of a case of sympathy, namely from watching a shipwreck, shows the differ-
ence between his concept of sympathy and that of today’s everyday language: 
Suppose I am now in safety at land, and wou’d willingly reap some pleasure from 
this consideration: I must think on the miserable condition of those who are at sea in a 
storm, and must endeavour to render this idea as strong and lively as possible, in or-
der to make me more sensible of my own happiness. But whatever pains I may take, 
the comparison will never have an equal efficacy, as if I were really on the shore, and 
saw a ship at a distance, tost by a tempest, and in danger every moment of perishing 
on a rock or a sand-bank. But suppose this idea to become still more lively. Suppose 
the ship to be driven so near me, that I can perceive distinctly the horror, painted on 
the countenance of the seamen and passengers, hear their lamentable cries, see the 
dearest friends give their last adieu, or embrace with a resolution to perish in each 
other’s arms: No man has so savage a heart as to reap any pleasure from such a spec-
tacle, or withstand the motions of the tenderest compassion and sympathy.51 
 
                                                 
49 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature p. 382. 
50 ibid. pp. 385. 
51 ibid. p. 594. 
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  Today we would not say that watching a shipwreck would inspire to sympathy 
with the crew and passengers; instead, we would say that it would give us a shock 
and give rise to fear for the lives of those aboard, and possibly to pity with their suf-
fering. Pity, according to the way we use the expression today, as suffering because 
of another person’s suffering, is a reactive feeling, i.e., an emotional reaction to the 
way one imagines another’s suffering. 
  Certainly we also sympathise with people who suffer, but still this means some-
thing else than pitying them. We do not, as in Hume, sympathise with others’ feel-
ings. If a person is suffering, one does not sympathise with his or her suffering, 
which makes one pity him or her, i.e., imagining his or her suffering and transform-
ing this picture into a feeling experience. Instead, one sympathises with the person, 
taking sides with him or her, which takes the form of an attitude of affirmation and 
of experiencing certain pleasant feelings in the intercourse with him or her.  
  According to the way we use the expressions today, pity has quite another intensity 
than the feelings included in sympathy. Sympathy may make it easier for one to ex-
perience fellow-joy or pity for the person: When pitying, our affirmative attitude of 
sympathy remains, but our feelings change from pleasant ones, above all of joy, into 
feelings of suffering. Our sympathy is thus changed into pity. But sympathy is not a 
necessary requirement for being able to pity someone, since we may well pity people 
with whom we do not sympathise, i.e., with whom we do not take sides as a willing-
ness to enter into some kind of partner relation because liking them personally, and 
the fact that we sympathise with a person does not mean that we will necessarily pity 
him in a situation where we have reason to suspect that he is suffering. Sympathy 
and pity, as containing opposite feelings, namely of joy and of pain respectively, 
cannot exist together: Pity, being such an intensive feeling, when it appears always 
replaces one’s sympathy. One cannot be joyful, which is part of what it means to 
sympathise with someone, and at the same time pity someone, since pitying means 
suffering with someone. Either there is pity without sympathy preceding it, or there 
is sympathy which does not vanish, even at the sight of suffering, or there is sympa-
thy which is replaced by pity, or one’s sympathy for the person vanishes without 
being replaced by pity.  
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  Neither is sympathy directly connected to fellow-joy. Whereas fellow-joy, like pity, 
is a reactive feeling, as joy because of the joy of another, sympathy is not necessarily 
reactive, and in most cases it is not. Sympathy connotes taking sides with someone, 
and thereby confirming one’s willingness to a partnership, either as colleagues or as 
friends. One can take sides with another person because one finds him or her intellec-
tually interesting or physically attractive, or because one judges his or her action to 
be morally good, and in all these cases one’s sympathy for the other has no relation 
to the other’s current feeling. Fellow-feeling, as fellow-joy and as pity, does not mean 
confirming one’s willingness to a partnership, either as colleagues or as friends or 
whatever, by taking sides with someone; it just means to feel. This means that sym-
pathy today has no direct relation to joy or to suffering in the other. 
  In Humean sympathy, our own person is not the object of any passion, and there is 
nothing which fixes our attention on ourselves.52 Likewise, sympathy in the everyday 
sense today is exclusively directed towards others: One cannot sympathise with one-
self. Sympathy as we use the expression in daily language must have an object which 
is not identical with the agent himself. Thus sympathy means a relation to another 
person, through the mental attitude included, which may facilitate fellow-feeling, but 
which is still distinct from fellow-feeling. 
  Humean sympathy is a sympathy also with those who are dead53, and today we 
would say that as we may love or hate or pity or even fear those who are already 
dead, likewise we can sympathise with them. We sympathise with people from the 
past whose ideas we evaluate positively, and we can also sympathise with the per-
sons themselves, if we believe them to have been helpful to others in their lifetime, 
for example. For Hume, complete sympathy requires sympathising not only with 
what one imagines to be a person’s present passion, but also what one imagines to be 
his or her future passion. Today we would not say that we sympathise with a per-
son’s future state, as consisting of feelings or whatever, since we do not sympathise 
with his or her state at all, but with him- or herself, and we would not say that right 
now we sympathise not only with the person now but also with him or her in the 
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future. On the other hand we may say that we sympathise with future generations of 
people not yet born, for example in a discussion of current environmental problems. 
 
 
‘SYMPATHISING’ AND ‘BEING SYMPATHETIC’ 
Our discussion of Humean sympathy has made it clear that according to the way we 
use the expression of sympathy today we do not sympathise with feelings. Instead, 
we sympathise with individual persons, with groups of persons, like for example 
with all those who make a serious effort to live healthily so as not to be a burden to 
the social system, with organisations like a political party, with ideologies, and with 
theoretical conceptions of value. For our purposes, namely to show how the every-
day expression of maturity is connected to that of morality, what is of interest is not 
sympathy with certain social groups, organisations, ideologies or ideals, but sympa-
thy with individual persons, and as we will see, ultimately with all other individuals, 
and this makes one take also society as a whole into regard for the sake of all its 
members.  
  In everyday language we say that one ‘feels sympathy’ for another person, and that 
one ‘shows’ another person sympathy, but we also say that a person is ‘sympathetic’. 
According to the way we use the expression, that someone is sympathetic is a 
judgement about that person’s appearance and behaviour. ‘Appearance’ means a 
person’s external attitude, which takes the form of body language: pose, facial ex-
pressions, gaze, tone of voice, and bodily movements. ‘Being sympathetic’ means 
appearing and behaving in a way which the person judging finds friendly, which 
means being polite and helpful in a way which the judge finds pleasant. Judging 
someone as being sympathetic in this sense indicates that one imagines that this per-
son has a friendly appearance most of the time and that he or she behaves friendly 
not only towards oneself right at the moment, but towards all or most other people 
over a longer period of time, which means that ‘being sympathetic’ connotes a cer-
tain habit of appearing in certain ways to others and of treating others in certain 
ways. This points to a continuity and universality in the meaning of the expression. 
  But rather than saying that the sympathetic person him- or herself feels sympathy 
or shows sympathy, we would say that the person who is judging another as being 
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sympathetic probably feels – and possibly shows - sympathy, namely for the person 
whom he or she judges as being sympathetic, which means that he or she is sympa-
thising with that other person. Thus whereas ‘being sympathetic’ is a quality which 
someone attributes to another person because of the way he or she interprets that 
person’s appearance and behaviour, which shows that it is a third person perspec-
tive, ‘sympathising’ connotes one’s own behaviour towards others, as a first person 
perspective: Whereas one would hardly call oneself ‘sympathetic’, one may well say 
that one sympathises with someone.  
  The person whom one judged as being sympathetic because he or she treated one in 
a way which one found friendly might be a civil servant doing his or her job cor-
rectly, which includes treating others politely and helpfully. Likewise, sympathy for 
someone is exhibited in friendly appearance and in friendly behaviour, i.e., as being 
polite and helpful. 
  ‘Sympathetic’ thus is a judgement of someone simply as appearing and as behaving 
in certain ways. It does not require of that person that he or she take a certain mental 
attitude towards others, and neither does it require having any special feelings. We 
do not expect from the civil servant that he or she shall like us personally, experienc-
ing joy and other pleasant feelings in our company, in the way our friends do. Sym-
pathising with someone on the other hand, according to the way we use the expres-
sion in daily language, cannot be reduced to appearance and behaviour, to just play-
ing a social role successfully by wearing a mask of friendliness through being polite 
and helpful, without taking any real interest in the other and without experiencing 
certain feelings. Sympathising with someone means a much more active form of en-
gagement than just politely and helpfully doing one’s job to avoid complaints from 
one’s senior officials, like in the case of the civil servant. Sympathising with someone 
includes taking an interest in the person which is not just an interest in the other as a 
client in a business relation, for example; it means taking an interest in the other on 
personal grounds. For this reason, sympathising with someone implies some sort of 
personal relation on the part of the person sympathising towards the other, but not 
necessarily one of reciprocity, as we will see later. 
  The fact that sympathising includes taking a personal interest in the other makes 
sympathising fragile, as distinguished from being sympathetic. Whereas the compe-
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tent civil servant or businessman/businesswoman will not change his or her appear-
ance and behaviour even if he or she becomes disappointed with the other’s behav-
iour, since being sympathetic is part of his or her task, sympathising, being much 
more personal, can well be punctual: One can well sympathise with someone at one 
moment and not at the next, because of a sudden disappointment, which indicates 
that sympathising must not take the form of a habit of treating all or most people 
friendly.  
  On the other hand, sympathising with someone does not require personal inter-
course: One may well establish a personal relation of some kind to a person whom 
one has never met, whom one knows only from hearsay, but of whom one has re-
ceived a good impression, simply by liking him or her, which is quite another rela-
tion than that of the civil servant or of the businessman/businesswoman to his or her 
client. 
  We sympathise with others because they fulfil certain criteria which we judge to be 
good. For example, we sympathise with persons who share our own views, e.g. po-
litical or moral or aesthetic, and with persons who act in a way which we approve of, 
for example in being helpful to others. We may sympathise with people whom we 
judge as being honest, brave, or just, for example, which are qualities which are 
thought to be of use to others. But often we sympathise with others because there is 
something which we hope to receive from them. Thus one may sympathise with an-
other person who is helpful to a third part because one hopes to receive help oneself. 
And it is not at all the case that we always sympathise with someone whose views 
and/or acting correspond to morality. People tend to sympathise with different 
things due to their personal taste, and not all of these things are useful to individuals 
or to society. We tend to sympathise with people whom we find physically attractive, 
nice, funny, intellectually interesting, etc., since these are qualities which we approve 
of, for which reason we receive pleasure from the intercourse with these persons. 
Such a sympathy is dependent on one’s expectation to receive further pleasure from 
the other by spending more time with him or her: We are affirmatively disposed to-
wards the other only as long as we believe that we can gain any pleasure from him or 
her, and we like a person more who gives us more pleasure. And for this reason, of-
ten people’s sympathy for others is not of long duration: When one feels bored or 
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irritated or disappointed by the other, one’s sympathy easily vanishes, since one does 
not expect to receive any more pleasure from him or her. This means that people of-
ten sympathise with a person in a certain situation but not in the next. 
  For Hume, similarity in character or manners as well as a relation through country, 
family, or work, or mere acquaintance, facilitate our sympathy.54 Similarity gives rise 
to approbation and therewith to pleasure, and pleasure gives rise to love, and rela-
tion or acquaintance produces love through the intimacy included. We naturally love 
our close relatives more than remote relatives, and strangers even less, and the closer 
the relation to the object, the more easily the conception of the other’s passion is con-
verted into a passion of our own. Further Hume claims that through our sympathy 
for others, we are influenced not only by what we imagine to be other persons’ pas-
sions, but also by their opinions, including their views concerning good and evil. 
People’s sympathy for each other gives rise to a uniformity in the mentality of those 
belonging to a certain nation.55 Concerning the propensity to sympathise with others 
and to receive their inclinations and sentiments, Hume says: 
This is not only conspicuous in children, who implicitly embrace every opinion 
propos’d to them; but also in men of the greatest judgment and understanding, who 
find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of 
their friends and daily companions.56 
 
  Hume’s claim that similarity in characters and relation in the form of nationality, 
family, work, or mere acquaintance facilitates our sympathy is true also of a sympa-
thy which is dependent on pleasure received from the other. Like Humean sympa-
thy, such a sympathy dependent on pleasure decreases with increasing distance; it is 
easier to sympathise with people whom we meet personally than with persons 
whom we know only through hearing, for the simple reason that we more easily re-
ceive pleasure from persons with whom we have direct intercourse. Further Hume’s 
claim that sympathy makes the agent take the other’s position, assuming his or her 
perspective, and therewith become influenced by his or her views, including his or 
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her views concerning moral good and evil, is true also of a sympathy dependent on 
pleasure received. 
  A sympathy of this kind makes one concentrate solely on the persons with whom 
one sympathises, which makes it impossible to take others into consideration when 
making a moral judgement. Further the fact that sympathy of this kind easily makes 
one influenced by the other’s views destroys one’s capacity for critically judging the 
views of those with whom one sympathises. A moral judgement which is based on a 
sympathy of this kind only says that those with whom one sympathises are to be 
supported or defended, which means that it must be a bad moral judgement. Conse-
quently sympathy of such a kind is a threat to the person’s moral competence, since 
it makes partial. 
  Sympathy with non-moral qualities like physical attraction or wittiness, or even 
with human weakness like laziness, i.e., with lack of energy, and in addition even 
with anti-moral qualities, i.e., with immoral ones like a child-like egoism, because the 
interpretation of the other as possessing such qualities gives us pleasure, is sympathy 
as a purely non-moral expression. This does not mean that we use the expression of 
sympathy in a negative (reprehensible) sense in daily language, that we consider it 
immoral. Not everything which is not moral is immoral; although in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle does not distinguish between morality and etiquette: Wittiness and 
tactfulness, joined in ευτραπελια, are part of morality, which means that a man who 
is not able to entertain, amuse, others  in a pleasant way is immoral; still today vari-
ous kinds of behaviour are no matter for morality, namely behaviour which concerns 
giving a good, i.e. pleasant impression, like telling good jokes, behaving well at table, 
dressing well or moving and speaking elegantly, what we call etiquette. This kind of 
behaviour is commonly used in a non-moral sense, as being socially relevant but 
nevertheless as being morally irrelevant: Unlike Aristotle, we would not call a person 
who does not know how to behave well at table ‘immoral’.  
  A sympathy which is based on the striving for pleasure makes people socialise: 
People meet with the aim of having a good time and of pursuing their interests, and 
they do this for their own sake, and this is done out of a sympathy with others which 
is neither moral nor immoral. 
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  We will now argue that the description of sympathy given above was premature, 
and that the everyday expression of sympathy is also used in a way which connects it 
to the everyday expression of morality, which makes it highly relevant in a discus-
sion of maturity and its moral relevance. This requires that we clarify the meanings 
of the two most relevant aspects of sympathy, namely mental attitude and feeling. 
  
 
AFFIRMATIVE MENTAL ATTITUDE 
We have noted that according to the way we use the expression in everyday lan-
guage, mental attitudes are no states but a directedness of the mind, actively created 
by the mind itself, to itself or to something else. Mental attitudes are always directed 
towards something, which means that they always have an object. This directedness 
takes the form of attention to and concentration on the object.  
  We receive thousands of stimuli in a single moment, but only a few are relevant as a 
source of information for living according to morality. We cannot absorb everything, 
and we have to concentrate on what is essential. My hunger or thirst, my tiredness, 
my irritation and fascination in other things, my memories of the past and expecta-
tions concerning the near future, colours and lights which are not connected to the 
problem at hand, pain, etc., nothing is allowed to disturb my morally relevant per-
ception of a situation. 
  In everyday language, ‘attention’ means a general preparedness or readiness to be 
sensitive to stimuli; it means that the mind is open to the context in which the object 
is to be found, and thus to relations of the object to other objects. But our attentive-
ness to ourselves and to our fellow-men must be regulated by concentration to be-
come effective. In everyday language, concentration means sorting out and choosing 
some aspects of reality as worthy of our attention, and focusing one’s mind on these, 
which makes one receptive to stimuli from the objects of one’s concentration and not 
from other objects. Thus a concentrated and at the same time attentive mind observes 
the object as well as the context. 
  We have also noted that taking a mental attitude towards something is something 
much more active than just passively experiencing a feeling; one can directly, 
through an effort of the will, take a mental attitude, for example in forcing oneself to 
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become interested in another person. According to the everyday use of the expres-
sions of feeling and mental attitude today, attitudes are more durable dispositions 
than feelings. We take an interest in something over a longer period of time, but we 
feel joy only during a short moment. 
  Whereas the feeling, according to the way we use the expression in daily language, 
is an experienced state, the mental attitude is a relation, and according to the way we 
use the expression ‘relation’ in connection with the expression ‘attitude’ in the mean-
ing of a mental attitude, one does not experience a relation. According to the every-
day meaning of ‘attitude’ as meaning mental attitude and of ‘experience’, one does 
not experience a mental attitude in the meaning of the mind being directed towards 
an object; instead, certain experiences are made possible through this directedness of 
the mind, or more exactly, through our perception of the object towards which the 
mental attitude is directed. The everyday expression ‘mental attitude’ implies the 
expressions ‘concentration’ and ‘attention’, and according to the way we use these 
expressions, one can be aware of one’s concentration and attention, by which one 
may conclude that one has taken a certain attitude as meaning a mental attitude. In 
addition one experiences feeling states, according to the meaning of the expression 
‘feeling state’ in everyday language, and ‘feeling state’ and ‘attitude’ in the meaning 
of a mental attitude imply each other semantically, that is, depending on their mean-
ings, certain feelings imply certain mental attitudes and the other way round. The 
way we use the expression ‘being interested’ implies for example the expression 
‘feeling excited’. But this does not mean that ‘being interested’ itself means an ex-
perience; instead, it implies ‘feeling excited’ (among other things), which means ex-
periencing something. Further, the meaning of the everyday expression of attitude in 
the meaning of a mental attitude differs from that of ‘wish’ in that wishing means 
wanting something, it means an exercise of one’s will, an individual act of willing, 
whereas a mental attitude is a relation, a directedness of the mind towards an object, 
in attention and concentration.  
  Hume’s notes on pride in A Treatise of Human Nature will help clarifying the nature 
of the mental attitude included in sympathy, by showing what it is not. For Hume, 
whereas the object of love is another person, the object of pride is oneself. Pride is 
pleasant, and except for oneself, the object of pride is also what gives one pleasure, 
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and these two things are closely connected: Pride is a satisfaction with oneself arising 
form the perception of one’s own good qualities or one’s external goods. An object 
which excites pride is always considered with a view to oneself: One is proud only of 
something which is related to oneself, like one’s beautiful house, not of beauty as 
such. Therewith pride turns one’s attention towards one’s self, making one think of 
one’s own qualities and circumstances.57 
  As distinguished from Humean pride, the mental attitude included in sympathy is 
not directed towards oneself, but only towards others: As we noted in the section on 
Humean sympathy, one cannot sympathise with oneself. And since we are here in-
terested in mental attitude as part of what we mean by a sympathy which is con-
nected to a morally relevant maturity in the everyday sense, taking a mental attitude 
here means that the mind is directed towards individuals, not towards things like 
political movements, political ideologies, or conceptions of value. 
  Taking a mental attitude towards someone means creating a certain kind of relation 
to the other, and usually this relation is qualitative, i.e., it means being well or ill, fa-
vourably or unfavourably disposed towards the person, which means that mental 
attitudes are mostly pro or con, although they can be neutral. One example of being 
well, favourably, disposed towards another person is the mental attitude which we 
call interest. Interest in the external world is a directedness of the mind towards 
something else than itself. One is not interested in general, one is interested in some-
thing, and interest is directedness towards objects which have been, which are, and 
which may become objects of one’s perception. One is almost always interested in 
something, and one is interested in various things, but one’s interest always takes the 
form of concentration and attention. Taking an interest in someone means taking a 
mental attitude of affirmation of the object of one’s interest, of an affirmative accep-
tance of the object as being something which deserves one’s attention and concentra-
tion.  
  We may clarify the meaning of the everyday expression of interest by comparing it 
with that of curiosity. As distinguished from interest, curiosity as we use the expres-
sion in daily language is not directed towards what is relevant. It is momentary and 
may easily vanish. Curiosity implies self-centredness, which interest as such does 
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not, since curiosity is the striving for acquisition of knowledge for one’s own sake, to 
satisfy one’s own intellectual needs. Interest on the other hand must not necessarily 
aim at the mere acquisition of knowledge. Instead it can be part of a wider pattern of 
understanding the world for the sake of fulfilling the demands of morality. This is 
the case in interest in others for their sake. Such an interest is not motivated by per-
sonal wishes, which means that it is not self-centred. 
  The meanings of the everyday expressions of experiencing pleasant feelings, of tak-
ing sides with someone, and of forming a favourable conception of someone are con-
nected. Sympathy includes joy at human intercourse, which means experiencing cer-
tain pleasant feelings in the person’s company or at the thought of him or her. This 
motivates to taking a certain mental attitude towards the person, which not only con-
sists in taking an interest in him or her, but furthermore in taking sides with the per-
son, thereby confirming a willingness to enter into a partnership of some kind, as 
colleagues, or, more personal, as friends. Further the pleasant feeling which we call 
joy motivates to forming a favourable conception of the person through making cer-
tain favourable judgements of him or her as being ‘nice’ or ‘friendly’, for example. 
On the other hand, according to the way we use the expression ‘interest’ in daily lan-
guage, although as being a mental attitude it is not itself a feeling, it is still connected 
to some form of tension, which gives an impulse, a feeling of energy and stimulation. 
One feels wakeful, delighted, exhilarated, excited and/or intrigued, perhaps expec-
tant, and joyful. Thus, according to our everyday use of the expressions, the mental 
attitude of interest gives a feeling of pleasure and thus of joy. This is what it means to 
‘feel interested’. This means that the everyday expressions of attitude in the meaning 
of an affirmative mental attitude and of the feeling of joy are semantically connected 
and that they mutually imply each other. 
  All this together, experiencing joy at the intercourse with the other, taking an af-
firmative mental attitude towards him or her and forming a conception of him or her 
as being good in some way, is what we mean by ‘liking’ a person. The everyday ex-
pression of sympathy means liking another person in this sense, which means that 
sympathy as we use the expression in daily language includes both a feeling and a 
mental attitude, among other things.  
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  The fact that the meaning of the everyday expression of sympathy corresponds to 
that of liking someone becomes clearer if we compare the meaning of liking someone 
to that of admiring someone. Like liking someone, admiration for someone too is 
made up by a complex of pleasant feeling, affirmative mental attitude, and the con-
ception of someone as being in some way good. But whereas ‘admiration’ in the eve-
ryday sense of the word means experiencing very strong/intensive feelings at the 
intercourse with the other, focusing completely on the other person whom one ad-
mires, and forming a conception of the other as being in some sense extraordinary 
good, as being exemplary, liking someone just implies a certain joy at the intercourse 
or thought of the other, taking an interest in and taking sides with the other, and 
forming a view of the other as being good, often in a rather trivial sense – as we have 
noted, for example as being ‘nice’. The meaning of sympathy in everyday language 
clearly comes closer to the meaning of liking someone than to admiring someone: 
The feeling included in sympathy is less intensive than that of admiration, the mental 
attitude in sympathy is less strongly affirmative, and the judgement concerning the 
other is more modest. This makes it clear that the meaning of the everyday expres-
sion of sympathy corresponds to the meaning of the everyday expression of liking 
someone, and thus by explaining the meaning of the everyday expression of liking 
someone we have also explained the meaning of the everyday expression of sympa-
thy. 
   
 
FRIENDLY FEELING 
As we have noted, sympathising with someone includes ‘feeling sympathy’ for the 
person. With ‘showing someone sympathy’ we associate a friendly appearance (body 
language) and friendly behaviour, being ‘nice’ and helpful, for example. Conse-
quently we may assume that the feeling included in sympathy is what we would call 
a ‘friendly feeling’. 
  Today, the ‘friendly feeling’ is the kind of feeling which friends tend to have for 
each other, which means quite another thing than what is meant by love of man in 
daily language. We do not say that one ‘loves’ a friend; a person who feels very 
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strongly-intensively for his or her friend does not experience a friendly feeling, but 
instead the emotion of love, which must not be of an erotic kind.  
  We have noted that our everyday use of the expression interest is connected to our 
everyday use of the expression joy, namely at human intercourse: A person who 
takes an interest in others experiences joy in their company, and joy at human inter-
course is what we mean with a friendly feeling. This implies that the meanings of the 
expressions ‘attitude’ in the meaning of affirmative mental attitude and ‘friendly feel-
ing’ are connected; the expression ‘affirmative mental attitude’ implies the expres-
sion ‘friendly feeling’, and, due to their meanings, having a friendly feeling implies 
that the mind is directed towards something in a mental attitude of affirmation. 
  Aristotle does not distinguish between friendship and love. φιλια includes all kinds 
of affection between human beings: parental love, erotic love, and friendship.  (Aris-
totle does not discuss what today we would call love of man.) The affection con-
tained in φιλια, both as love and as friendship, implies intimacy, which requires re-
ciprocity, i.e., affection in both partners, based on mutual acquaintance and liking 
each other. Thus it cannot be practised towards people one has never met. And there 
is no φιλια, i.e., neither love nor friendship, for inanimate objects, because if there 
were, then our affection could not be returned, and we could not wish for the good of 
the object. A φιλια which is not based on utility, i.e., on hopes for gaining something 
from the other, nor on direct pleasure from the human intercourse itself, and which is 
not of an erotic kind, but which is based on moral goodness, takes some time to de-
velop, since getting to know a person and acquiring the intimacy needed takes some 
time.58 
  Certainly today the everyday expression ‘friendship’ too implies a certain intimacy, 
but the expression ‘friendly feeling’ does not imply the expression ‘friendship’. 
Whereas ‘friendship’ implies ‘reciprocity’, ‘friendly feeling’ does not: According to 
the way we use the expression of friendly feeling in everyday language, one can well 
like another person and enjoy his or her company without the other returning one’s 
friendly feeling. As distinguished from fellow-joy, it has no direct connection to the 
other person’s feelings; it is not dependent on the way the agent interprets the feel-
ings of others, and it is well possible without the other person experiencing any kind 
                                                 
58 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1155a16-1156b26. 
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of feeling or taking any mental attitude towards us at all, and without the other 
showing any special body language; in fact the other must not even be conscious of 
us, and it does not require knowing much about the other. For this reason, the 
friendly feeling does not imply intimacy. 
  But there is also Aristotelian φιλια of an incomplete while undeveloped kind, since, 
if at all mutual, it is not recognised by both parties. This Aristotle calls goodwill 
(ευνοια).59 According to the way we use the expression of friendly feeling today, it 
seems to come closer to the meaning of this concept of goodwill. Aristotelian good-
will consists of an affection which, like today’s friendly feeling, is without intensity. 
Like this kind of affection, which is spontaneous and sudden, today’s friendly feeling 
too can be spontaneous and sudden, as when one immediately starts liking someone 
because of a good impression received. Unlike Aristotelian friendship, Aristotelian 
goodwill does not allow for reciprocity, i.e., if two persons have the feeling of good-
will towards each other, then this is not known to them. Aristotelian goodwill can be 
practised towards people one has never met; it is enough that one believes the other 
to be good or helpful. Whereas, as we have seen, sympathy can be based on the hope 
for receiving pleasure from the other, Aristotelian goodwill cannot be based on hopes 
for personal advantage, because then the object of one’s ‘goodwill’ is oneself. It is 
never aroused by utility or pleasure, and it is without ‘desire’, Aristotle says.60 
  Although today the friendly feeling does not require reciprocity, it does not exclude 
it: Certainly two persons may well have friendly feelings towards each other. And if 
we have reason to assume that the other enjoys our company, that it makes him or 
her feel joy because of the pleasure it gives him, then this gives us an additional 
pleasure and thus joy, according to the meaning and thus implications of the every-
day expression of joy. In this sense our pleasure corresponds to his or her pleasure 
and our joy to his or her joy. But this is by no means necessary for sympathy in the 
everyday sense, and if it happens, then it rather strengthens the sympathy we al-
ready have for the other.  
  As we noted in the section on feelings and emotions, all feeling experiences make 
the mind self-centred to some extent, but because of its lack of intensity, the feeling 
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included in sympathy does not mean such a high degree of self-centredness as love 
of man does. Further the friendly feeling can, but must not necessarily, be a result of 
the belief that one can gain pleasure from the other. If it is the result of such a belief, 
then it makes especially self-centred; if not, then the friendly feeling, since it is not 
compatible with feelings like fear, anger, or disgust, and since one always has feel-
ings of some sort, may well represent the lowest degree of self-centredness possible 
in a human mind. 
  Our comparison with the Aristotelian concepts of friendship and goodwill has 
made it clear that the friendly feeling lacks intensity, that it does not require reciproc-
ity, but that it does not exclude it; that it does not require intimacy, and thus that it 
does not require much knowledge about the other. It can be spontaneous and sud-
den, and it can be experienced towards strangers. It is not dependent on the other 
fulfilling certain criteria, neither moral nor non-moral, and it is not necessarily moti-
vated by self-centred psychophysical wishes and expectations of pleasure, nor by the 
expectation that the other can be useful to oneself. This means that the friendly feel-
ing must not necessarily be punctual, experienced only in certain situations; it can 
also be continuous and universal, as joy at the intercourse with or thought of others 
simply as human beings. 
  Since the friendly feeling is no intensive feeling, it is no hindrance to critical reflec-
tion and to prudence. Although one likes one’s friend and experiences joy at the in-
tercourse with him or her, one is still not as emotionally involved with him or her 
that one cannot deliberate on his or her faults, as well as on what is good for oneself.  
 
 
UNIVERSAL SYMPATHY 
After having clarified the mental attitude and the feeling included in sympathy, we 
will now examine a meaning of sympathy according to which sympathy is not moti-
vated by the striving for pleasure. 
  Neither Humean sympathy, nor a sympathy motivated by the striving for pleasure 
are continuous, nor are they universal: They are both directed towards persons who 
in one’s own judgement deserve one’s sympathy. This means that both are punctual, 
i.e., they are activated in certain cases only, and they are more easily activated if the 
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other person fulfils certain criteria; in Humean sympathy above all strong suffering, 
in sympathy in the everyday sense of the word today what pleases the agent. But the 
fact that according to the meaning of ‘sympathy’ today, one can sympathise with 
people whom one knows only from hearsay, i.e., with people whom one has never 
met, for example because one hears that they do good to others, and with people 
who are already dead, for example because one hears that they did good to others 
during their lifetime, points to the fact that there is what we have chosen to call a 
universal sympathy, directed towards all men, which is not motivated by the striving 
for pleasure. 
  Except for feelings, Aristotelian friendship and goodwill as they are presented in the 
Nicomachean Ethics both contain an attitude of being well-adopted towards another 
person, of wishing for his or her well-being for his or her own sake. We have reason 
to assume that we use the everyday expression of sympathy too in this sense, i.e., 
that – on occasion - we sympathise with the other not for our own sake but for his or 
her sake, and if this is true, then it makes the everyday expression of sympathy rele-
vant in a discussion of the connection between the everyday expressions of maturity 
and of morality.  
  A sympathy motivated by the striving for pleasure means taking a personal interest 
in the other for one’s own sake, which means that it is dependent on the agent’s own 
preferences, what he or she likes and dislikes. This means creating a personal relation 
to the other, even if this relation is only from the agent to the other, i.e., one’s interest 
is not returned. Such a personal interest motivated by one’s own striving for pleasure 
will easily vanish in the face of a disappointment, if the other does not fulfil one’s 
criteria. But the everyday expression of sympathy is also used in the meaning of tak-
ing an interest in the other for his or her own sake, which is a concern for others. This 
means that the other, what supports him or her and makes his or her life worth living 
to him or her, is important to one. Such an interest is not motivated by the striving 
for pleasure, and thus it is not a personal interest: it is not dependent on the agent’s 
own preferences, what he or she likes and dislikes, and thus it is not dependent on 
the other fulfilling certain criteria like being beautiful or funny. In this sense it is not 
personal: It does not take the form of a personal relation to the other, neither as 
friends, nor as colleagues, nor as allies.  
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  Unlike Humean sympathy which is influenced by similarity and personal relation, 
and which decreases with increasing distance in space, what we have chosen to call a 
universal sympathy is influenced neither by similarity between the agent and the 
other person, nor by some kind of personal relation, and it does not decrease with 
increasing distance in space. The other is the object of one’s sympathy simply as be-
ing a fellow human being in a brotherhood of men. This also allows for sympathising 
with future generations of yet unborn human beings.  
  A sympathy of this kind, which is not motivated by the striving for pleasure and 
which thus is not dependent on the other fulfilling certain criteria, is more stable than 
an interest motivated by the striving for pleasure: It will not easily vanish in the face 
of a sudden disappointment, which means that it can be continuous. It can also be 
universal, directed towards all men, since individual differences in looks or manners 
do not matter. Everyone with whom the agent comes into contact immediately be-
comes the object of his sympathy, and it is as strong towards all men.  
  A sympathy which is not dependent on the striving for pleasure comes closer to the 
meaning of the everyday expression of love of man, but without its intensity in feel-
ing, and without its exclusive focusing on one single individual at a time. Unlike 
Humean sympathy and love of man in the everyday sense today, a universal sympa-
thy, as we have chosen to call it, is no focusing of all one’s attention on anyone, as a 
concentration excluding attention to others. Although according to the way we use 
the expression in everyday language, love of man is universal in the sense of being 
directed towards all individuals, where no-one is excluded, it is not necessarily di-
rected towards more than one individual at a time, and it means a complete concen-
tration on human beings and their present condition, which does not allow for taking 
also what is good or necessary for the survival of all individuals into regard, namely 
the stability and continuity of society. Sympathy on the other hand can be directed 
towards several individuals at the same time, i.e., not only towards one single indi-
vidual who is in need of help, but towards all who are involved in a certain situation, 
and in addition it allows for taking also society as a whole into regard for the sake of 
all its members, which makes the everyday expression of sympathy morally more 
relevant than the everyday expression of love of man. 
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  Further a universal sympathy does not make the agent take the other’s position, 
assuming his or her perspective, and therewith becoming influenced by his or her 
views. Such an influence requires a sympathy which is directed towards a certain 
person or a certain group only, which advocates a certain view or views. One cannot 
assume the perspective of everyone, since the perspectives of different people collide, 
which implies that a universal sympathy, which is directed towards everyone, would 
not be possible if it influenced the agent to take on the views of all other men. This 
indicates that a universal sympathy must exclude being influenced by the opinions of 
others. 
  For these reasons, a sympathy which is not motivated by the striving for pleasure is 
connected to morality as the expression is used in everyday language, and this makes 
the everyday expression of sympathy relevant in our study of the everyday expres-
sion of maturity. 
  In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume speaks of restricting one’s selfish passions by 
wilfully changing their direction: Although we cannot change our feelings, we can 
change their direction. At first this is done for self-interested reasons: We all have an 
interest in restraining our selfish feelings, since this preserves society. This self-
restriction out of selfish reasons is by itself replaced by a genuine disinterestedness: 
What supports society now pleases us, and what threatens it displeases us, and we 
are now pleased by a character which is fitted to be useful to others or to the person 
him- or herself or which is agreeable to others or to the person him- or herself, even if 
this does not support us personally.61 
  Similary to Hume, we may well imagine a habituation not only of appearance and 
of behaviour, but also of mental attitude, and therewith of feeling. A sympathy moti-
vated by the striving for pleasure can change into a sympathy which is not motivated 
by the striving for pleasure. Sympathy as mental attitude and as feeling can be 
trained to become continuous and universal, as a natural part of the person’s mental 
constitution. This is done by wilfully taking a mental attitude of interest in all other 
human beings for their sake, which means that it is universal, directed towards all 
men in all situations. This will raise the corresponding joy at the intercourse with and 
                                                 
61 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature pp. 492, 517, 533, 591. 
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thought of all one’s fellow-men. With the time, keeping one’s affirmative mental atti-
tude no longer demands any effort of will. 
 
 
SYMPATHY AND MATURITY 
In the everyday sense of the word, ‘maturity’ means the capacity to live according to 
morality, which requires being able to make moral judgements which when they are 
acted on realise the aims of morality in the everyday sense of the word. Morality  in 
the everyday sense demands the support of all other members of society, which re-
quires taking all men into consideration when making a moral judgement. Taking an 
affirming attitude of interest in other people for their sake, and experiencing certain 
feelings towards others, feelings which we call friendly, makes the life of these others 
and the fact that their lives are worth living to them important to one. This is a pre-
supposition for wanting to live morally, and wanting to live morally is needed for 
being able to live morally, to fulfil the demands of morality. Sympathy motivates to 
wishing to support other people, which means supporting the realisation of the aims 
of morality. This motivates to making mature judgements and to act on them.  
  Further the affirmative mental attitude included in universal sympathy means con-
centrating on the relevant aspects of reality, what is relevant for making a mature 
judgement, and being attentive to the context, i.e., two perspectives, one focused, and 
one wide. This includes paying attention to the psychology of the persons involved: 
to their wishes and to their intentions, and to what they are capable of doing and 
what they are prepared to do.  
  In addition, the mature person’s feelings are such feelings which support his or her 
moral judgement-making, that is, which motivate to making mature judgements and 
acting on them and which support the process of making true factual judgements 
which are used as information material in the process of making mature judgements. 
The feelings which best satisfy these requirements are those which we mean when 
we use the expression sympathy: Pleasant feelings without intensity, i.e., friendly 
feelings, which express themselves as joy at the company of the other. Sympathy re-
places mental phenomena which contain self-centred attitudes and destructive feel-
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ings: hatred, contempt, disgust, envy, or fear. These are neutralised by one’s sympa-
thy. 
  Thus a universal sympathy as mental attitude and as feeling is needed for moral 
competence in judgement and in action.  
  Intensive/strong feelings like the emotion of love do not allow for critical reflection 
and for prudence, which are a requirement for autonomy, and thus for maturity. In-
stead they motivate to making judgements which do not have to take either the agent 
him- or herself, nor all other human beings into consideration. For this reason, love of 
man is not optimal for realising the basic demands of morality in a longer time per-
spective, and since maturity implies such a competence, it is not compatible with 
love of man. 
  On the other hand, a universal, continuous sympathy implies autonomy in a certain 
meaning of the word, namely as a morally relevant autonomy, one which gives a 
moral competence in judging and in acting and thus in realising the aims of morality. 
This meaning of autonomy corresponds to our everyday use of the expression of ma-
turity. And since maturity is continuous, and since morality demands taking all men 
into consideration when judging how to act, the kind of sympathy allowing for ma-
turity must be continuous and universal. 
  The mental attitude included in universal sympathy is the key to maturity: A person 
who takes such an attitude towards others will experience feelings of joy at the inter-
course with others, and his or her sympathy, as a universal, continuous affirmative 
mental attitude and as a continuous feeling experience, will make him or her 
autonomous enough to fulfil the aims of morality, which means that he or she is ma-
ture in the everyday sense of the word.  
  In the next chapter we will examine the everyday expression of autonomy and its 
relation to those of morality, maturity, sympathy, and mature judgement. This will 
also make clear how the everyday expression of sympathy is related to these other 
expressions.  
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Chapter 3 
Autonomy 
 
 
MATURITY, AUTONOMY, AND SYMPATHY: AN OVERVIEW 
In the last chapter we saw that the everyday expression of maturity implies a certain 
meaning of the everyday expression of sympathy, namely a sympathy which is con-
tinuous and universal. But certainly in everyday language today we do not use 
‘sympathy’ as a synonym for ‘maturity’, and it is not even certain that we necessarily 
think of a mature person as having sympathy for others. We will have to further clar-
ify the connection between the everyday expressions of maturity and sympathy, and 
we will do it by an analysis of the everyday expression of autonomy. 
  In this chapter we will show that the meaning of the everyday expression of matur-
ity corresponds to a certain meaning of the everyday expression of autonomy, and 
thus that ‘maturity’ means a autonomy of a certain kind, namely one which gives the 
capacity to live according to the demands of morality. Autonomy in this sense gives 
the capacity to make mature judgements and to act on them, and thus a moral com-
petence, namely in furthering the good of those others with whom one has direct in-
tercourse as well as of all members of society. 
  This is an autonomy which is formed by, i.e., which is made possible by, as well as 
being given its direction by, and thus being restricted by, what we have chosen to 
call a universal sympathy, according to a certain use of the expression of sympathy in 
daily language. This means that the way we use the expressions of sympathy and 
autonomy in daily language today implies that a person with a continuous, universal 
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sympathy for others is autonomous in a sense which gives him a moral competence, 
and this kind of autonomy is what is meant by the everyday expression of maturity.  
  Probably most people are not aware of this connection between the everyday ex-
pressions of sympathy and of maturity through the everyday expression of auton-
omy, and our study will help clarifying the semantics of these expressions in daily 
language, which may change our view of and our use of these expressions.  
  We will start by examining Kant’s concept of autonomy, and this will make it clear 
that autonomy today means something rather different from what Kant had in mind. 
We will then discuss Kupfer’s concept of autonomy, and we will see that it comes 
much closer to today’s autonomy than Kantian autonomy does. This discussion will 
further help clarifying the meaning of autonomy. Some additional notes on other 
modern authors will fill in the picture enough for our purposes, namely to exhibit the 
semantic connections between the everyday expressions of maturity, sympathy, 
autonomy, morality, and mature judgement. 
 
 
KANT AND AUTONOMY TODAY 
The basis for Kant’s concept of autonomy as it is presented in his Grundlegung zur 
Metaphysik der Sitten is a will which is free from all influence from interest as stimu-
lus or compulsion, from what is important to one personally, from desires, i.e., (psy-
chophysical) wishes, for one’s own benefit, as well as from feelings like pleasure. It is 
determined solely by reason. Such a will without incentives says that one shall be 
able to want that one’s maxim, i.e., the principle according to which one acts, should 
become a universal law, valid for all rational beings. This is the categorical impera-
tive, and it is the sole principle of morality. The categorical imperative accepts moral 
views only if these can be universalised. As an example, one cannot want a life in 
idleness and pleasure to be universally prescribed, Kant says.62 
  According to Kant in the Grundlegung, only a will determined solely by reason is a 
free will.63 Autonomy is the freedom of the will, and this is the capacity of the will to 
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63 ibid. p. 255. 
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be a law to itself.64 The will exercises its freedom in creating the categorical imperati-
ve and in subjecting itself to it.65 Being autonomous thus means letting one’s will be 
guided by one’s reason only, and such a will, a free will, is a will which is subjected 
to its own moral law, i.e., the categorical imperative. This means that Kantian auton-
omy takes the form of a mental act only, and thus not of practical, physical, action. 
  The everyday expression of autonomy today connotes being able to decide for one-
self what is important to one, i.e., to form one’s own opinions concerning what is 
preferable, and to decide for oneself how one wants to be, i.e., to influence one’s own 
mental life, to judge oneself what to do in practical action, and to perform the corre-
sponding actions. Thus autonomy includes being empowered to act on one’s will, to 
realise one’s will in practical action, that is, to live according to one’s own mind. Thus 
according to the everyday meaning of the expression, the autonomous person is not 
only able to want something freely, he or she is able to influence and thus modify his 
or her own mental life and to form his or her own life in practical action, which 
means that autonomy today takes the form not only of a mental act like in Kant, but 
also of practical action. Forming one’s own life means taking care of oneself in daily 
life and fulfilling oneself, i.e., securing one’s survival and making one’s life accept-
able to oneself, and furthermore, making one’s life worth living to oneself. 
  Further, whereas Kantian autonomy requires that one’s will is determined solely by 
reason, which means that it excludes any kind of influence, autonomy does not ex-
clude influence on one’s will of any sort that Kant mentions, neither from interest, 
nor from what one finds important to oneself, nor from psychophysical wishes, nor 
from feelings. And in addition it does not exclude influence from other persons’ 
wills, views, and emotional reactions. These things are all allowed to influence one’s 
will, if only one has checked them and found them acceptable, which means that one 
judges that they are compatible with what one thinks is important and correct, either 
in the situation, as being useful, or while corresponding to reality, as being true. 
  The fact that Kantian autonomy as presented in the Grundlegung manifests itself in 
creating a moral principle and in subjecting one’s will to it means that Kant can de-
rive morality from his concept of autonomy, since autonomy determines what is 
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65 ibid. pp. 228. 
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morally right or wrong: What one can do out of free will in the Kantian sense is mor-
ally allowed, and what one cannot do out of free will is morally prohibited. For this 
reason a human being, if only he or she chooses to use his or her reason, always 
knows what is morally correct: The categorical imperative makes it possible to dis-
tinguish between good and evil, and by following it, one always knows what to do 
morally, he says. 
  Autonomy in the everyday sense today on the other hand as such gives no moral 
guidelines. As we have noted, it is the capacity to decide for oneself what is impor-
tant to one, which means forming one’s own opinions concerning what is right and 
wrong, and to decide for oneself how to act. This does not imply a certain morality; 
autonomy today gives one the freedom to choose, but it cannot tell one what to 
choose. Thus whereas Kantian autonomy is a moral concept, autonomy in the every-
day sense today is not; like the everyday expression of rationality, it is non-moral, 
morally indifferent. Later we will see that an autonomy which is based on sympathy 
in a certain sense of the word indirectly implies a certain morality, but what implies 
this morality is in reality sympathy, and not autonomy as such. 
  Kant’s definition of autonomy, as creating and subjecting one’s will to a certain 
moral principle, means that Kantian autonomy is punctual, i.e., it is exercised only in 
certain cases, namely when the agent is confronted with a moral problem situation. 
Only in such a situation is there a reason to ask oneself whether one can want that a 
certain action shall be prescribed as a universal law. This is the mental act which con-
firms one’s autonomy. According to the way we use the expression of autonomy in 
everyday language today, autonomy is nothing which one has at one moment and 
not at the next; autonomy is manifested not only in moral problem situations, but in 
a continuous exercise of influence over one’s mental life and in continuously forming 
one’s life in practical action. 
  In the Grundlegung Kant assumes that all men can easily reason themselves to the 
categorical imperative and that everyone can subject his or her will to it: It requires 
no special intelligence and no experience of life,66 and as consisting solely in an act of 
the will, of course it does not require access to any material goods. This means that 
everyone can be autonomous, and that there are no degrees of autonomy. Either one 
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is autonomous or one is not; either one creates and subjects one’s will to the moral 
law for the right reasons, and then one is autonomous, or one does not, and then one 
is not autonomous. 
  But according to the way we use the expression of autonomy in daily language, 
people differ in their autonomy: Some men are more autonomous than others, since 
some exercise a stronger influence over themselves and over their own lives than 
others do. They are more certain of what they want, they fear less, and they have 
more energy, which makes them more able to concentrate on performing the tasks 
they have formulated for themselves, and they are more independent of others, ma-
terially, emotionally, and prescriptive. 
  Our discussion of Kantian autonomy has shown that today’s everyday expression 
of autonomy means something quite different from Kantian autonomy, and it has 
given some hints concerning what autonomy today consists in. We will now discuss 
Kupfer’s theory of autonomy, which will further help clarifying the nature of today’s 
everyday expression of autonomy. 
 
 
KUPFER AND AUTONOMY TODAY 
In today’s philosophical literature, autonomy is defined as either self-determination 
(for example Kupfer, Steinfath), self-direction (for example Oshana, Berofsky), or 
self-governance/self-government (for example Kupfer, Oshana, Jacobs, Den Uyl),67 
and these concepts all mean much the same. For this reason, and since in this study 
we refer to philosophical theories only with the aim of clarifying common sense, we 
will here confine ourselves to a discussion of Kupfer’s concept of autonomy as put 
forward in his Autonomy and Social Interaction. We will see that Kupfer’s definition of 
autonomy comes much closer to the way we use the expression of autonomy in eve-
ryday language today than Kant’s definition does. 
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  Kupfer defines autonomy as self-determination, which means being self-governing, 
he says. This means arriving at one’s beliefs independently, by means of critical rea-
soning, and choosing for oneself what to think, namely one’s values, what one thinks 
is right and good, and what sort of person one wants to be and what one wants to do, 
based on these values. 
  Leaving aside for the moment the question of independently arriving at one’s be-
liefs,68 we may note that Kupfer’s demand of choosing one’s values and deciding 
oneself what sort of person one wants to be and what to do is met by autonomy in 
the everyday sense today: In our discussion of Kant, we noted that the everyday ex-
pression of autonomy today connotes being able to decide for oneself what is impor-
tant to one, i.e., to form one’s own opinions concerning what is preferable, and thus 
to decide for oneself how one wants to be, i.e., to influence one’s own mental life, as 
well as to judge oneself what to do in practical action. 
  The key word in Kupfer’s concept of autonomy is critical reasoning.69 For Kupfer, 
autonomy means choosing how to be, what to think, and what to do through decid-
ing what is especially important to one and how to realise this. Autonomy requires 
that one’s will is fully one’s own, and this requires deliberation not only on the 
means to satisfy one’s current desires, i.e., one’s (psychophysical) wishes, but also on 
their aims, assessing the value of one’s wishes in terms of their importance rather 
than in terms of their intensity, duration, or urgency. Autonomy thus requires acting 
out of a desire which one has evaluated and decided to act on. 
  In our discussion of Kant we concluded that autonomy means that one is oneself the 
origin of one’s choices and actions, which means choosing and acting according to 
one’s own will. But this will is not just any kind of will; carrying on with some activ-
ity which one finds boring because one knows that finishing this activity successfully 
will be rewarding is a sign of autonomy in the everyday sense, while giving way to 
one’s wish to stop doing it because of one’s boredom is a sign of lack of autonomy. 
This shows that the kind of will which is meant here is a will which corresponds to 
what one holds as being correct while being important to one, either as being useful 
or as being true, which means that it is a reasoned will, which corresponds to what 
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one thinks is right, what one has deliberated on and accepted as being the most rele-
vant thing to do. In the case just mentioned, of carrying on with a boring activity, one 
act of will opposes another, and the one which corresponds to what one finds correct 
while more important is the one which determines one’s autonomy. 
  Kupfer distinguishes between autonomy of judgement, of will, and of action. 
Autonomy of judgement or intellectual autonomy means being able to deliberate on 
the correctness of one’s beliefs and values by assessing their justification. Autonomy 
of will means being able to determine what should be willed, and to deliberate over 
choices, make decisions, and act on these. Being able to do what one wants Kupfer 
calls autonomy of action, which indicates that autonomy of action is part of auton-
omy of will. Autonomy both of judgement and of will Kupfer calls an overall auton-
omy.70 
  In our everyday use of the expression of autonomy, we do not distinguish between 
different kinds of autonomy in the way Kupfer does. Autonomy forms a unity, 
which as we have noted in our discussion of Kant makes it possible to form one’s 
own opinions concerning what is preferable, i.e., choosing one’s values oneself. This 
implies that autonomy makes it possible to determine what should be willed, and it 
also means being able to judge what to do and to act on one’s judgement, and thus to 
deliberate over choices, make decisions, and act on these. Therewith autonomy in the 
everyday sense includes all three kinds of autonomy mentioned by Kupfer. We will 
postpone the discussion whether autonomy implies being able to deliberate on the 
correctness of one’s beliefs and values by assessing their justification until the end of 
this chapter.71 
  Kupfer claims his concept of autonomy to be broader than that of Kant, which sim-
ply consists in self-legislation; Kupfer’s own concept of autonomy takes the abilities 
and dispositions which make us self-determining into consideration, he says.72 One’s 
autonomy is affected by a lot many things depending on one’s abilities and on the 
situation. Autonomy requires having a certain self-concept, namely a conception of 
oneself as an independent originator of thought and action. Further it requires inte-
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gration of one’s beliefs, opinions, interests and projects, i.e., that they form a unity, 
that is, that they fit together without contradiction, in which case one’s mind is one, it 
is not split. This makes it possible to understand and appreciate their implications for 
action and for thought, their meaning and weight, and it makes it possible to concen-
trate one’s powers on one purpose, thus giving the mind a certain direction, which 
makes autonomous. 
  According to Kupfer, autonomy is constrained by internal factors like mental retar-
dation, severe emotional disturbance, and mental disorders. Further it is constrained 
by external factors like deception and censorship: misdirection of the agent’s think-
ing and keeping him ignorant.73 Dependence on others takes the form of accepting 
other people’s judgement without having good reasons to think it reliable. It is a re-
sult of others’ interference, and of the agent’s own habituation, weakness, or choice. 
Autonomy therefore requires independence from interference and access to relevant 
information, and in addition having options for choice and action, being able to see 
the opportunities that exist, and being able to seize the opportunities at hand. Kupfer 
also mentions energy and self-discipline, access to certain means, and relevant skills - 
he speaks of flexibility, i.e., the ability to respond creatively and constructively to a 
variety of circumstances, which includes the ability to adapt to change.74 
  We will postpone our discussion of self-concept and self-integration in relation to 
autonomy until we have clarified the meaning of the everyday expression of self.75 
Kupfer’s notes on internal and external constraints certainly are valid also for auton-
omy. External constraints are a result of interference. As we have noted, autonomy 
does not exclude influence as long as one has deliberated on and chosen to accept 
this influence. On the other hand, autonomy does not allow for dependence on oth-
ers, neither emotional nor intellectual, which means influence which one has not re-
flected on and accepted. 
  Autonomy certainly requires certain means or instruments relevant for acting on 
one’s judgements, like money, as well as access to the information needed for making 
                                                 
73 Kupfer, Autonomy and Social Interaction p. 12. 
74 ibid. pp. 14, 23. 
75 This discussion is found on pp. 95-99. 
 89
good factual judgements, as well as skills in discerning opportunities which are 
given, and, as we have already noted, empowerment to act on one’s decisions. 
  Now it is time to consider Kupfer’s claim that autonomy means arriving at one’s 
beliefs independently, by means of critical reasoning, and being able to deliberate on 
the correctness of one’s beliefs and values by assessing their justification, what 
Kupfer calls autonomy of judgement or intellectual autonomy.  
  As we have seen, Kupfer defines dependence as accepting other people’s judgement 
without having good reason to think it reliable.76 Arriving at one’s beliefs independ-
ently thus means having deliberated on their correctness and having found that they 
are justified. We described dependence according to the way we use the expression 
in daily language as influence which one has not reflected on and accepted, and in 
our discussion of Kant we noted that autonomy in the everyday sense today requires 
critical examination of internal and external influence on the will, from one’s own 
mind, like feelings and wishes which on reflection one judges as being less impor-
tant, and from the minds of others, and on choosing whether to accept this influence 
or not, which means that this influence, if it is accepted, is willed by oneself. This 
means that autonomy today requires independent reasoning, and this implies that it 
requires having deliberated on and accepted as true at least one’s more important 
beliefs, which are beliefs which have a certain consequence for one’s life, without just 
accepting more important beliefs which might be motivated by wishes rather than 
being based on correct information concerning reality, and which may be the beliefs 
of others which likewise are motivated by wishes instead of being based on correct 
information. Consequently autonomy too requires having arrived at one’s beliefs 
independently, and thus this aspect of Kupfer’s theory of autonomy too is covered by 
autonomy in the everyday sense today. 
  But according to Jacobs in Some Tensions Between Autonomy and Self-governance, hav-
ing been raised in a way that excludes certain kinds of perception and action so that 
it does not occur to one to think and act differently does still not exclude a consider-
able freedom of the will (‘voluntariness’) and thus autonomy, what he calls self-
governance. For a state to be voluntary, it is not required that the agent had complete 
control over its initiation and establishment; willingness to accept ends and practices 
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can be sufficient for the voluntariness of states and acts, Jacobs says.77 And Steinfath 
admits that it is not possible to acquire all information which may be relevant, and 
that it is not even possible to examine all the relevant information which one actually 
acquires. For this reason, in his Orientierung am Guten Steinfath allows for self-
determination (Selbstbestimmung) based on hypothetical reflection: The person would 
not have acted differently had he deliberated on the matter. But he stresses that in 
certain spheres and situations which are especially important for the person’s life, 
self-determination requires making explicit deliberations.78 
  This certainly is valid also for autonomy today. Checking all information oneself is 
simply not possible; a lot of things one has to take for granted, and the everyday ex-
pression of autonomy seems to be dependent more on reflection than on knowledge: 
on the critical examination of the information which one actually acquires, rather 
than on having access to all relevant information. But at least in more important 
questions of life, it will not do just to follow one’s habit; in such situations, actual, not 
only hypothetical, critical reflection is needed for autonomy according to the way we 
use the expression in daily language; the agent must reflect on the matter and choose 
according to what he himself thinks is correct. This does not exclude that the agent’s 
whole way of reasoning is something which reflects a certain intellectual tradition. 
  From the way our examinations of the concepts of autonomy of Kant and of Kupfer 
have revealed the meaning of autonomy to us, we may conclude that autonomy pri-
marily connotes the capacity to influence oneself, directly or indirectly, by accepting 
or rejecting internal or external influence, and therewith influencing who one is, and 
therewith forming one’s life oneself in taking care of oneself in daily life and in ful-
filling oneself, i.e., securing one’s survival and making one’s life acceptable to one-
self, and furthermore, making one’s life worth living to oneself. 
  Kupfer notes that deciding how one wants to be and how one wants to live gener-
ally has to do with the nature of the self. This implies that the self plays a crucial role 
in autonomy in the everyday sense today. For this reason, before we complete our 
examination of the nature of today’s autonomy, we will have to investigate what this 
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self is which the autonomous man is capable of influencing, i.e., what is meant by the 
expression ‘self’ in everyday language. 
 
THE SELF 
In both Aristotle and in Kant, man’s self is his reason. For Aristotle, the intellectual 
part, the thinking part, of man is the self,79 and Kant defines man’s genuine self both 
as intelligence (reason) and as will.80 This means that for both Aristotle and for Kant, 
the self is a purely mental factor. But according to Mischel and Mischel in Self-control 
and the Self, the expression ‘I cut myself’ shows that the self is a living organism, and 
they identify this living organism with the person.81 And according to Alston in Self-
Intervention and the Structure of Motivation, in ordinary speech we do not distinguish 
between self, person, and human being: The self is the real, unitary agent.82 
  If the self in the everyday sense is the same as the agent, then the self is the subject 
of deliberation, choice, and action. Likewise, Steinfath defines the self as the subject 
of all practical deliberations, i.e., all deliberations which aim at checking and guiding 
our decision-making and acting, which means also all non-moral decisions and 
acts.83 
  But philosophers have also been sceptical concerning the existence of a self. Accord-
ing to Johnstone in The Problem of the Self, we encounter persons in our everyday life, 
but we do not encounter selves, except possibly for our own. And Johnstone goes as 
far as calling the self a hypothesis used to explain the behaviour of persons, whereas 
we do not claim the existence of persons to be a hypothesis. Nearly everything that a 
person is and does can be adequately explained without appealing to the self, so 
there is almost never any need to invoke this hypothesis, he says.84 If Smith has ‘self-
control’, then Smith is in control of Smith rather than being in control of Smith’s self. 
And ‘self-consciousness’ is not consciousness of a self; it is either a person’s con-
sciousness of him- or herself, i.e., of a person, or consciousness of consciousness.85 
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  The expression ‘I cut myself’, mentioned above, gives at hand that in daily language 
today, the expression ‘self’ is used in a wider sense than in Aristotle and in Kant. But 
in everyday language, the meanings of the expressions ‘self’ and ‘person’ are in fact 
not quite identical, which means that the everyday expression ‘self’ clearly makes 
sense, contrary to what Johnstone says. 
  It is true that in daily language we use the expression ‘self’ in much the same way as 
that of ‘person’: The self is an individual human mind with all its mental abilities of 
thinking, feeling, wishing etc., as well as the content of this mind; thoughts, feeling 
experiences, and so on; but it is also this individual’s body with all its physical abili-
ties of movement and of action, and this individual’s characteristic ways of reacting 
and behaving. That ‘self’ today means more than an individual’s mind, that it also 
includes his or her body, is clear not only from the saying ‘I cut myself’, but more-
over from the fact that we tend to identify strongly not only with our views, espe-
cially with our values, and with our characteristic ways of reacting emotionally, say-
ing that a certain way of thinking and feeling ‘is’ oneself, that one is one’s own views, 
for example, but that we also tend to identify strongly with our bodies, for example 
in judging an injury wilfully done onto our bodies by others as an attack not simply 
on our bodies but on ourselves, and this even in cases where we are asleep or uncon-
scious. On the other hand, the fact that sometimes we may speak of an attack on a 
person’s body as an attack on him- or herself even when he or she is already dead, 
and consequently when the mind has ceased to exist, as in the case of the mutilation 
of a dead human body in a war or of the desecration of someone’s grave, is an incor-
rect use of the expression ‘self’, since it is based on one’s imagining the dead body as 
still being connected to a functioning mind, which is not the case. Thus selfhood re-
quires having both a mind and a body. 
  In Self Expressions. Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life, Flanagan claims psychologi-
cal and bodily continuity to be essential for personhood: Being a person means being 
a continuous organism, he says.86 
  Certainly an individual human being’s mind and body with all their functions is 
also what we mean by a person in daily language, and as in the case of the self, after 
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some afterthought we would not call a dead human body a person. But still the use 
of the everyday expressions of self and person differ. 
  In daily language, the expression ‘self’ almost exclusively appears in the expressions 
‘myself’, ‘yourself’, ‘himself’, ‘herself’, ‘itself’, ‘ourselves’, ‘yourselves’, and ‘them-
selves’; one hardly speaks of just ‘selves’. The expression ‘self’ is used for the agent, 
as in ‘I built this house myself’ or ‘He did it all by himself’, but furthermore, ‘self’ is 
used in the meaning of an internal perspective, either my own or that of another, sig-
nifying that individual’s own experiences: The consciousness of having a life of one’s 
own, of being the subject of experience, characterised by unity and continuity, we call 
a sense of self, Flanagan says.87 The fact that he claims that ‘we’ call this a sense of 
self shows that he refers to the everyday use of the expression. Selfhood thus de-
pends on the individual’s own mental and physical functioning only. 
  ‘Person’ too is used of the agent, as in ‘That person did this to me’, but mostly for 
other individuals, although in seldom cases the expression ‘my person’ is used, as in 
‘I am not carrying any weapon on my person’. ‘Person’ is used in the meaning of an 
external perspective: Personhood is dependent on one’s status as an individual in a 
community of men, which means that for being a person, one must engage in certain 
social relations which are recognised by other individuals, and thus when one says ‘I 
as a person’ or ‘my person’, one means oneself as a member of society, with the same 
rights and duties as other members, i.e., as someone who can be made responsible 
for his actions. This shows that according to the way we use the expressions in daily 
language, ‘person’ has a wider meaning than ‘self’. 
  The everyday expression of self as meaning mind and body with all their functions 
intact implies being able to use these functions, i.e., to intend, to judge, to choose, and 
to act, which implies that the mind is able to control both itself and the body, which 
means that a certain part of the self is able to control the rest, and this part is what we 
call will. This is what we mean by the expression ‘being oneself’ in the meaning of 
being in control of oneself: We say of a person who is so angry that he or she is not 
able to think clearly and not to deliberate on what he or she really finds important 
and correct, either as being useful or as being true, so that he or she makes decisions 
and acts in ways which he or she would not otherwise do and which he or she will 
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have reason to regret later, that he or she is not him- or herself. This indicates that 
being oneself implies having a reasoned will, i.e., that one’s will corresponds to one’s 
beliefs and to one’s more important views. And thus in a certain sense having a self 
requires ‘being oneself’, which means being able to influence oneself, which means 
that selfhood implies a certain autonomy in the everyday sense. 
  From the internal perspective, the self is the originator of one’s judgements, deci-
sions, choices, and actions; from the external perspective, the originator is the person. 
Consequently we speak of ‘influencing oneself’ rather than of ‘influencing one’s per-
son’. And as we have seen, influencing oneself means that the self influences itself, 
i.e., that a certain part of the self, namely what we call will, influences the rest of the 
self, mind and body. 
  
 
‘SELF-IMAGE’ AND ‘INNER HARMONY’ 
Now we are able to comment on Kupfer’s requirements, mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, of having a certain kind of self-concept and of being integrated in one’s be-
liefs, opinions, interests, and projects for being autonomous. 
  According to Kupfer, thinking and acting autonomously requires having an 
autonomous self-concept, which means a conception of oneself as a self-determining 
being, that is, as an independent originator of thought and action, which means see-
ing oneself as being able to think one’s own thoughts and as being capable of inde-
pendent choice, and of acting accordingly. This Kupfer calls first-order autonomy of 
the self-concept, which means that it is concerned with particular thoughts and ‘de-
sires’, concrete choices and plans of action.88 Second-order autonomy of the self-
concept means being able to control one’s self-concept by means of self-reflection in 
the forms of self-evaluation and self-criticism. For a full autonomy of the self-
concept, not only first-order but also second-order autonomy of the self-concept is 
needed.89 
  In daily language we rather use the expression ‘self-image’ than ‘self-concept’, and 
of course we do not speak of ‘first-order and second-order autonomy of the self-
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image’. But still we will have to examine whether what Kupfer means with first- and 
second-order autonomy of the self-concept is covered by the meanings of our every-
day expressions of self-image and of autonomy. 
  According to the way we use the expression of self-image in everyday language, 
one’s self-image is one’s own conception of one’s self, i.e., how one sees oneself, one’s 
mind and body and their functions and one’s actual execution of these functions. 
One can have a conception of oneself as a person who is tall, who has a bad memory, 
who is easily frightened, who enjoys a good meal, who is good at playing the flute, 
etc. 
  One’s self-image can be more or less clear, due to in how far we are certain of the 
way we are. If we are not certain of the way we are, of our capacities and characteris-
tic ways of reacting, our self-image will be confused while vague and possibly con-
tradictory. This indicates that our self-image can correspond more or less to the way 
one is, i.e., to the nature of one’s self, and thus that it can be more or less correct. 
  We need a self-image for being able to orientate in the world around us, and thus 
for being able to relate to situations and to other people. In our discussion of Kupfer 
we noted that autonomy in the everyday sense today requires access to valid infor-
mation. According to Steinfath, self-determination requires enough relevant and cor-
rect information concerning the world. Knowledge of the world here means knowl-
edge of the social world, he says.90 This must mean the character of our daily human 
intercourse. Having false views means that our willing is influenced by something 
unknown to us, Steinfath says.91 But in addition, having feelings and wishes of which 
one is not (fully) aware, i.e., which are not fully known to one, implies a lack of self-
determination, since they can influence one’s will, quite apart from the fact that they 
can be manipulated by others. This implies that self-determination requires not only 
knowledge of the world, but also knowledge of oneself.92 And of course this is valid 
also for autonomy in the everyday sense today. 
  According to its use in daily language, the expression ‘self-knowledge’ means 
knowledge of the nature of one’s self, with all its functions, one’s abilities and one’s 
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characteristic ways of using one’s functions, mental and physical, as well as one’s 
current use of these. But in daily language, self-knowledge means more than just 
knowledge of isolated mental and physical functions and the individual uses of 
these: Self-knowledge also connotes an overview over the self as a whole, mental and 
physical, and thus a knowledge of how different capacities and uses of these capaci-
ties are connected and influence each other, which sheds light on their importance as 
part of a system of functions. In addition, self-knowledge also includes knowing one-
self in a social sphere, how one’s own mental and physical acts are related to those of 
others. This knowledge is necessary for being able to use one’s functions, mental and 
physical, and thus it is necessary for autonomy. We have also noted that autonomy 
requires being able to critically examine and accept or reject influence on the central 
part of one’s self, namely on one’s will, from other parts of the self, e.g., from feelings 
and from (psychophysical) wishes which on reflection one would judge as being less 
important, and from other people, their expressed demands, their emotional reac-
tions, etc. This of course requires being aware of this influence, which requires self-
knowledge. Self-knowledge is given by a self-image which is fairly correct, which 
corresponds to reality in essential aspects, which means that autonomy requires hav-
ing a correct self-image. 
  But autonomy, i.e., being able to choose oneself what to find important, and to 
choose oneself how to be and to form one’s own life accordingly, requires not only 
having a fairly correct self-image, but having a self-image of a certain kind, namely 
one which says that one is autonomous in the everyday meaning of the word. This is 
a requirement for being empowered to choose oneself what to find important, to 
choose oneself how to be, and to form one’s own life accordingly, and thus for being 
autonomous according to the way we use the expression in daily language. But just 
having a self-image which says that one is autonomous in the everyday meaning of 
the word of course is not enough for autonomy; a person can believe him- or herself 
to be autonomous in the everyday sense of the word, that he or she is able to form his 
or her own life, and consequently that he or she freely chooses to carry on with his or 
her daily routines, although in fact he or she is a slave who was born as a slave and 
who has never known any other life. Autonomy, according to the way we use the 
expression in daily language, requires that one’s self-image of oneself as being 
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autonomous in the everyday sense of the word be true, it must correspond to reality; 
i.e., one must actually be empowered in the way one’s self-image says one is. Thus 
being autonomous in the everyday sense of the word implies having a correct self-
image as being autonomous, and this requires continuous empowerment, which re-
quires continuously being able to adjust one’s self-image after the current character 
of one’s self, since one’s abilities tend to change with time. Thus Kupfer’s claims that 
autonomy requires both being able to control one’s self-concept and having a self-
concept of a certain kind, namely one which claims one to be an independent origina-
tor of thought and action,93 are both confirmed by the everyday meaning of the ex-
pression. 
  In our discussion of Kupfer, we also noted that Kupfer claims that autonomy of will 
requires integration of one’s beliefs, opinions, interests and projects. The reason for 
his claim is that inconsistency in our beliefs will move us emotionally and appeti-
tively in different, and thus conflicting, directions: Lack of integration among our 
beliefs yields incompatible beliefs and commitments and thus inconsistent goals. In-
tegration of one’s beliefs and of one’s opinions is a requirement for consistency in 
one’s beliefs and in one’s opinions, which is necessary for having a coherent ranking 
of moral values and commitments, and thus for knowing what is most important to 
one, which is necessary for one’s commitments to be consistent. 
  For Kupfer, integration makes it possible to concentrate one’s powers on one pur-
pose, thus giving the mind a certain direction, and it gives an overview over one’s 
life as a whole. This makes one capable of making autonomous decisions concerning 
individual issues. 
  In everyday language today we would say that deciding for oneself what is impor-
tant to one, i.e., forming one’s own opinions concerning what is preferable, and de-
ciding for oneself how one wants to be, i.e., influencing one’s own mental life, as well 
as judging oneself what to do in practical action and performing the corresponding 
actions, which is how we described today’s everyday use of the expression of auton-
omy in our discussion of Kant, requires not only knowing oneself, which means hav-
ing a correct conception of oneself, but it also requires a certain inner harmony. ‘In-
ner harmony’ means that the mind is not in conflict, that there are no essential con-
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flicts between feelings and thoughts: beliefs, wishes, views, and judgements; that 
there are no conflicts of any kind in the mind which may make one incapable at least 
of more important decision-making and acting.  
  This means that ‘inner harmony’ implies an integration not only of beliefs, opinions, 
interests, and projects, but of all mental factors of relevance, and thus autonomy im-
plies a wider scope concerning the mind than Kupfer’s concept of autonomy does. In 
daily language we hardly use the expression ‘self-integration’, and according to the 
use of the expression ‘self’ in everyday language, ‘self-integration’ would include not 
only the mind but also the body with all its functions, and this is not the way we use 
the expression ‘inner harmony’; inner harmony exclusively connotes mental func-
tions, it is a harmony of the mind. 
  Inner harmony allows for a correspondence between thinking, feeling, and will, i.e., 
one wants to act in the way one thinks is right, and one feels well when one does so 
and unwell when one does not. It is a requirement for internal independence, and 
thus for empowerment of the reasoned will, which implies that it is a requirement for 
the will’s influence over the rest of the self, and therewith for an influence over one-
self, and thus for autonomy.  
  This shows that Kupfer’s stress on integration of one’s beliefs, opinions, interests, 
and projects as a requirement for autonomy is true also of autonomy, although by 
using another expression and with a slightly wider scope. 
  
  
AUTONOMY AS AUTHORITY OVER ONESELF 
Let us now sum up what we have said so far concerning autonomy in the everyday 
sense today. Autonomy today consists in being able to decide for oneself what is im-
portant to one, i.e., to form one’s own opinions concerning what is preferable, and to 
decide for oneself how one wants to be and to influence and thus to modify oneself 
accordingly, to judge oneself what to do in practical action, and to perform the corre-
sponding actions. Thus autonomy includes being empowered to act on one’s will, to 
realise one’s will in practical action, that is, to live according to one’s own mind. 
  What is autonomous according to our use of the expression in daily language is a 
human being, not an act of will, a judgement, or an action. Autonomy forms a unity, 
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it is just one; there is no autonomy of will, of judgement, of action, etc., and conse-
quently one cannot be autonomous in the everyday sense of the word in certain re-
spects but not in others, for example in will but not in judgement, since the abilities 
which make up autonomy develop simultaneously; there is no autonomous willing 
without autonomous judging, and the other way round. But the fact that autonomy 
forms a unity does not exclude that people can be autonomous in the everyday sense 
of the word in different degrees: Some men are more autonomous than others, since 
some men have more influence over themselves and consequently over their own 
lives than others have. 
  The self in the everyday sense is both mind and body, with all their functions, as 
well as the actual execution of these functions. The self is the agent and signifies an 
internal perspective of the individual, according to which the self is the originator of 
one’s judgements, decisions, choices, and actions. 
  Autonomy today seems to be dependent more on reflection than on knowledge: on 
the critical examination of the information which one actually acquires, rather than 
on having access to all relevant information. At least in more important questions of 
life, it will not do just to follow one’s habit. Autonomy requires independent reason-
ing, which means that it requires having deliberated on and accepted as true at least 
one’s more important beliefs, which are beliefs which have a certain consequence for 
one’s life, and at least in important situations, the agent must reflect on the matter 
and choose according to what he or she him- or herself thinks is correct. And at least 
in such important situations, the agent must also reflect on influence on his or her 
will from other parts of the self, e.g., from feelings and from (psychophysical) wishes 
which do not correspond to what he or she on reflection judges as being more impor-
tant, as well as from other people, their expressed demands, their emotional reac-
tions, etc., and he or she must choose whether to accept or to reject this influence ac-
cording to whether he or she judges it to be compatible with what he or she thinks is 
important and correct, either in the situation, as being useful, or while corresponding 
to reality, as being true. This means that autonomy requires having a reasoned will, a 
will which corresponds to what one concludes is the right thing to do after delibera-
tion on what one finds important. On the other hand, autonomy is nothing which 
one has at one moment and not at the next; it is manifested not only in moral prob-
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lem situations, but in a continuous exercise of influence over one’s mental life and in 
continuously forming one’s life in practical action, in taking care of oneself in daily 
life and in fulfilling oneself, i.e., in securing one’s survival and in making one’s life 
acceptable to oneself, and furthermore, in making one’s life worth living to oneself. 
  Deliberation on influence on one’s will of course requires being aware of this influ-
ence, which requires self-knowledge, i.e., knowledge of the contents of one’s self. 
Self-knowledge requires having a self-image which corresponds to reality in essential 
respects, which means that autonomy requires having a correct self-image, which 
requires being able to adjust one’s self-image to reality. But autonomy also requires 
having a self-image of a certain kind, namely one which says that one is autonomous 
in the everyday sense of the word, since such a self-image is necessary for being em-
powered to choose oneself what to find important, to choose oneself how to be, and 
to form one’s own life accordingly, and thus for being autonomous. This means that 
being autonomous in the everyday sense of the word implies having a correct self-
image as being autonomous, which of course requires actual empowerment. Em-
powerment requires inner harmony, which means that there are no conflicts of any 
kind in the mind which may make one incapable at least of more important decision-
making and acting. This allows for a correspondence between thinking, feeling, and 
will, i.e., one wants to realise one’s values, and thus to act in the way one thinks is 
right, and one feels well when one does so and unwell when one does not. Inner 
harmony is a requirement for the will’s influence over the rest of the self, and 
therewith for an influence over oneself, and thus for autonomy in the everyday 
sense.  
  Our conclusion must be that autonomy today primarily connotes the capacity to 
influence oneself, and therewith forming one’s life oneself. 
  The everyday expression of self as meaning mind and body with all their functions 
intact implies being able to use these functions, i.e., to intend, to judge, to choose, and 
to act, which implies that the mind is able to control both itself and the body, which 
means that a certain part of the self, namely the will, is able to control the rest. This is 
what we mean by the expression ‘being oneself’ in the meaning of being in control of 
oneself. Being oneself implies having a reasoned will, i.e., that one’s will corresponds 
to one’s beliefs and to one’s more important views. 
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  As we have noted, autonomy is no moral concept; it is non-moral, morally indiffer-
ent. It gives no moral guidelines: Autonomy gives one the freedom to choose, but it 
cannot tell one what to choose. Thus it does not imply a certain morality. We have 
also noted that an autonomy which is based on sympathy in a certain sense of the 
word implies a certain morality, but what implies this morality is in reality sympa-
thy, and not autonomy as such. This we will have to examine further in the next sec-
tion. 
  We have noted that autonomy primarily connotes the capacity to influence oneself, 
and therewith forming one’s life oneself. But ‘being able to influence oneself’ could in 
fact mean just being able to use one’s mental and physical functions without oneself 
being the origin of one’s will. We need another expression which signifies that the 
agent is him- or herself the origin of his or her own will. 
  The kind of influence which is at stake here, as the self influencing itself, or more 
precisely, that a reasoned will, corresponding to beliefs which one has deliberated on 
and found justified and to values and views which likewise one has deliberated on 
and found especially important, influences the rest of the self, mind and body, corre-
sponds to the way we use the everyday expression of authority. This implies that 
autonomy means influence over oneself in the sense of having authority over oneself. 
Our daily semantic practice concerning autonomy is in no need of expressions like 
‘determination’, ‘direction’, or ‘government’, used by academic philosophers. 
  Having an authority over something does not require influencing factors which are 
of no interest to the agent: The leader of a group exercises his or her authority over 
the members of his or her group only in so far as he or she has the power to influence 
the members in a way which is relevant to him- or herself. To an officer it is relevant 
that his or her soldiers obey his or her orders, but it is not relevant that they share his 
or her aesthetic taste, for example. This means that for the officer to have authority 
over his or her men, it is enough that they obey his or her orders. And the soldiers 
can still have an authority over themselves, although they obey their officer, if only 
they have checked this influence and come to the conclusion that it is acceptable, and 
chosen to accept it. If the soldiers regard their officer’s orders as trivial, it may not 
even be very important for them to be able to choose themselves whether to obey or 
not, which means that their relevant influence over themselves and thus their author-
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ity over themselves is not threatened. For the soldier, being able to choose him- or 
herself whether to obey or not becomes important only in cases where obeying be-
comes questionable, like in a case of being forced to use torture against prisoners. 
Likewise, authority over oneself is not only a reasoned but a relevant influence over 
oneself, in questions which are of some importance to the agent. In such cases, the 
agent must deliberate on his or her beliefs, checking their justification, and he or she 
must deliberate on what is important to him or her and why, as well as on influence 
on his or her will, and whether it is acceptable or not. One’s authority over oneself is 
not threatened by the fact that one has to observe traffic rules when driving a car, 
since one accepts and follows the rules because one understands and affirms the aim 
of these traffic rules, namely to protect the lives of others and of oneself. 
  Now it is time to examine the relation of the everyday expression of autonomy to 
that of maturity.  
   
 
AUTONOMY, SYMPATHY, AND MATURITY 
In Chapter 2, we noted that according to Hume, one’s sympathy for other persons 
makes it difficult for one to form an opinion of one’s own and to use this opinion 
when making a judgement concerning how to act. We will quote the relevant passage 
once again: 
No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its conse-
quences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by 
communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even 
contrary to our own. This is not only conspicuous in children, who implicitly embrace 
every opinion propos’d to them; but also in men of the greatest judgement and un-
derstanding, who find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination, in 
opposition to that of their friends and daily companions.94 
 
  With such a conception of sympathy, sympathy and autonomy are in conflict. We 
will now show that universal sympathy as it was described in the last chapter, al-
though limiting the scope of autonomy as it has been described above, in fact is a 
                                                 
94 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature p. 316. 
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necessary requirement for a certain kind of autonomy as authority over oneself, 
namely for an autonomy which is morally relevant. We will show that this connects 
all the central everyday expressions which we have chosen to study in this work: 
sympathy, autonomy, maturity, morality, and mature judgement. 
  To a certain extent the everyday meaning of autonomy in daily language today as 
authority over oneself is meant as something good, since it makes it possible for the 
individual to take care of him- or herself without continuous external support, and 
thus without being a burden to others and thus not to society, and to form his or her 
own life: to fulfil him- or herself, i.e., securing his or her survival and making his or 
her life acceptable to him- or herself, and furthermore, making his or her life worth 
living to him- or herself. 
  In taking care of oneself one fulfils one’s role in society in a basic way by not being a 
burden to other individuals or to the state. This might perhaps be possible through 
living from an inheritance and by avoiding the company of others and thus every 
kind of responsibility towards one’s fellow-men, but basically fulfilling oneself in the 
everyday sense, i.e., making one’s own life worth living to oneself, is dependent on 
successful interaction with other members of society. But in addition to just being 
independent of others, autonomy gives one the capacity to fulfil one’s role in society 
in a wider sense, namely in performing a variety of social tasks as a company 
worker, a family member, a friend, and as a citizen, tasks which all serve the good of 
others and thus ultimately that of society as a whole, and thus indirectly all members 
of the community. This is what we expect from all biological adults in our society, 
and for this reason we expect all biological adults to be autonomous in the everyday 
sense of the word and thus being capable of actively working for the good of society.  
  But today there is also a concept of autonomy with bad connotations. Referring to 
the way autonomy was treated by the ancient Greeks will help clarifying why this is 
so.  
  In ancient Greek literature αυτονομια, consisting of the words αυτος, meaning self, 
and νομος, meaning law, meant being one’s own law-giver, that is, deciding for one-
self. It is used by Sophocles in Antigone, by Xenophon in The Spartan Constitution, and 
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by Isocrates in Panathenaicus.95 According to Griffith in his commentary to Antigone 
in The Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics, this is the earliest occurrence of the 
word αυτονομια in Greek texts.96 In Xenophon and in Isocrates, αυτονομια is used in 
much the same way, and by both authors in relation to the Spartan state. For these 
reasons we will discuss all three of these examples. 
  By Sophocles, the word αυτονομια is used of Antigone in freely accepting her death 
penalty. Her brother Polyneikes has lead an army against Thebes to claim the throne, 
but his army was defeated and Polyneikes himself was killed. Antigone’s uncle 
Kreon, taking over the rule of Thebes, forbids the burial of the dead Polyneikes, but 
for reasons of kinship and the will of the gods, Antigone feels obliged to bury her 
brother in spite of Kreon’s prohibition. After having been arrested, brought before 
Kreon, and sentenced to death, she commits suicide. In the prose translation by 
Hugh Lloyd-Jones, at Antigone’s appearing before Kreon, the choir of Theban elders 
says: 
Is it not with glory and with praise that you depart to this cavern of the dead? Not 
smitten by wasting maladies nor paid the wages of the sword, of your own will you 
alone of mortals while yet alive descend to Hades [αλλ αυτονομος ζωσα μονη δη 
θνητων Αιδην καταβησηι].97 
 
  Griffith translates αυτονομος as ‘observing your own law’ or as ‘voluntary’.98 
  By Xenophon the expression αυτονομια is used negatively as simply doing what 
one pleases. Xenophon is an admirer of Sparta, and in The Spartan Constitution he 
tries to explain why Sparta, although having such a small population, could become 
the most powerful and famous city in all of Greece. He explains this by referring to 
the laws of Lycurgus, which according to Xenophon are the reason for the success of 
the Spartans. Xenophon discusses the begetting and the education of children in 
Sparta, and then he says:  
When they [the boys] cease to be children and attain puberty, the other Greeks release 
them from the pedagogues, set them free from their teachers; no one is in charge of 
                                                 
95 The sources are mentioned by Cooper in his Stoic Autonomy pp. 2-3. According to Griffith in his 
edition of Antigone (p. 268), αυτονομια is also used by Herodotus (1.96) and Thucydides (1.144). 
96 Sophocles, Antigone, ed. Mark Griffith, p. 268. 
97 Sophocles, Antigone 817-822. 
98 Sophocles, Antigone, ed. Mark Griffith, p. 268. 
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them anymore, but they are allowed to live as they like [αυτονομους αϕιασιν]. Ly-
curgus, however, instituted quite different customs from these too. Realizing that 
men of this age are very high-spirited, that insolence predominates, and that the most 
intense physical desires beset them, he imposed on them much labour and contrived 
that they should have very little leasure.99 
  
  In Isocrates’s Panathenaicus the expression αυτονομια is used by one of Isocrates’s 
former students, who is now a member of an oligarchic government and who likes to 
praise the Spartans, and who claims that the Spartans have discovered the finest way 
of life, which they have adopted themselves and revealed to others. Isocrates himself 
then complains about the Spartan custom of allowing children to steal and even ad-
miring theft among children, as long as the little thieves are not caught. In this prac-
tice there is nothing noble or righteous; it is shameful and far outside common de-
cency, he says. His former student answers: 
‘You… have presented your argument as if I approved of everything there and 
thought everything was just fine in Sparta. In my opinion, however, it is reasonable to 
fault them for the freedom they give their children [της των παιδων αυτονομιας] and 
on many other grounds, but you accuse me unfairly.’100 
 
  From this we learn that among the Greeks, autonomy meant either freely accepting 
the result of one’s actions (Sophocles), doing what one wants instead of being forced 
to activities which are useful for one’s society (Xenophon), or being allowed to do 
bad things instead of being forced to activities which are in accordance with the ide-
als of justice and of moral nobility (Isocrates). This indicates that among the Greeks, 
simply deciding for oneself was not necessarily considered a good thing. Especially 
in Xenophon, we have the impression that he fears that if everyone would start act-
ing after his or her own mind, society would collapse, and lawlessness would follow. 
Similarly, in the Politics Aristotle says that the freedom to do as one pleases is not 
compatible with holding back the bad things that exist in every man.101 
                                                 
99 Xenophon, The Spartan Constitution 3.1-2. 
100 Isocrates, Panathenaicus 215. 
101 Aristotle, Politics 1318b39-1919a1. 
 106
  The problem of the Greeks still haunts us: In everyday language today, ‘autonomy’ 
as being able to form one’s life after one’s own mind implies not only being able to 
take care of oneself without continuous external support, and thus without being a 
burden to others and thus to society; it also implies independence of social ties.  
  Freeing oneself from all emotional ties to family members and friends, from all ad-
miration or respect for persons who might serve as one’s model, and from all the 
moral views which others share, would surely allow for a very independent reason-
ing, but the moral value of this reasoning is questionable. The more autonomous a 
person is, the less dependent he or she is on external influence and thus on accepted 
conventions, and this might be seen as a threat to others and to society. Thus an 
autonomous person, who decides for him- or herself how to live his or her life, might 
choose to break the law. 
  We have noted that autonomy is no moral concept; it is non-moral, morally indif-
ferent. It gives no moral guidelines: Autonomy is the capacity to decide for oneself 
what is important to one, which means forming one’s own opinions concerning what 
is right and wrong, and to decide for oneself how to act. This gives one the freedom 
to choose, but it cannot tell one what to choose. This means that, as we have noted 
before, autonomy as such does not imply a certain morality; a person can use his 
autonomy for the good of other people and for society as a whole, which is what mo-
rality in the everyday sense of the word demands, but he can also use it simply for 
obtaining his own aims. Similarly, as we use the expression of rationality in daily 
language, it tells us how to evaluate, but not what to evaluate. In Chapter 1 we noted 
that in everyday language, ‘rational’ means that something is appropriate, i.e., 
adapted, suited, to its purpose. But we do not use the everyday expression of matur-
ity in the meaning of being a rational agent. 
  We use the expression ‘morality’ in a social context: As we noted in Chapter 1, the 
everyday expression of morality connotes different conceptions of how to live as to 
support other individuals with whom one has more or less direct personal contact, as 
well as to support the stability and thus permanence of society as a whole, for the 
sake of all of its members. The everyday meaning of morality implies that the mem-
bers of society should not only live from society, they should also contribute to its 
good by fulfilling their roles as members of society, therewith supporting all its 
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members. Being able to live according to morality in the everyday sense requires be-
ing able to support oneself enough for being able to support others, and for this rea-
son morality must allow for a basic self-fulfilment, i.e., making one’s life worth living 
to oneself. But it also requires being able to form one’s will after the demands of mo-
rality and being able to judge accordingly, using these demands as reference.  
  ‘Maturity’ too is used in a social context: As the expression is used in everyday lan-
guage, maturity means the competence to judge and to act according to morality. 
And so it is with ‘autonomy’: The everyday expression of autonomy means the ca-
pacity to form one’s life in a social sphere, in a community of people. One is autono-
mous in the everyday sense of the word in relation to others, and often in opposition 
to others. 
  As implying the competence to judge and act according to morality, maturity is 
both positively and negatively related to autonomy seen as the capacity to judge and 
act according to one’s own mind: Positively, since autonomy makes one able to fulfil 
the aims of maturity, namely living according to morality; and negatively, since it 
endangers the fulfilment of this aim by making one able to act contrary to what mo-
rality prescribes. This means that maturity, as meaning a quality which makes one 
able to form one’s life in accordance with morality, is the same as autonomy in the 
positive sense, i.e., a morally relevant autonomy. Consequently a mature man or 
woman in the everyday sense of the word is a person with an autonomy limited by 
the concerns of morality, i.e., who makes use of his or her autonomy for the sake of 
others and of society. And since the preservation of society, one of the aims of moral-
ity, requires respect for the laws of the state, being autonomous in the everyday sense 
as a prerequisite for being mature in the everyday sense cannot imply questioning 
the law, judging it critically and accepting and rejecting it according to one’s own 
judgement, and then deciding for oneself whether to follow it or not. 
  Maturity in the sense of a quality which makes one able to fulfil the demands of mo-
rality of course cannot imply a moral autonomy, i.e., the capacity to accept or reject 
all kinds of moral conceptions and to create a morality of one’s own. Instead matur-
ity implies accepting and fulfilling a certain kind of morality, namely one which sees 
to the good of all individuals in society in a longer time perspective, including future 
generations. 
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  Maturity as a quality which gives the ability to fulfil the aims of morality thus im-
plies being able to question everything except for morality itself, which requires a 
limited autonomy. Such a limited while morally conditioned autonomy is provided 
for by a sympathy of the universal kind. Maturity is identical with an autonomy 
formed by what we have chosen to call a universal sympathy. 
  Let us now recapitulate what we said in the last chapter concerning universal sym-
pathy. This summary will help clarifying the connections between the meanings of 
the everyday expressions of sympathy and of autonomy. 
  At the outset of Chapter 2, we noted that in everyday language we use the expres-
sion ‘maturity’ in a way which implies sympathy in a certain everyday meaning of 
the word. Already in Chapter 1 we noted that maturity must be connected both to 
extroversion in the sense of being interested in others, and to unselfishness as some-
thing active, i.e. as taking an interest in others for their sake, with the aim of support-
ing these others, and in Chapter 2 we showed that extroversion and unselfishness in 
this sense are provided for by a universal sympathy. 
  In Chapter 2 we claimed that a certain meaning of the everyday expression of sym-
pathy, namely one which is continuous and universal, covers what is needed for a 
morally relevant autonomy, i.e., a continuous influence over oneself which is used 
for realising the aims of morality in judging and in acting, taking all men into consid-
eration when judging how to act, and which thus gives a moral competence, and that 
this is the way we use the expression ‘maturity’ in everyday language today. 
  We showed that what we call a continuous, universal sympathy in this work, which 
is as strong towards all men, consists mainly in a certain attitude, namely as an af-
firmative mental attitude, and in friendly feelings, which are feelings of joy at human 
intercourse, and we noted that this affirmative mental attitude means taking an in-
terest in the other for his or her own sake, which is a concern for others. This concern 
implies that the other, or more precisely, what supports his or her life and what 
makes his or her life worth living to him or her, is important to one. In universal 
sympathy, the other is the object of one’s sympathy simply as being a fellow human 
being in a brotherhood of men, and universal sympathy is directed towards all who 
are involved in a certain situation, and in addition it allows for taking also society as 
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a whole into regard for the sake of all its members, and it also allows for sympathis-
ing with future generations of yet unborn human beings.  
  The fact that the good of others is important to one is a presupposition for wanting 
to live according to morality, and wanting to live according to morality is needed for 
being able to live accordingly, to fulfil its demands. Universal sympathy thereby 
makes one want to support other people, which means supporting the realisation of 
the aims of morality. This motivates to making mature judgements and to act on 
them.  
  The affirmative mental attitude included in universal sympathy implies concentrat-
ing on the relevant aspects of reality, what is relevant for making a mature judge-
ment, and being attentive to the context, i.e., two perspectives, one focused, and one 
wide. This includes paying attention to the psychology of the persons involved: to 
their wishes and their intentions, and what they are capable of doing and what they 
are prepared to do. Further, since the friendly feeling included in universal sympathy 
is without intensity, it is no hindrance to critical reflection and to prudence, which 
are requirements for autonomy, and thus for maturity. The friendly feeling motivates 
to making mature judgements and to acting on them. 
  Universal sympathy makes autonomous in the everyday sense of the word by pro-
viding the agent with what is required for authority over oneself, which are the crite-
ria discussed in this chapter: As we noted in the last paragraph, universal sympathy 
provides the mind with a certain direction, namely towards what is morally relevant. 
This makes internally independent by limiting the influence on one’s will from feel-
ings and psychophysical wishes, and it also makes one externally independent, inde-
pendent of the demands of others, by providing the will with an aim of its own.  
  In Autonomie im Gehorsam. Die Entwicklung des Distanzierungsvermögens im sozialis-
ierten Handeln, Blasi claims that the capacity to question normative demands is based 
on an act of distinguishing between oneself and other authorities by opposing one’s 
own needs and wishes to the external demands, and by accepting what harmonises 
with these personal mental needs and rejecting what does not.102 But the agent does 
not have to actively and intently oppose his or her own wishes, which aim at satisfy-
ing his or her own personal needs, to the external demands for being able to question 
                                                 
102 Blasi, Autonomie im Gehorsam p. 305. 
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these demands. Instead, universal sympathy makes one concentrate on what is mor-
ally relevant and care for the realisation of the aims of morality. Therewith one’s uni-
versal sympathy reduces one’s emotional dependence on others as authorities in 
judgement, and therewith they reduce others’ influence on the agent’s will. There is 
no need for opposing one’s own personal (psychophysical) wishes to the external 
demands, and no need for any direct and intended control of the mental processes, to 
try forcing one’s mind in a certain direction. 
  The everyday expression of sympathy in the meaning of universal sympathy is se-
mantically connected to what is called ‘inner harmony’ in everyday language, which 
allows for an integration of one’s mental states and attitudes which avoids inner con-
flicts, and which thus unifies the will, by co-ordinating the agent’s feelings, views, 
and wishes. Further, the direction of the mind provided for by universal sympathy 
focuses one’s attention on what is morally relevant, which improves one’s morally 
relevant perception, which supports one’s morally relevant knowledge of the exter-
nal world. It also provides the agent with psychological skills: It stimulates one’s ca-
pacity for imagining the psychological lives of others, and for imagining alternatives 
of action connected to the needs and wishes of others, and thus the consequences of 
these actions. This supports one’s capacity for making mature judgements. 
  The aim of the will which is provided for by universal sympathy is to fulfil the aims 
of morality, and the fact that the will has an overall aim strengthens it, which gives it 
a constancy by directing it towards certain objects. This gives energy, and all this 
supports the empowerment of the will. 
  According to the way in which we use the expression ‘will’ in everyday language, 
all willing is self-centred to a certain degree: All willing originates in the self, is an 
expression of the self. No willing is possible without self-centred thoughts: ‘I 
want…’. For this reason there is no genuinely selfless will. A will is a demand, and so 
in willing, there is always a certain pretension, which means that willing something 
in the everyday sense of the word is always connected to a direction of one’s interest 
towards one’s own person. But although all willing is a sign of self-centredness, still 
there are significant differences: A self-centred will aims at supporting the person 
him- or herself; it is a will to satisfy one’s own personal needs and preferences, which 
may be very prosaic things like comfort. But except for willing something exclusively 
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for one’s own sake, and willing something at least partly for other’s sake, there is also 
the kind of will which is furthered by universal sympathy, namely a will which aims 
exclusively at furthering the good of all others and which thus is not at all self-
centred except for the necessary self-centred aspect of willing as such. 
  But universal sympathy not only allows for an authority over oneself, it also re-
stricts the agent’s autonomy: The direction of the mind towards what is morally rele-
vant, which is provided for by universal sympathy, is a mental attitude of interest in 
others for their sake, which makes one concerned about the external world; it makes 
one care about the good of other individuals and about the preservation of society for 
the sake of all its members, thus motivating one to fulfil the demands of morality. 
This means that the aim with which the will is provided is to live according to moral-
ity. 
  What we have chosen to call universal sympathy provides the agent with a concep-
tion of morality, namely that what supports the life of all individual human beings 
and what makes their lives worth living to them is to be supported, which is what 
morality prescribes. One’s will is now founded on the moral views implied by one’s 
universal sympathy, which are the views contained in morality, as well as on one’s 
more important beliefs which one has deliberated on and found correct. This makes 
an autonomy building on universal sympathy into a moral concept, as distinguished 
from standard autonomy, which is more of a practical rationality in the everyday 
sense. This kind of autonomy, made possible by as well as restricted by universal 
sympathy, is what we call maturity in everyday language.  
  The morally relevant autonomy provided for by universal sympathy gives the agent 
the capacity to question everything which lies outside the sphere of the kind of mo-
rality implied by his or her universal sympathy, and this kind of morality is morality. 
This capacity entails the capacity to question and reject other normative demands 
than those made by morality. The mature person in the everyday sense of the word, 
with an autonomy formed by universal sympathy, is able to examine other norma-
tive demands and compare them with the demands raised by his or her universal 
sympathy, and accept those which are compatible with the demands raised by uni-
versal sympathy and reject those which are not. Such an autonomy still means being 
able to decide for oneself what is important to one, i.e., to form one’s own opinions 
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concerning what is preferable, and to decide for oneself how one wants to be and to 
influence and thus modify oneself accordingly, to judge oneself what to do in practi-
cal action, and to perform the corresponding actions, which means that it still means 
being empowered to act on one’s will, to realise one’s will in practical action, that is, 
to live according to one’s own mind. The difference to an autonomy which is not 
formed by sympathy is that this kind of autonomy, this empowerment as authority 
over oneself, is not used to question one’s own sympathy, but instead it accepts one’s 
sympathy, and therewith it is used to realise the aims of morality. This means that a 
autonomy building on a universal sympathy is a limited autonomy: It does not mean 
being able to question and accept or reject everything. One does not choose whether 
to be mature or not in the everyday sense of the word: The mature man or woman in 
the everyday sense has been raised to a universal sympathy as a form of life; this is 
nothing which he or she chooses freely, and he or she is not able to question and re-
ject his or her universal sympathy. He or she is autonomous towards all authorities – 
except for towards his own universal sympathy. Questioning one’s universal sympa-
thy would mean questioning one’s morally relevant autonomy, which would mean 
questioning one’s maturity, and certainly maturity in the everyday sense does not 
imply being autonomous enough for being able to reject one’s own maturity. 
  What we have chosen to call universal sympathy thus gives a morally relevant au-
thority over oneself and thus the capacity to make mature judgements and to act ac-
cordingly. Such a morally relevant autonomy as a morally relevant authority over 
oneself is an autonomy which gives a moral competence, i.e., the capacity to influ-
ence oneself in important questions of life with the aim of fulfilling the demands of 
morality. And such a continuous influence over oneself which fulfils the aims of mo-
rality, in judgement and in action, corresponds to what is meant by maturity in daily 
language.  
  
 
 
- 
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Chapter 4 
Mature Judgement 
 
  
MATURITY AND MATURE JUDGEMENT: AN OVERVIEW 
We have analysed the everyday expressions of maturity, morality, sympathy, and 
autonomy, and we will now complete our study of the everyday expression of ma-
turity with an examination of the everyday meaning of mature judgement. In this 
chapter we will also sum up what we have said concerning maturity in earlier chap-
ters. 
  We have noted that the meaning of maturity corresponds to an autonomy formed 
by a universal sympathy. Universal sympathy makes the lives of all other men and 
what makes their lives worth living to them important to the agent, which motivates 
him or her to take an interest in others for their sake with the aim of supporting 
them. This makes the individual moral problem situation important to the agent, and 
it directs the agent’s attention towards the situation and makes him or her concen-
trate on the morally relevant information in the situation which is necessary for ac-
quiring a morally relevant knowledge, which is used in making good moral judge-
ments. Further universal sympathy motivates to making good moral judgements and 
to acting accordingly, which means living according to morality in the everyday 
sense. 
  Maturity thus gives the capacity to live according to morality. Morality demands 
good citizenship, which means acting in ways which are useful to other people, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, and this means supporting the good of all others, directly, 
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in the actual situation, as well as indirectly, by providing others with possibilities for 
individual self-fulfilment by supporting the stability and permanence of society for 
the sake of all its members. This means fulfilling one’s role in society, which means 
taking one’s responsibility as a member of the community. This implies fulfilling cer-
tain basic moral demands which means that the action is morally acceptable, that it is 
not blameworthy. 
  The fact that maturity gives the competence to live according to morality does not 
mean that it gives the competence to do things which are not demanded by morality. 
In Chapter 1 we noted that maturity allows for and even requires a certain prudence, 
and that prudence is not compatible with ruining one’s own life. We further noted 
that as being supererogative, i.e., more than what morality demands, self-sacrifice is 
neither mature nor immature, since maturity is concerned with the sphere of morals 
only. 
  In Chapter 1 we also noted that the everyday expression of maturity is used in con-
nection with intellectual development, which means that what is mature or imma-
ture according to the everyday expression is a human mind. But there are also eve-
ryday expressions of mature judgement and of mature action: We say both that a cer-
tain judgement and that a certain behaviour is mature or immature. This makes it 
necessary to examine whether or not a mature judgement according to the way we 
use the expression in daily language is identical with a good moral judgement, and 
whether or not a mature action is identical with a morally good action.  
  According to the way we use the expression in daily language, a good moral 
judgement is a judgement which correctly points out a morally good action, and a 
morally good action according to our daily use of the expression is an action which 
fulfils the demands of morality. But the everyday expressions of mature judgement 
and of mature action mean more than just pointing out a good moral action and ful-
filling the demands of morality, respectively.  
  Although living according to morality is what we call good citizenship, being a 
good citizen according to the way we use the expression in daily language is com-
patible with simply adjusting oneself to the current custom in society, without much 
reflection and knowledge and without intently and freely, i.e., willingly, adjusting 
oneself for the sake of others.  
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  For this reason maturity cannot imply a standard good citizenship, but only good 
citizenship of a certain kind. Maturity requires living according to morality for cer-
tain reasons and in certain ways: for the sake of others, intently and willingly and 
after reflection, in full knowledge of what one is doing.  
  Thus whereas the good citizen can do without much good moral judgement-
making, since it is enough that he or she has been raised to follow the custom in his 
or her society by means of habituation, which does not require much reflection and 
criticism, which means that in most cases the agent might well just be acting on other 
persons’ good moral judgements without having considered their correctness, matur-
ity as we use the expression in daily language requires making good moral judge-
ments of one’s own. These good moral judgements are not just accidentally good; 
they build on morally relevant knowledge, which means that they build on morally 
relevant, true factual judgements concerning the situation at hand as well as concern-
ing society.   
  Further, whereas the aim of the good citizen’s morally good acting may be his or 
her own self-fulfilment, maturity requires having good intentions, i.e., intending the 
good of others for their sake. The mature man’s or woman’s moral judgements are 
judgements which tell him or her how to realise his or her good intentions, which are 
living according to morality for the sake of others. This implies that whereas the 
good citizen might well perform morally good actions because of fear of punishment, 
the mature person must do them willingly instead of reluctantly. 
  However, these criteria on the mature person’s moral judgement are not covered by 
the meaning of ‘good’ in the everyday expression ‘good moral judgement’: A good 
moral judgement is simply one which tells one how to live according to morality, for 
whatever reason and in whatever way. It does not get worse simply by the fact that it 
was not made by the agent him- or herself, and it can be accidental, which means 
that it must not be founded on relevant knowledge, and it must not be made intently 
and willingly, and it must not aim at fulfilling the demands of morality for the sake 
of others.  
  This indicates that the mature person’s moral judgement, which is what we call a 
mature judgement in everyday language, cannot be reduced to a standard good 
moral judgement. Instead, a mature judgement is a good moral judgement of a cer-
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tain kind, namely one which the agent made him- or herself willingly, with the inten-
tion of supporting others for their sake, after critical reflection on the situation at 
hand, and building on morally relevant knowledge, and thus in full consciousness of 
what he or she was doing. A moral judgement of this kind fulfils certain conditions 
of objectivity in the meaning of being reliable: it is clearly formulated, it prescribes 
only what morality demands, it takes all persons into regard, it is made by the agent 
him- or herself, it is based on morally relevant knowledge and thus on sufficient 
relevant information, it can be sufficiently explained and thus motivated by the 
judge, it is done intently and willingly, i.e., as the result of critical reflection and 
choice, it is motivated by the agent’s own good intentions, and it remains prelimi-
nary while revisable in the face of new and relevant information. This means that the 
mature judgement is not simply a good moral judgement, but one that is trustwor-
thy, which means that it can serve as a moral advice to others. 
 
ARISTOTLE, PRUDENCE, AND MORALITY 
We will begin our study of the everyday expression of mature judgement with an 
examination of Aristotle’s concept of φρονησις as it is presented in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, which will help clarifying the meaning of mature judgement in the everyday 
sense today by showing what it is not, which will also show what it is. Like in previ-
ous chapters we will here refer to philosophical theories only in so far as this helps us 
in our task of clarifying common sense, and we will not argue against any philoso-
phical standpoints. 
Aristotle’s expression φρονησις is often translated as ‘prudence’. For the sake of 
convenience we will keep this translation here. The translation ‘practical wisdom’, 
which is also often used for φρονησις, may seduce one to believe that φρονησις is 
some kind of practical counterpart to Aristotelian σοφια or ‘wisdom’, which is erro-
neous, since φρονησις has nothing to do with σοφια. In a footnote to the Nicomachean 
Ethics Barnes suggests the translation ‘practical common sense’.103 In Chapter 1 we 
distinguished between different meanings of the expression common sense: as mean-
ing a basic human reason or understanding, which is thought to be the way of rea-
                                                 
103 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translation by J.A.K. Thomson, revised by Hugh Tredennick, note 1 p. 
209. 
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soning of the plain man, unbiased by any schooling of the mind through logical 
thinking, by scientific standpoints, or by ideological concerns; as meaning the moral 
intuitions of most men, where something seems obviously morally right or wrong to 
most people without them having reflected much on the matter, like a certain distri-
bution of goods, or the killing of an innocent person; and as meaning the actual 
moral views currently held by most people in a community. But φρονησις is neither 
a basic human reason or understanding - it is not the plain man’s way of reasoning 
concerning moral issues - nor is it moral intuition in the modern sense, since it is not 
independent of reflection, and nor does it consist in moral views. Instead, it is an an 
excellence of character (ηθικη αρετη), to which one must be educated by a competent 
teacher. And Aristotle’s view of man is clearly aristocratic: In the Politics he says that 
not all men are able to acquire excellence of character, not even with the very best 
teaching.104 
  We will now show that the meaning of the Aristotelian concept of prudence as pre-
sented in the Nicomachean Ethics corresponds to two everyday expressions today, 
namely prudence and moral judgement, which have distinct functions but which are 
both implied by the everyday expression of maturity today.  
  Aristotelian prudence is the capacity to deliberate on what is good and advanta-
geous in view of one’s life in general. Therewith it is deliberation on the right mean, 
that is, the right action, for obtaining a good aim, and it concerns what it is practically 
possible for the agent himself to do.105 The particular judgement formed by prudence 
is imperative; it says what one should or should not do. Aristotle associates the aim 
with human goods, but the best goods are goods of the soul (ψυχη), or more pre-
cisely, certain activities of the soul. 
  Beasts too have prudence, but of a primitive kind, consisting in a practical skill in 
supporting themselves materially and in protecting themselves against dangers. This 
analogy with the capacity of beasts to support and protect themselves sheds light on 
the function of Aristotelian prudence. According to Aristotle, people of his time tend 
to think of prudence as the capacity to find out how to obtain the greatest good for 
                                                 
104 Aristotle, Politics 1316a10-11. 
105 Nobody deliberates about things that he cannot do himself, Aristotle says (Nicomachean Ethics 
1140a31-33). 
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oneself. Aristotle keeps this view: Prudence presupposes having a true opinion of 
what is to one’s own advantage. But Aristotelian prudence is also the capacity to find 
out how to obtain the greatest good for others. This is shown by Aristotle’s claims 
that good men, who are men with prudence, do not allow their friends to go wrong, 
and that the leaders of a household and political leaders must be prudent for being 
good leaders. 
  But although Aristotelian prudence is the capacity to deliberate on the right means 
to support both oneself and others in the best way, it is questionable whether it is a 
quality with which one deliberates on how best to support everyone one meets. Are 
strangers included, not to speak of enemies? We have seen that Aristotelian prudence 
is constructed in analogy with the capacity of beasts to support and protect them-
selves, and this capacity of beasts certainly includes supporting and protecting their 
offspring. Likewise, a prudent man is capable of deliberating on how to secure what 
is best for himself and for those for whom he is in some way responsible, depending 
on his tasks: family, servants, friends, and, for the politician, all the members of the 
city-state. As an individual, it is one’s task to be helpful to one’s friends, as the head 
of a household it is to support the members of one’s household: family members and 
servants, and as the head of the city-state it is to support the population as a whole. 
This does not exclude that the prudent man’s ultimate concern is to support himself, 
and thus Aristotle can say: 
But it is also true to say of the man of good character that he performs many actions 
for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary even dies for them. For he 
will sacrifice both money and honours and in general the goods that people struggle 
to obtain, in his pursuit of what is <morally> fine. For he would rather have intense 
pleasure for a short time than quiet pleasure for a long time; rather live finely for one 
year than indifferently for many; and rather do one great and glorious deed than 
many petty ones. This result is presumably achieved by those who give their lives for 
others; so their choice is a glorious prize. Also the good man is ready to lose money 
on condition that his friends shall get more; for the friend gets money, but he himself 
gains fineness <of character>, so he assigns himself the greater good. He behaves in 
the same way too with regard to political honours and positions; all these he will 
freely give up to his friend, because that is a fine and praiseworthy thing for him to 
do. So it is natural that he is regarded as a man of good character, since he choses 
 119
what is fine in preference to anything else. He may even give up to his friend oppor-
tunities for doing fine actions, and it may be a finer thing for him to become the cause 
of his friend’s doing than to have done them himself. Thus we see that in the whole 
field of praiseworthy conduct the good man assigns himself the larger share of what 
is fine.106  
 
  And he states that it is impossible to secure one’s own good independently of do-
mestic and political science. What is best for man is his own self-fulfilment 
(ευδαιμονια), which consists in pleasure as well as in being socially active. 
Aristotelian prudence thus must include deliberating on how to promote what is 
best for others for being able to serve as a means to one’s own self-fulfilment, since 
this self-fulfilment is social in character. Apparently, then, the good man’s striving 
for personal self-fulfilment is his ultimate motivation for his doing well not only in 
personal matters but also as a friend and as the leader of a household and of the city-
state, and consequently, although Aristotelian prudence is the capacity to find the 
means to secure what is best both for oneself and for others, its ultimate aim is to se-
cure what is best for the agent him- or herself. 
  Everyday morality today differs from Aristotle’s conception of morality in several 
ways: Aristotle does not distinguish clearly between morality and politics, nor be-
tween morality and etiquette. Morality is presented as being a part of or rather an 
introduction to political science. Morality studies the nature of the good, i.e., what is 
good for man, but Aristotle claims that this study is properly carried out by political 
science. Further wittiness and tactfulness, joined in ευτραπελια, are part of morality, 
which means that a man who is not able to entertain, amuse, others in a pleasant way 
is immoral. In everyday language today we distinguish both between morality and 
politics and between morality and etiquette. In daily language we do not speak of 
political questions, views, and decisions as being moral questions, views, and deci-
sions. The everyday expression of morality concerns individuals only, not a people as 
a whole, notwithstanding the fact that morality concerns all individual members of 
society, each and everyone taken as an individual. And morality today does not in-
clude etiquette, which indicates that how best to please others through an agreeable 
                                                 
106 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1169a18-b1. 
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conduct and how to avoid displeasing others, although being socially relevant, are 
not considered important enough to count as moral questions. 
  In Chapter 1 we explained that today’s everyday expression of prudence means the 
capacity to judge correctly what is good for oneself and to act on this judgement so as 
to support oneself. This means that the everyday expression of prudence today is 
exclusively concerned with oneself. But unlike Aristotle’s ethics, morality today is 
not based on self-fulfilment. It concerns one’s behaviour towards other people only: 
It consists in views concerning how to behave so as to support other individuals, and 
its aim is to secure mutual support for the members of a community. For this reason 
morality gives no guidelines concerning self-support, and one cannot act ‘morally’ or 
‘immorally’ towards oneself.  
  This means that whereas being prudent according to the meaning of the everyday 
expression of prudence today means being useful to oneself, being moral means be-
ing useful to others. This shows that prudence is distinguished from morality, which 
indicates that prudence is not a moral quality. 
  We have noted that morality does not demand of us that we ruin or destroy our 
own lives in order to assist others; no-one would call a man who refused to sacrifice 
his own life to support others ‘immoral’. Morality demands only that we fulfil certain 
minimal criteria of good citizenship; of not harming others through physical or men-
tal violence, and of directly helping fellow citizens in need, as well as supporting 
them indirectly, i.e., their possibilities for self-fulfilment. Morality allows for taking 
care of oneself, for protecting one’s own life and for securing for oneself what makes 
life worth living to oneself in a basic sense. This means that morality allows for a cer-
tain prudence. We also noted that maturity not only is compatible with prudence, 
but that it even requires prudence: Maturity in the everyday sense implies autonomy, 
which implies being able to take care of oneself in daily life, which means being use-
ful to oneself, and consequently autonomy implies prudence. Further maturity is a 
long-term quality; it is nothing which one has at one moment and not at the next, and 
for providing the agent with the long-term competence to live according to morality, 
and thus to judge and to act morally well, maturity requires protecting one’s life and 
even securing a certain good for oneself which makes one’s life worth living to one-
self in a basic sense, and for this reason too maturity requires prudence.  
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  But this does not mean that the ultimate aim of the mature man’s or woman’s judg-
ing and acting is his or her own self-fulfilment, like in Aristotle’s ethics. The Aristote-
lian good man takes an active part in social life, and he supports the good of the 
community, but the fact that the ultimate aim of his moral acting is benefiting himself 
shows that Aristotle’s conception of human goodness radically differs from the 
meaning of the everyday expression of maturity today.  
  Maturity today requires having good intentions, which means intending to live ac-
cording to morality for the sake of others, without the ultimate aim of benefiting one-
self, and for this reason maturity is compatible with prudence only insofar as con-
tinuously living according to morality requires prudence. This means that the mature 
man’s or woman’s prudence is a minimal prudence, which aims at protecting the 
person’s own life and at securing that his or her life is worth living to him- or herself 
as far as this is necessary for a continuous moral competence. Consequently the ma-
ture man’s or woman’s prudence serves his or her moral competence and thus ulti-
mately other people rather than him- or herself.  
Aristotle’s concept of prudence follows from his conception of ethics as the study of 
what is best for man and how to obtain this, primarily for oneself, and we have now 
seen that morality, as being quite another conception of morality than that of Aris-
totle, implies another kind of moral judgement. We will now examine the meaning of 
today’s everyday expression of good moral judgement, and we will show that it 
forms the basis for the everyday expression of mature judgement, which is the topic 
of this final chapter of our study. 
 
 
FACTUAL JUDGEMENT AND MORAL JUDGEMENT 
Before we can give a fair description of the nature of the good moral judgement ac-
cording to the everyday use of the expression today, we must specify what judging 
means in daily language. We will clarify the nature of judgement by referring to 
Bell’s theory of judgement.  
  According to Bell in Frege’s Theory of Judgement, we can distinguish between asser-
tive and unassertive mental acts and assertive and unassertive occurrences of propo-
sitions. There are mental acts or states of mind which involve the agent or possessor 
 122
in a commitment to the truth of some claim, and there are those which do not. Exam-
ples of the second kind are wondering, considering, imagining, or supposing, in 
which one neither asserts nor judges nor denies anything. Such acts are neither true 
nor false. Judging, thinking that, believing, denying, agreeing, remembering that, 
means asserting something, making a certain claim in a proposition expressed by a 
sentence, which commits the agent or possessor to the truth of the corresponding 
claim, since the judgement, the belief etc. can be either correct or incorrect, true or 
false. What a sentence says is either true or false; its meaning is neither.107 
  Bell distinguishes between internal and external acts of judgement. An internal act 
of judgement is a mental, assertive act which may or may not result in any physical 
behaviour; an external act of judgement is a physical act of some sort. External acts of 
judgement may be either linguistic or non-linguistic: one can express one’s judge-
ment concerning a certain theatre performance by saying that it is terrible, i.e. a lin-
guistic act, or by throwing something at the actors, a non-linguistic act.108 The 
judgement is an act of putting together tokens (physical, mental, or linguistic) in con-
formity with certain rules. In the simplest case this involves the assertion that an ob-
ject falls under a concept, or that a concept falls within a higher level concept.109 
  Bell’s description of judgement corresponds to the way we use the expression ‘fac-
tual judgement’ in daily language. The everyday expression ‘factual judgement’ 
means something primarily internal, namely a mental, assertive act, which takes the 
form of a claim made in a proposition and expressed by a sentence. In addition, ‘fac-
tual judgement’ also means an external claim made in the form of a linguistic act, 
which means that something is uttered, it is said. An example of a factual judgement 
is ‘I am now sitting in front of a computer’. 
  The factual judgement states the objective existence of an object or of objects or of a 
certain relation or relations between objects, or that a certain object or objects or cer-
tain relations between certain objects do not exist. Although there is a semantic con-
nection between the everyday expression of factual judgement and that of sense per-
ception, so that the factual judgement, according to the way we use the expression in 
                                                 
107 Bell, Frege’s Theory of Judgement pp. 99-103, 114. All these references are to Bell’s own concept of 
judgement. 
108 ibid. p. 100. 
109 ibid. pp. 139-140. 
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daily language, builds on sense perception, ‘objective existence’ according to the way 
we use the expression in everyday language means an existence which is independ-
ent of an agent perceiving something or making a certain claim. This means that al-
though we make what we call factual judgements on the basis of sense perception, 
the meaning of the everyday expression of factual judgement implies that what the 
factual judgement states, namely a certain fact about the world, is true independently 
of one’s judgement-making, so that it would be true even if no factual judgements 
were made. 
  This means that according to the way we use the expressions in daily language, ‘fac-
tual judgement’, ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ are semantically connected, so that it is part 
of the meaning of a factual judgement that it is necessarily either true or false: Either I 
am actually sitting in front of a computer or I am not. What is true or false in the fac-
tual judgement according to its meaning in everyday use is what the sentence, which 
expresses the proposition which makes up the factual judgement, says, namely the 
claim, namely that certain objects or relations between objects do or do not exist. This 
means that the way the everyday expressions ‘factual judgement’ and ‘truth’ are se-
mantically connected implies that our everyday semantic practice assumes the cor-
rectness of the correspondence theory of truth for factual judgements: What is ‘true’ 
is a claim which correctly describes reality and which therefore corresponds to real-
ity. But we will see that our semantic practice does not assume this for moral judge-
ments.  
  According to our everyday use of the expression ‘truth’, a truth is something which 
is unchangeable, and therewith permanent. That Caesar was murdered by Brutus is a 
factual judgement about the relation between two objects, namely two human be-
ings, namely that the first was killed by the second, which implies that this judge-
ment is either true or false, according to the way we use the expressions ‘factual 
judgement’, ‘truth’, and ‘falsehood’. If it is true now that Caesar was murdered by 
Brutus, then this was true in 44 B.C., and it will be true in a thousand years as well, 
and it would still be true even if mankind were to die out, which means that this 
truth is not dependent on a human perception or on a human claim. 
  According to the way we use the expressions ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ in everyday 
life, there is no partial truth, but there is partial knowledge of the truth. Truth does 
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not change, for example with scientific development; what changes with scientific 
development is not truth itself, but our knowledge of the truth. Obtaining knowledge 
in the everyday sense does not mean that the world changes, but that our views of 
the world change, towards views which better correspond to the world. This means 
obtaining knowledge of a truth which is there all the time, and this process may well 
be gradual. Thus when we say ‘This is not the whole truth’, we mean that this is not 
everything that can be known about the object or the occurrence. Interestingly, al-
though we say ‘Now our knowledge has changed’ meaning that it has increased, we 
never say ‘Now truth has changed’. 
  In daily language we use the expression ‘factual judgement’ in quite another sense 
than that in which we use the expression ‘moral judgement’. But before we can ex-
amine this difference we must state what we mean by the expression moral judge-
ment in everyday language.  
  We have seen that Aristotelian prudence is the capacity to find the right mean to 
realise a certain moral aim, and that the exercise of Aristotelian prudence results in 
an action prescription. This means that Aristotelian prudence is not a particular 
judgement as a proposition, but instead the capacity to make moral judgements.  
  The Aristotelian good man reasons himself to what is to be done by means of draw-
ing the correct conclusion from two premises, one major or universal premise and 
one minor and particular, of what is called the practical syllogism, for example: ‘Do 
not kill any human beings’, and ‘This is a human being’. By using his prudence, the 
Aristotelian good man draws the conclusion ‘Do not kill this human being’. This 
means that the Aristotelian particular moral judgement does not say what is good or 
bad or right or wrong; it takes the form of an action prescription only, which is valid 
in an individual case, and which says only what the agent him- or herself should do. 
It concerns the agent’s treatment of him- or herself - for Aristotle there is at least one 
purely self-related moral excellence of character, namely μεγαλοφυχια or magnanim-
ity - and of others, but not others’ treatment of the agent, and not others’ treatment of 
themselves or of each other.  
  Likewise, there is an everyday expression of moral judgement today as the capacity 
to deliberate well in moral matters, but ‘moral judgement’ also means a particular 
moral judgement which is the result of one’s deliberation, and which takes the form 
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of a proposition, which means that the everyday expression of moral judgement has 
two different meanings. Like in the case of the factual judgement, what we mean by 
‘moral judgement’ as a particular moral judgement is the internal, mental, assertive 
act of formulating a claim to oneself in one’s thoughts, which is made in a proposi-
tion, expressed by a sentence, as well as its external, linguistic, expression. 
The fact that Aristotelian prudence and today’s moral judgement as the capacity to 
make moral judgements build on different conceptions of morality implies that the 
meaning of today’s everyday expression of moral judgement as the capacity to make 
moral judgements must be quite different from Aristotelian prudence, and therewith 
its moral judgements must differ from the Aristotelian moral judgements. 
Unlike in Aristotle, prudence today, as the everyday use of the expression is under-
stood by the author, is not directly connected to morality, which implies that in eve-
ryday language today, moral judgements differ from prudential judgements. The 
prudential judgement says what is good or bad for oneself, which means that it is an 
assessment of value which states that something is valuable or not, which is what we 
call a value judgement. Further the prudential judgement says what one should do to 
obtain this good or to avoid what is bad, which is what we call an action prescrip-
tion. But since morality today demands only that one support others, not that one 
support oneself, unlike both the Aristotelian particular moral judgement and today’s 
prudential judgement, today’s particular moral judgement cannot say what is good 
or bad for oneself. Like in the case of the prudential judgement, the particular moral 
judgement too says what is good or bad, which means that a certain kind of value 
judgement forms part of the moral judgements, but these value judgements do not 
say what is good for the agent him- or herself, but instead what is good or bad in re-
lation to others. This means that according to the way we use the expressions in daily 
language, moral value judgements are to be distinguished from prudential value 
judgements, which are non-moral value judgements. 
  Further, unlike the moral judgements made by Aristotelian prudence, today’s moral 
judgements do not consist of action prescriptions only. According to Kaniak, a moral 
judgement is an opinion in moral matters about right and wrong concerning a certain 
physical, mental (thought or feeling) or linguistic act, and thus it says what is the 
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right or wrong thing to do, think, feel, or say.110 And in his Ethics. Inventing Right and 
Wrong, Mackie says: 
A moral or ethical statement may assert that some particular action is right or wrong; 
or that actions or certain kinds are so; it may offer a distinction between good or bad 
characters or dispositions; or it may propound some broad principle from which 
many more detailed judgements of these sorts might be inferred – for example, that 
we ought always to aim at the greatest general happiness, or try to minimize the total 
suffering of all sentient beings, or devote ourselves wholly to the service of God, or 
that it is right and proper for everyone to look after himself.111 
 
Certainly what Kaniak and Mackie say is true of the everyday expression of moral 
judgement. We have already noted that today’s particular moral judgement says 
what is good or bad in relation to others, and this includes Mackie’s claim that the 
moral statement says that a certain character type or disposition is good or bad, as 
well as the statement that a certain person is good or bad, or that humans have an 
absolute value. These statements are all in some way related to what is good or bad 
for others, since in everyday language the statement that a certain character type is 
good means that the person who has such a character is at least intending to promote 
the good of others, and the statement that a certain disposition is (morally) good 
means that the person has a disposition to promote the good of others, and conse-
quently that a certain person is good means that he or she has good intentions, as we 
noted in Chapter 1 concerning goodness of the heart, and the statement that humans 
have an absolute value implies the conception that they have a right to (a good) life.  
Like the value judgements which are forms of the moral judgements differ from 
those which are forms of the prudential judgements, the moral judgements which 
take the form of action prescriptions differ from those of the prudential judgements. 
Whereas prudential action prescriptions or rather recommendations say what one 
should do to obtain what is good for oneself, moral action prescriptions say what one 
should do so that others should obtain what is good. These action prescriptions can 
be generally held, like in ‘One ought never to kill the innocent’, or specific, as in ‘You 
ought not to kill that man’. Since morality in the everyday sense of the word consists 
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111 Mackie, Ethics p. 9. 
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of views concerning how human beings should treat each other only, the particular 
moral judgement concerns what the agent should do or not do to others, directly and 
indirectly, and what others should do or not do to the agent and to each other, but 
not what the agent or what others should or should not do to themselves. One single 
moral judgement can contain several kinds of action prescriptions, for several per-
sons who are involved in the situation, and it can say that several persons are or are 
not to perform the same action. And it may prescribe not only what should be done 
right at the moment, but also what should be done later, in a longer perspective. But 
action prescriptions do not have to contain any information concerning why the ac-
tion ought or ought not to be performed, or who is or is not to perform it (‘Someone 
ought to stop that madman’). 
  The various meanings of the everyday expression of moral judgement indicates that 
the process of making a moral judgement in everyday life is much more complex 
than Aristotle’s description of moral judgement-making as simply drawing the cor-
rect conclusion from two premises. There may be many premises involved, depend-
ent both on the kind of moral judgement and on the complexity of the situation and 
thus on the amount of morally relevant information available. 
  In the passage quoted above, Mackie also mentions the stating of moral principles 
as forms of moral statements. This is neither a value judgement concerning what is 
good or valuable or not, nor is it an action prescription, but instead a universal moral 
judgement, which claims something to be right or wrong, e.g. ‘All killing is wrong’. 
In addition to what Kaniak and Mackie mention, there are moral judgements which 
claim that people have rights, either generally, like in ‘All children have the right to a 
childhood free from violence’ or specifically, like in ‘These men have a right to speak 
freely’.    
If we now sum up what we have said concerning the nature of today’s particular 
moral judgement, we may note that it makes a certain claim, either ‘This is valu-
able/good/worthless/bad’, ‘This is right/wrong’, ‘All/they/he/she/none has a 
right to…’, or ‘This ought/ought not to be done’. 
  Expressions like ‘I know that I shouldn’t steal’ or ‘It is true that I ought to help him’ 
might make one suspect that our everyday way of expressing ourselves concerning 
morality points to a value objectivism, the existence of absolute moral values, which 
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are assumed to exist through our use of language. This view of everyday language is 
defended by Mackie. Relating his position will make clear how everyday language 
does not function, which will point to how it actually functions concerning moral 
statements. This means that although Mackies claims concerning everyday language 
are false, they are still important to our discussion, and stressing where Mackie goes 
wrong will help making apparent the nature of everyday language concerning mo-
rality. 
  According to Mackie, in everyday life we mean to say how that what we want to 
characterise morally, for example a certain action, is in itself, or would be if realised, 
whether something is right or wrong in itself. Consequently moral statements made 
in everyday language are statements concerning what is good or bad, right or wrong 
absolutely, which assumes that objective values are part of the ‘fabric of the world’, 
as he calls it.112 This means that according to Mackie, what we want to say is abso-
lute; it is not contingent upon any desire or preference. 
  In his Philosophy and Ordinary Language, Hanfling rejects Mackie’s analysis of our 
everyday uses of moral language: 
How should we understand the ontological commitments that Mackie ascribes to or-
dinary users of moral language? --- What is the fabric of the world? One might reply 
by reference to the materials of which it is made, such as rocks, metals, water, etc.; or, 
at a more analytic level, chemicals and molecules. But the idea that values could find 
a place in this company is bizarre and there is no reason to suppose that this is what 
people are committed to by their use of moral language, or that ‘linguistic analysis’ 
would reveal such a commitment. Here… the opponent of linguistic philosophy helps 
himself by foisting implausible metaphysical claims and theories on speakers of ordi-
nary language. Having saddled them with such commitments, he points out that they 
are indeed unacceptable and concludes from this that a philosophy based on ordinary 
language is itself unreliable.113 
 
We will here show that Hanfling is right, and we will do this by pointing at the dif-
ferences between factual judgements and moral judgements according to the every-
                                                 
112 Mackie, Ethics p. 15. 
113 Hanfling, Philosophy and Ordinary Language p. 147. 
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day use of these expressions, and at the meaning of the everyday expressions ‘truth’ 
and ‘good’, as well as at the function and thus the aim of morality. 
  The factual judgement just states, for example, that someone is dead. It does not say 
whether it is good or bad that this someone is dead, and it does not say that some-
thing is right or wrong, nor that something ought or ought not to be done. The 
statements that it is good (or that it is bad) that x is dead, that it was right (or wrong) 
to kill him or her, and that someone ought (or ought not) to call an ambulance are all 
radically different from the statement that x is dead, according to our everyday se-
mantic practice: The statement that someone is dead contains neither an evaluation, 
nor a prescription. According to our daily use of the expressions, ‘values’ and ‘obli-
gations’ are both radically different from ‘facts’, since values and obligations are al-
ways either claimed, accepted, or rejected by someone, whereas facts are not neces-
sarily either claimed, accepted, or rejected by anyone at all. Even if no human being 
ever makes a claim concerning a certain stone lying on the riverbank, it is still a fact 
that it lies there.  
  Further we have noted that in daily language, according to how the author under-
stands the use of the everyday expression, we use the expression ‘truth’ in the mean-
ing of something which is unchangeable, and therewith permanent, as in the exam-
ple of Caesar being murdered by Brutus. But we do not use the everyday expression 
of moral judgement in this sense; it makes no sense to say that it would be true that 
all men are equal or that stealing is wrong even if mankind were to die out.  
  This indicates that a statement like ‘All men are equal’ is not a claim like the state-
ment ‘I am sitting in front of a computer’: Whereas facts, according to our everyday 
use of the expression, are supposed to have an objective existence, an existence which 
is permanent and independent of their ever being noticed by any human being, the 
way we use the expressions ‘value’ and ‘obligation’ indicate that these are not sup-
posed to have an objective existence: They must necessarily be claimed by someone, 
and they are not thought of as being permanent. This implies that although particu-
lar judgements which take the form of statements concerning values and obligations 
are often grammatically formulated like factual judgements, they are in fact used in 
the same way as opinions are, i.e., as personal, subjective views, what one thinks is 
good or bad, right or wrong, what someone has or does not have a right to, and what 
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one thinks ought or ought not to be done. This means that a moral judgement like 
‘You ought not to take his bike’ is not a claim which says that it is eternally true that 
the other ought not to take that third person’s bike, and that this is true independ-
ently of the existence of any human beings; it simply means that one has the opinion 
that the other ought not to take the third person’s bike, an opinion which can be ex-
plained and thus motivated by the judge: The third person needs the bike, he will 
suffer if the other person takes it, etc.  
  The explanation for the difference between the factual judgement and the moral 
judgement concerning truth is to be found in the different functions of these judge-
ments. The function of the factual judgement is expressing a knowledge about the 
world. The function of the particular moral judgement on the other hand is depend-
ent on the function and therewith on the aim of morality, which is not the expression 
of knowledge, but which is practical, namely the mutual support of the members of a 
community. 
  Today the everyday meaning of the expression ‘good’ differs from the Aristotelian 
conception of the good referred to in Chapter 1, as being an absolute value with an 
objective existence. We have seen that in Aristotle’s theory, the good man knows 
what is good absolutely, which means that Aristotle believes in the objective exis-
tence of moral values, and as we have noted, the objective existence of moral values 
implies that moral judgements are either true or false. 
  We have noted that morality prescribes good citizenship, which does not require 
knowledge of moral truths, but only a morally relevant knowledge, notably what the 
laws of the state and the current customs of society say. This means that unlike Aris-
totle’s ethics, as it was described in the section on goodness in Chapter 1, morality 
does not presuppose the existence of objective values. 
  What we say in moral matters always relates to a certain conception of what is good 
and bad, right or wrong, a conception which consists of opinions which are based on 
what one thinks is important: life, happiness, freedom, etc.  
  In relation to the everyday expression of judgement, the expression ‘true’ is meta-
physical in a way which ‘good’ is not: As we have seen, that a certain judgement is 
true means that it correctly singles out a material object or several objects, or a rela-
tion or several relations between objects. But according to the way we use the expres-
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sion ‘good’ in everyday language today in relation to particular judgements, that a 
particular moral judgement is ‘good’ does not mean that it is ‘true’ in this sense; in-
stead, a good moral judgement is a particular judgement which correctly applies mo-
rality either generally to human life or to a particular situation, which means that it 
corresponds both to morality and to certain morally relevant, true factual judge-
ments. 
  We are raised to accept morality, and since morality prescribes usefulness to others, 
aiming at the mutual support of the members of a community, the fact that we are 
raised to accept morality means that we are raised to accept certain values which are 
related to what is useful to others. Accepting these values does not mean accepting 
that they have an objective existence of which one has knowledge, and that state-
ments about them are necessarily either true or false; instead it means internalising 
the view that they should be realised in a life for others. ‘It is wrong to steal!’ is the 
way one talks to small children so that they internalise the opinion that one should 
not steal, so that in fact they do not perform the act of stealing. When uttering moral 
judgements to adults, one hardly presents one’s opinion as a factual claim but as a 
personal view, an opinion, for which one gives a motivation. Thus instead of saying 
‘It is wrong to steal!’, one says for example ‘I think you should not take that thing 
from him, because it is all he has’. And if one says ‘All men are equal’, what one 
means is that one is of the opinion that all men should be treated as equals, i.e., with 
the same fairness, and that one wants others to share one’s opinion. This is shown by 
the fact that more generally held moral judgements imply other moral judgements 
which are more specific: The value judgement that all men are equal implies the uni-
versal moral judgement that one ought to treat all men as equals, which implies the 
moral judgement that one ought to treat x as equal to y and z, for example. And as 
we have stated, the aim of morality is not the expression of knowledge, but moral 
acting, for which reason the function of all value judgements and universal moral 
judgements is to make the receiver of these uttered judgements internalise the impor-
tance of acting on certain action prescriptions. 
  This means that whereas according to the meaning of the everyday expression of 
factual judgement, it is semantically connected to the everyday expressions of truth 
and falsehood, according to the meaning of the everyday expression of moral judge-
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ment, the moral judgement is not. This means that whereas uttering a factual judge-
ment means stating a fact, uttering a moral judgement does not mean stating a fact. 
But against Bell, it still means making a claim, namely that something is good or 
valuable or not, that something is right or wrong, or that someone has or does not 
have a certain right, or that something ought or ought not to be done, although this 
claim is not true or false. And for this reason making a moral judgement is not a case 
of wondering, considering, imagining, or supposing, in which one neither asserts nor 
judges nor denies anything.  
 
 
GOOD MORAL JUDGEMENT 
According to our everyday use of the expression today, what is good in the moral 
sphere is simply what preserves the lives of human beings and what makes it possi-
ble for them to fulfil themselves and thus to obtain and to do what makes their lives 
worth living to them, and this is what morality prescribes. Of course what this means 
tends to vary between people depending on what they regard as being important to 
themselves, but in fact people tend to want much the same things; pleasant feelings 
of being content with life, experiencing oneself as being loved and appreciated by 
others, developing and exercising one’s capacities and therewith cultivating one’s 
interests, and experiencing that one’s life makes sense, that it is meaningful. In Chap-
ter 1 we noted that not only are we not always ourselves the best judges of what 
keeps us alive; furthermore, we are not even always the best judges of what makes 
our lives worth living, since we may have forgotten or simply neglect considering 
what is important to us, while others may be aware of this and being prepared to 
support us with it, and when we receive it, we feel joyful, relieved, satisfied, etc. 
Consequently what makes our lives worth living is dependent on our own reactions 
when we experience things. 
  Since morality demands the support of all other men, the good moral judgement 
aims at supporting all other individuals, and consequently, and as distinguished 
from Aristotle, it takes the good of all others into consideration, all who are involved 
in the situation, friends and acquaintances as well as strangers, and even enemies, 
and further all present and even all future members of society. Consequently the 
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good moral judgement tells one how to assist all persons involved in the actual situa-
tion, and supporting them can be done either directly, for example by helping an-
other person who is about to drown, or indirectly, by providing all members of soci-
ety with the means to their own self-fulfilment by supporting the preservation of 
their lives and their possibilities of making life worth living to themselves by remov-
ing obstacles to this aim, which is done by supporting the order and thus the stability 
and therewith the continuity of society. On the other hand, since morality allows for 
a minimal prudence, the good moral judgement does not clash with what such a 
minimal prudence recommends. This means that the good moral judgement does not 
prescribe assisting others at all costs; it does not prescribe heroic actions which in-
clude ruining or sacrificing one’s own life. Instead, it prescribes actions which fulfil 
the criteria of good citizenship. 
  In the everyday expression of good moral judgement, ‘good’ is used in a technical 
sense, which means that the quality of the moral judgement, whether it is good or 
not, is independent of the agent’s own judging, i.e., whether the agent has made the 
judgement him- or herself, or whether he or she has just accepted another person’s 
judgement as his or her own. Simply repeating another person’s moral judgement 
will not make this judgement worse, if only it applies morality either to human life in 
general or to a certain situation. Further the quality of the moral judgement is inde-
pendent of the quality of the agent’s own judging, i.e., his or her access to morally 
relevant information and his or her critical reflection based on this information, and 
thus of his or her morally relevant knowledge. This means that a moral judgement 
can be a good moral judgement accidentally, simply because it happens to apply mo-
rality to human life in general or to a specific situation. And finally, the good moral 
judgement is independent of the agent’s intentions and thus of his or her reasons for 
judging or accepting a certain moral judgement as his or her own: If he or she cor-
rectly applies morality to human life in general or to a certain situation with the aim 
of benefiting him- or herself, then this does not make his or her moral judgement 
worse. 
  Most people’s value judgements and universal moral judgements are vague and not 
fully conscious to them, which means that these moral judgements consist of unar-
ticulated judgements which are more sensed than formulated in thought. These 
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vague moral opinions form the basis for people’s moral judgements, and certainly 
such a vague, half-conscious moral opinion may well correctly apply morality either 
to human life in general or to an individual situation, in which case it is a good moral 
judgement. But is this the way we use the expression ‘mature judgement’ in every-
day language? 
  We have now clarified the meaning of the expression ‘good moral judgement’ in 
daily language today, but it still remains to examine the meaning of the everyday 
expression ‘mature judgement’, and how it is related to the everyday expression 
good moral judgement. For being able to do this we will have to examine the nature 
of morally relevant knowledge. 
  
 
MATURITY AND MORALLY RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE 
We will now describe the semantic connection between the everyday expressions of 
maturity and of good moral judgement by showing that maturity allows for what we 
have chosen to call morally relevant knowledge, which is necessary for making good 
moral judgements which are not made accidentally. This and the moral motivation 
implied by maturity semantically connects maturity to morality. 
  Maturity makes one able to behave in ways appropriate for adults, which means 
fulfilling one’s role in society, which means taking one’s responsibility as a member 
of the community, which means acting in ways which are useful to others, which 
means supporting their good. This means fulfilling certain basic moral demands 
which means that the action is morally acceptable, that it is not blameworthy. A mor-
ally relevant knowledge must tell one how to realise this aim. 
  We have seen that Mackie’s claims in Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong concerning 
our use of language show what the function of morality is not, which gives important 
clues to what it is. Mackie says: 
Someone [who] is in a state of moral perplexity, wondering whether it would be 
wrong for him to engage, say, in research related to bacteriological warfare, wants to 
arrive at some judgement about this concrete case, his doing this work at this time in 
these actual circumstances; his relevant characteristics will be part of the subject of 
the judgement, but no relation between him and the proposed action will be part of 
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the predicate. The question is not, for example, whether he really wants to do this 
work, whether it will satisfy or dissatisfy him, whether he will in the wrong run have 
a pro-attitude towards it, or even whether this is an action of a sort that he can hap-
pily and sincerely recommend in all relevantly similar cases. Nor is he even wonder-
ing just whether to recommend such action in all relevantly similar cases. He wants to 
know whether this course of action would be wrong in itself.114  
 
  But certainly a scientist who asks himself whether it would be wrong for him to en-
gage in research related to bacteriological warfare does not want to know whether 
this is wrong in itself, he wants to know what to do in this situation. The aim of our 
everyday moral deliberation is not to obtain knowledge of objective moral values, 
and thus it is not to find out what is good or bad, right or wrong in itself; instead, 
everyday moral deliberation is an activity which aims at finding solutions to actual 
moral problems in daily life. We want to come to a decision concerning what to do, 
and our decision we base on factual judgements in the everyday sense which we 
have reason to believe to be true: If I do this research then it might be dangerous for a 
lot many people, but if I don’t, my career as a scientist may be over, etc., as well as on 
our own moral views, e.g.: I do not think one should endanger the lives of other peo-
ple, even if these people are unknown to oneself. 
  In Chapter 1 we noted that as distinguished from Aristotle, being a good citizen, 
according to the way we use the expression in daily language, does not require 
knowledge of moral truths, of what is good or bad, right or wrong absolutely, only of 
what is required of one as a member of society, which is what the law and the more 
important customs prescribe. We also noted that morality prescribes good citizen-
ship, which means that morality does not assume a value objectivism and knowledge 
of moral truths. In this chapter we have noted that whereas the everyday expression 
‘factual judgement’ is semantically connected to the everyday expression ‘truth’, the 
everyday expression ‘moral judgement’ is not.  
  The correct expression for knowledge of objectively existing moral values and there-
fore of what is good or bad, right or wrong as such would be ‘moral knowledge’, but 
this is not the way we express ourselves in our everyday semantic practice: We do 
                                                 
114 Mackie, Ethics pp. 33-34. 
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not say that we have ‘moral knowledge’, and we do not say that we ‘know’ what is 
good or bad, right or wrong as such. Such a claim to knowledge would equal a claim 
to knowledge of what is in a certain desk drawer. We can doubt that someone knows 
what is in the desk drawer by saying that he hasn’t checked, he is only guessing, but 
we would not say that someone does not know what is good or bad, right or wrong 
because he has not checked it, and therefore he is only guessing. According to our 
everyday language, there is proof of what is in the desk drawer, namely through 
sense perception, but there is no proof of what is good or bad, right or wrong. Instead 
of saying that we have moral knowledge, we say that we have knowledge of morality, 
which means something quite different. In everyday language, with the expression 
‘morality’ we mean a system of views concerning what ought to be done so as to 
serve the mutual support of the members of a community, namely that each member 
of society fulfils his or her role by supporting others with whom he or she has direct 
intercourse as well as the stability and thus permanence of society for the sake of all 
its present and future members. Consequently morality prescribes support, direct 
and indirect, of all other members of society. This means that ‘knowledge of moral-
ity’ means knowledge of a certain moral conception, a certain moral view or opinion, 
and when we say that we know what is good or bad, right or wrong, we use the ex-
pression ‘knowledge’ in this sense, i.e., as knowledge of moral views which we ac-
cept ourselves.  Consequently when we say ‘I know what is right’ or ‘I know what I 
ought to do’, we do not make any metaphysical claims; instead we confirm our 
knowledge of and acceptance of a certain moral convention.  
  Such knowledge builds on true beliefs concerning the existence of certain moral 
views. Beliefs build on factual judgements, which means that knowledge of moral 
views builds on true factual judgements concerning the existence of certain moral 
views. ‘Knowing that what one does is wrong’ thus means knowing that what one 
does is wrong according to a certain kind of morality, and accepting this as valid for 
oneself. The expression ‘It’s true that I ought not to steal’ has the same meaning as ‘I 
ought not to steal’, namely that stealing is prohibited according to a certain moral 
view which one accepts as being valid for oneself. By formulating the claim either 
internally, to oneself, or by uttering the expression, one  thereby confirms to oneself 
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that one has this view, of which one might not have been fully aware a while ago 
when being a victim to the temptation of stealing. 
  Accepting something as valid for oneself means finding it correct not in the sense of 
being true, but in the sense of being good. In the last section we noted that the every-
day expression ‘good’ is not metaphysical in the sense which the expression ‘true’ is, 
and that the fact that a moral judgement is ‘good’ means not that it is true, but that it 
correctly applies morality either generally to human life or to a particular situation. 
Likewise, finding something correct in the sense of being good means not holding 
this something to be true, but instead it means accepting it as being imperative. 
  What we have now said implies that the good moral judgement according to the 
way we use the expression in everyday language builds not on knowledge of objec-
tively existing moral values, but on knowledge of morality. In addition it builds on 
knowledge of the situation and of society as a whole. This knowledge we can call a 
morally relevant knowledge, and thus a good moral judgement made by the agent 
himself which is not made accidentally implies morally relevant knowledge in this 
sense. 
  Not only knowledge of morality builds on true beliefs, in this case concerning the 
content of morality, beliefs which are based on true factual judgements; knowledge 
of the situation and of society as a whole too builds on true beliefs, and thus on true 
factual judgements, which means that morally relevant knowledge as a whole does, 
which indicates that morally relevant knowledge ultimately builds on sense percep-
tion. Knowledge through sense perception of course does not assume a value objec-
tivism, since sense perceptions are the basis for factual judgements only, and factual 
judgements, as we have seen, do not contain statements about values. 
  Morally relevant knowledge is based on true beliefs due to having made certain 
true factual judgements of moral relevance. Morally relevant, true factual judge-
ments are judgements which provide the agent with a knowledge of the different 
aspects of the situation and of how these aspects are connected, which gives an over-
view of the moral situation, and it also gives an insight in how the situation at hand 
relates to other situations. This shows which possibilities are offered, and thus the 
different alternatives for action, and thus what can be done and by whom, as well as 
which actions will serve to realise a certain aim. This requires being able to distin-
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guish and compare and thus assess the importance of things, above all the effects of 
actions on the people concerned. This means that the acquisition of morally relevant 
knowledge requires critical reflection on all or most relevant information concerning 
the situation at hand and the persons involved, what preserves their lives and what 
makes their lives worth living to themselves, presently as well as in a longer time 
perspective, and what they are doing presently and what they intend to do next, 
what they are capable of doing and what they are prepared to do. 
  The condition that a good moral judgement which is not made accidentally must 
rest on sufficient morally relevant knowledge, of morality, of the situation at hand, 
and of society as a whole, may seem to make the correctness of the good moral 
judgement relative, so that it is only correct to speak of a moral judgement as being 
better or worse in relation to other moral judgements which are less/more informed. 
But although there is no end to the information one can gather about a certain situa-
tion, not everything which there is to know is morally relevant, and in the end only a 
few factors are of special importance, and that a moral judgement is good simply 
means that it correctly applies morality to life in general or to an individual situation. 
This requires only a moral judgement which is sufficient towards the background of 
the morally relevant information immediately available. In many cases making a 
quick decision is more important than making one which takes all morally relevant 
information into consideration.  
  Maturity as an autonomy which is formed by a universal sympathy implies ration-
ality in the everyday sense of being appropriate, i.e., adapted, suited, to its purpose. 
Therewith it implies reflection, on what is demanded of one and of what one must do 
to fulfil these demands, which means that it requires the capacity to make correct 
assessments of priorities and thus a certain understanding of these priorities, of who 
is in most need of support in the situation and of which action best serves the pur-
pose of supporting the person who is in most need of help. This means that maturity 
secures a competence in making good moral judgements which are not good acci-
dentally, which means that they build on morally relevant knowledge. This implies 
that maturity supports the acquisition of morally relevant knowledge. This knowl-
edge tells one how best to realise one’s good intentions, i.e., with the least effort, with 
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the least risk of injury, and with the highest chance of success, which allows for mak-
ing moral judgements which can lay claim to a certain rationality. 
  The reason for the fact that maturity secures competent moral judgement-making is 
to be found in the universal sympathy on which the morally relevant autonomy is 
based, which corresponds to the meaning of our everyday expression of maturity. 
Universal sympathy makes the lives of others and the fact that their lives are worth 
living to them important to one, which makes living according to morality important 
to one. This motivates one to turn towards the situation and towards society as a 
whole in attention and concentration with the aim of understanding morally relevant 
aspects which are needed for making a good moral judgement, which is one which 
points to an action or actions which fulfils or fulfil the demands of morality. This 
means that universal sympathy, as we have chosen to call it, motivates the agent to 
strive to obtain morally relevant knowledge, and further to judging on the basis of 
this knowledge, and to acting accordingly. This function of universal sympathy is 
fulfilled by the affirmative mental attitude and the friendly feelings included, which 
were described in Chapter 2. The everyday expression ‘friendly feeling’, which 
means a feeling of joy at human intercourse, is semantically connected to the every-
day expression ‘affirmative attitude’ in the meaning of a certain mental attitude, and 
the everyday meanings of these two expressions indicate that the friendly feelings 
are connected to a mental attitude of interest in the other for his sake, and thus to 
concern for the other, and the everyday meaning of ‘concern’ indicates a direction of 
the mind of attention and concentration towards the object, the other person.  
  The feelings can improve one’s morally relevant perception: By giving rise to men-
tal attitudes which focus our attention on a certain object, our feelings can make us 
more receptive to certain kinds of external stimuli which influence our sense percep-
tion, so that we, when experiencing a certain feeling in a certain situation, perceive 
things which we would not have perceived without this feeling experience. By giving 
rise to concern for others, one’s friendly feelings support the perception of morally 
relevant aspects of reality, for example concerning the vulnerability of human beings, 
which gives a morally relevant knowledge, for example that a certain person is in 
danger and thus in need of aid. 
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  Our feelings are necessary for evaluating something as being important, although 
the evaluation itself must be made by the intellect. According to Steinfath, only 
through the feelings do we put something external in relation to ourselves, in experi-
encing that this something has a certain importance to us. Fear for example is neces-
sary for experiencing a danger as being directly related to oneself. This function can 
be filled neither by views, nor by wishes. Views and wishes become my views and 
wishes only when I experience feelings related to them. In feeling something I am 
inexchangeable; we cannot share feelings with others in the same way as we can 
share views.115 
  Something can be said to be important to us simply because we react with certain 
feelings which make us assume an affirming/rejecting attitude towards the object. 
But the feelings also make one interpret things as important or as unimportant. 
  One’s feelings motivate one to make use of one’s knowledge in sorting and classify-
ing one’s perceptions as part of one’s overall experience, and they motivate one to 
make factual judgements based on one’s interpretation of one’s perceptions. This 
means that the feelings are necessary for the forming of beliefs concerning the world. 
And since knowledge of the world rests on true beliefs concerning the world, the 
feelings are necessary for the acquisition of knowledge of the world, and thus for the 
acquisition of morally relevant knowledge.  
  It seems obvious that through our upbringing we learn to experience certain feel-
ings as a response to our interpretation of certain stimuli and in the context of certain 
beliefs and also of certain moral views which we learn to accept. We experience cer-
tain feelings when we judge that moral norms which we accept as correct in the 
meaning of being valid have been either respected or disrespected. This means that 
our emotional reactions make us attentive to when moral demands which we accept 
as valid have been violated, as well as when they have been fulfilled, and this means 
that if one has internalised, learned to accept as valid, the demands of morality, one’s 
feelings can indicate to one when morality has been respected or disrespected in 
judgement and in action. This means that the feelings help one in the process of mak-
ing good moral judgements. 
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  The feelings must always be interpreted by the intellect for providing the agent with 
any kind of knowledge. Such an interpretation can be very simple, like becoming 
aware of the situation in which one experiences a certain feeling and comparing this 
situation with earlier situations. This means comparing one’s feelings with other 
mental phenomena: with memories of earlier interpretations of feeling experiences, 
with mental attitudes, wishes, beliefs, views, and judgements. Since the feelings must 
always be interpreted, we cannot assume that they can give knowledge themselves. 
  The feelings and the mental attitudes in combination have a tendency to raise 
wishes. According to Steinfath, feeling experiences can give orientation in the direc-
tion of a certain way of acting if they casually lead to wishes or imply wishes concep-
tually.116 
  Feelings and attitudes alone give rise only to the simple wish to obtain the object or 
to avoid it. But together with other mental phenomena: beliefs, views, and judge-
ments, feelings and mental attitudes can raise also more complex wishes.  
  The affirmative mental attitude of concern for others is an interest in others for their 
sake, which means that the agent’s personal wishes, i.e., wishes to satisfy him- or 
herself, have been replaced by wishes to support others for their sake. This serves to 
improve one’s morally relevant perception, since the fact that one is observing the 
situation with the aim of supporting others makes one accept the information one 
receives without intently overlooking certain aspects or colouring one’s interpreta-
tion due to personal wishes. This is what we call matter-of-factness in daily language, 
and it supports the making of morally relevant, true factual judgements which pro-
vide one with morally relevant knowledge.  
  The mature man’s or woman’s feelings and mental attitude are such feelings and 
such a mental attitude which motivate him or her to accept morality as being valid 
for him- or herself, and which support his or her moral judgement-making, that is, 
which support the process of making morally relevant, true factual judgements 
which give the moral knowledge needed for making good moral judgements, and 
which further motivate to making good moral judgements and acting on them. The 
feelings and the mental attitude which best satisfy these requirements are those 
which we mean when we use the everyday expression ‘sympathy’ in a universal 
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sense: friendly feelings, which take the form of pleasant feelings without intensity, 
namely as joy at the company of others, and the affirmative mental attitude of con-
cern for others. The friendly feelings and the concern for others provide the agent 
with psychological skills: They stimulate one’s capacity for imagining the psycho-
logical lives of others, their needs, their wishes, and their intentions, and what they 
are capable of doing and what they are prepared to do, and they also improve one’s 
capacity for imagining alternatives of action which satisfy the needs of wishes of oth-
ers and thus what makes their lives worth living to them, which is what morality 
aims at.  
  We have seen that the good moral judgement made by the mature man or woman 
cannot be either true or false, but only ‘good’ in the sense of successfully applying 
morality to life in general or to an individual situation. We might find this conclusion 
dissatisfying, since we might expect more from a mature person’s moral judgement 
than just a technical goodness, goodness as efficiency, namely in applying morality, 
and one might ask oneself why there is talk of mature judgements at all in daily lan-
guage, instead of just of good moral judgements. What is so special with the mature 
judgement if maturity cannot guarantee knowledge of truth in moral matters? 
  The answer is to be found in the everyday expression ‘objectivity’. The semantic 
connection between the everyday expressions ‘mature judgement’ and ‘objectivity’ 
with regard to the expression ‘moral judgement’ will be the topic of the next section 
of our study. 
 
  
MATURE JUDGEMENT 
We have noted that the everyday expression ‘maturity’ is used in connection with 
intellectual development, which means that what is mature or immature is a human 
mind. But we also use the expression ‘mature’ for certain kinds of moral judgements, 
as well as for certain actions.  
  We have noted that maturity secures good citizenship, which may make one sus-
pect that what we call a ‘mature judgement’ in everyday language today is simply a 
good moral judgement, one which tells one how to correctly apply morality to life in 
general or to an individual situation by stating what is good or bad, right or wrong, 
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certain rights or the absence of rights, or what ought or ought not to be done, 
whereas a ‘mature action’ is a morally good action, namely one which fulfils the de-
mands of morality, and which thus realises the good moral judgement in practical 
action, which means that it is useful to other people, either directly or indirectly. But 
we will see that it is not quite that simple. 
  The fact that maturity secures good citizenship does not mean that it is identical 
with good citizenship. As we have seen, for being a good citizen it is enough simply 
to act well, and thereby to fulfil one’s role in society, but this is not enough for matur-
ity.  
  Since maturity secures good citizenship, a mature judgement must be one which 
tells one how to fulfil one’s role in society, of taking one’s responsibility as a member 
of the community, which means fulfilling certain basic moral demands, and conse-
quently that the action prescribed is morally good in the limited sense of being mor-
ally acceptable, of not being blameworthy. But as distinguished from good citizen-
ship, maturity implies making good moral judgements of one’s own which are not 
made accidentally, which means that they are based on morally relevant knowledge. 
The fact that the good moral judgement can be made accidentally, but the mature 
man’s or woman’s particular moral judgement cannot, means that although it too is a 
good moral judgement in the everyday sense of the word, it still differs from the 
standard good moral judgement: The mature judgement is a good moral judgement 
of a certain kind, one which fulfils other criteria than just applying morality to hu-
man life in general or to an individual situation.  
   As already mentioned, the mature judgement must build on morally relevant 
knowledge, which implies that it must be made in a certain way, namely in full con-
sciousness of what one is doing. Further, and as distinguished from the good moral 
judgement, the mature judgement must be made by the agent him- or herself, i.e., it 
will not do just to accept another person’s moral judgement as one’s own. And the 
mature judgement must be based on the agent’s own good intentions, i.e., intentions 
to live according to morality for the sake of others instead of for the sake of oneself or 
partly for the sake of oneself, which means that whether a moral judgement is to be 
considered mature or not is dependent on the agent’s reasons for his or her judging.  
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  In addition, the mature judgement can be sufficiently explained and thus motivated 
by the judge him- or herself, and it always remains preliminary while revisable in the 
face of new and relevant information. We will now show that these criteria on the 
mature judgement can be summed up as a criterion of objectivity in the everyday 
sense of that word. 
  In Baillie’s interpretation of Hume, moral judgements can be objective in the sense 
that they can be made by any competent person. This is a criterion of intersubjectiv-
ity.117 Likewise, according to the way we use the expression objectivity in everyday 
language, an objective moral judgement can be checked and found correct by several 
competent moral judges. This means that at least in theory, everyone who is capable 
of good moral deliberation, i.e., of making morally relevant, true factual judgements 
and of applying morality to the morally relevant knowledge which is based on true 
beliefs founded on these true factual judgements, is able to make the same moral 
judgement, which would mean that this moral judgement is an objective moral 
judgement.  
  Maturity gives the competence to live according to morality, which means making 
mature judgements and acting on them, and as we have seen, mature judgements are 
good moral judgements, which are moral judgements which correctly apply morality 
either to life in general or to individual situations. But it is questionable whether all 
mature men and women according to the way in which we use the expression matur-
ity in daily language today would make the same moral judgement in an actual prob-
lem situation.  
  The meaning of the everyday expression of morality as it is used in daily language 
changes with the times and with the current culture, which means that the meanings 
of the expressions ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’ change, and consequently the meanings of 
the expressions ‘good’ and ‘right’ do, but we have reason to believe that in all cul-
tures there is a certain conception of maturity which implies moral competence, 
whatever the current morality says, and that this moral competence secures good 
citizenship. And certainly the fact that for men and women in a certain culture it can 
be impossible to come to a certain conclusion morally because it is too far from their 
                                                 
117 Baillie, Hume on Morality p. 197. 
 145
way of thinking does not mean that there are no mature men and women in that so-
ciety.  
  Further morality today can be correctly applied in different ways to the same situa-
tion, depending on the judge’s interpretation of the situation. All men have an indi-
vidual personality and a unique life history with unique experiences, for which rea-
son people’s perception and their interpretations of their perception differs. This 
means that different mature men and women will interpret a certain situation differ-
ently, which means that their moral judgements will differ. This means that not only 
will mature men and women in different cultures differ in their moral judgements; 
even mature persons belonging to the same culture will occasionally come to differ-
ent conclusions concerning what is good, what is right, which rights people have and 
which they do not have, and what should be done. Thus, and against Aristotle, two 
mature persons may well make different moral judgements, which both satisfy the 
conditions for being mature judgements. 
This seems to indicate that the mature judgement cannot lay claim to objectivity, ac-
cording to the way we use the expression ‘objectivity’ in everyday language. But if 
we examine the everyday use of the expression in relation to the expression ‘moral 
judgement’, we will find that a moral judgement can fulfil the criteria for objectivity 
also in other ways.  
  Like in the case with the expression maturity, it may be easier to start by noting 
what objectivity in relation to moral judgement in everyday language does not mean. 
First of all, we would not use the expression of objectivity concerning a moral 
judgement if the end product, the linguistic claim, is vague, i.e., not clearly formu-
lated. And further, we would not use the expression of objectivity concerning a 
moral judgement if the moral judgement prescribed actions which were not de-
manded by morality, in which case it would not fulfil its purpose, which is to give 
guidelines concerning the fulfilment of morality. Thirdly, we would not use the ex-
pression of objectivity concerning a moral judgement if it took only certain persons 
into regard, in which case it would be partial, and morality according to the way we 
use the expression in everyday language demands that all persons are taken into re-
gard when acting.  
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  But objectivity concerning a moral judgement also seems to demand that certain 
requirements concerning the making of the moral judgement are fulfilled. We may 
note that ‘objectivity’ concerning moral judgements is used in much the same way as 
‘reliability’ is. A judgement which is reliable is one which can be trusted, and it can 
be trusted for the simple reason that it was made in a way which gives good reason 
to assume it to be correct in the meaning of correctly applying morality to an indi-
vidual situation or to life in general. An objective moral judgement is reliable in this 
way, which means that there are reasons to trust it, reasons which can be explained 
and motivated.  
  But objectivity in this sense concerning moral judgements is also not compatible 
with a lack of active participation on the part of the agent. A moral judgement, how-
ever ‘correct’ in the meaning of realising the aims of morality when acted on, cannot 
be said to be objective if made by another person and just accepted by the agent as 
being correct without him or her checking its validity by means of critical reflection. 
And if he or she does check its validity and finds it to be correct, then in fact he or she 
is making the moral judgement anew, which is quite another thing than just me-
chanically repeating what another person has said. Further we would not use the 
expression of objectivity concerning a moral judgement which was made accidentally 
by the agent, without building on enough morally relevant knowledge, and which 
thus cannot be sufficiently explained and thus motivated by the judge. Such a 
judgement we would not claim to be a reliable judgement. And we would not use the 
expression of objectivity concerning a moral judgement which was not done intently 
and willingly by the agent, in which case he or she might pursue quite other aims 
with his or her judgement-making than that of realising the aims of morality. Conse-
quently we would not use the expression of objectivity concerning a moral judge-
ment if it did not build on good intentions on the part of the agent but instead on 
selfish intentions, which would mean that the agent’s moral judgement-making was 
based on a subjective motivation, namely to support him- or herself. And finally we 
would not use the expression of objectivity concerning a moral judgement if it was 
not changed in the face of new and relevant information, in which case too it would 
not prove reliable. 
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  Having now clarified what objectivity concerning a moral judgement does not mean 
in everyday language, we have some clues to the everyday meaning of objectivity. 
From the negative description of objectivity in the everyday sense in connection with 
moral judgement given above we can deduce that according to our everyday seman-
tic practice, the objective moral judgement in the everyday sense, as being a good 
moral judgement of a certain kind, 1) says that something is either good or bad, right 
or wrong, that someone has or does not have certain rights, or that something ought 
or ought not to be done, 2) is clearly formulated, 3) prescribes only what morality 
demands, 4) takes all persons into regard, 5) is made by the agent him- or herself, 
either originally or anew by critically examining and accessing the validity of another 
person’s judgement, 6) is made in full consciousness of what one is doing, which 
means that it is based on morally relevant knowledge and thus on sufficient relevant 
information in the form of morally relevant, true factual judgements, 7) can be suffi-
ciently explained and thus motivated by the judge, 8) is done intently and willingly, 
i.e., as the result of critical reflection and choice, 9) builds on the agent’s own good 
intentions, which means that it aims at supporting both other individuals for their 
sake as well as society as a whole for the sake of all its members, and 10) remains pre-
liminary while revisable in the face of new and relevant information. 
  This gives at hand that the everyday meaning of ‘mature judgement’ corresponds to 
the everyday meaning of ‘objective moral judgement’, which means that according to 
the way we use the expression ‘mature judgement’ in everyday language, it has a 
certain objectivity while being reliable, in spite of the fact that it is neither true nor 
false, and in spite of the fact that different mature men and women can come to dif-
ferent conclusions concerning what is right or wrong morally. 
  This means that although mature persons will on occasion differ in their mature 
judgements, mature judgements can still be said to allow for a certain, although lim-
ited, objectivity. This means that the mature judgement is a moral judgement which 
can be trusted, and that even persons who are not themselves mature can well un-
derstand that they may safely trust these moral judgements, which is not the case 
with moral judgements which are just good, since as we have seen these may well be 
just repeated from what another person has said, they may be accidental, and moti-
vated by selfish strivings, they may not be made intently and willingly, they may not 
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take all persons into regard, and they may be vague and the agent may not be able to 
explain them thoroughly.  
  According to Raphael, disagreement in moral judgement suggests that we do not 
know for certain what we ought to do.118 But this must not be the case. The mature 
judgement can always be trusted, even if contradicted by another mature judgement, 
and since both are correct, both ought to be acted on. On the other hand, although it 
may well be that two mature persons, even from the same culture, come to different 
conclusions concerning what is good, what is right, which rights there are, or what 
ought to be done, still, as Hanfling rightly points out, 
It is no accident that concepts are shared, to a large extent, by different societies; they 
are part of the human condition, reflecting the needs and interests of human beings 
living in a social world.119  
 
  And he says:  
To a large extent… our concepts – especially those of interest to philosophers – are 
bound up with essential human situations: they are part of the human ‘form of life’.120  
 
  Since the conceptions of morality in different cultures tend to show certain similari-
ties, for the simple reason that there are some basic human needs and thus prefer-
ences which will always remain the same over the ages, above all to go on living and 
to engage in activities which make one’s life worth living, and since the conception of 
maturity, whatever this conception is called in the individual culture, always is un-
derstood as giving a moral competence, the moral judgements of mature men and 
women even from different cultures will still show a certain similarity. 
 
 
MATURE ACTION 
We noted earlier that not only is a human being called mature or immature, and 
what we call mature or immature here is a human mind; but we also use the expres-
sions ‘mature’ and ‘immature’ for moral judgements and for actions. And we asked 
                                                 
118 Raphael, Moral Judgement p. 152. 
119 Hanfling, Philosophy and Ordinary Language p. 72. 
120 ibid. p. 11. 
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whether, according to the way we use the expression ‘mature action’ in daily lan-
guage, a mature action is identical with a morally good action. 
  The case of mature action is easier than that of the mature judgement, since a ma-
ture action is simply an action prescribed by a certain mature judgement. This distin-
guishes the mature action from one which is merely morally good, since a morally 
good action is one which is pointed out by a good moral judgement, which simply 
means that it fulfils the demands of morality. A mature action on the other hand is 
not just an action which fulfils the demands of morality; the everyday meaning of the 
expression ‘mature action’ indicates that such an action requires certain criteria other 
than just being morally good, which are the conditions of mature judgement-making. 
This means that whereas a man or woman who acts on the mature judgement with-
out having made this moral judgement him- or herself acts well, he or she does not 
act maturely. This means that only mature men and women can judge and act 
‘maturely’ in the strict sense, although of course anyone can act on the mature per-
son’s moral judgement. 
  For Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, understanding the conclusion in the practical 
syllogism means not only intellectually understanding what should be done, but also 
being actively disposed to performing the act, i.e. understanding the conclusion 
forces one to act. But we have noted that Aristotelian prudence gives guidelines only 
concerning the agent’s own acting, whereas the mature man or woman according to 
our everyday use of the expression is also able to act as a moral advisor to others. 
And in many cases in daily life, it may be impossible for the competent moral judge to 
act according to his or her own judgement, even though it would be good for him- or 
herself if he or she would do so: he or she cannot make a try because he or she lacks 
the means – physical or mental strength (energy, courage etc.) the money necessary, 
and so on. This is not seldom the case in good moral advice given by old or sick peo-
ple. And in fact in many cases it will not even be good for the advisor him- or herself 
to live in the way he or she prescribes. He or she may come to a conclusion concern-
ing right action which is recommendable to others, but which would be devastating 
for him- or herself. Here we must distinguish between immediately good for the per-
son himself, good for the person himself in the longer perspective, immediately good 
for others, and good for others in the longer perspective. A good advice is always 
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good for the receiver of the advice, either immediately or in the long perspective. The 
mature man or woman strives to support others either directly, through his or her 
own acting, or indirectly, either by supporting society as a whole, or by acting as a 
moral advisor to others, and the person who in a certain situation is most able to ful-
fil the demands of morality is the person who rightly should act, which must not be 
the mature man or woman him- or herself. 
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Zusammenfassung  
in deutscher Sprache 
 
 
In unseren alltäglichen Gesprächen über Moral kommen die Ausdrücke „reif“ und 
„unreif“ auffallend häufig vor. Nicht nur sagen wir, eine gewisse Person, ein gewis-
ses Urteil oder eine Handlungsweise sei „gut“ oder „schlecht“, sondern auch, sie/es 
sei „reif“ oder „unreif“. Interessanterweise gibt es noch keine eigentlich philosophi-
sche Forschung zur Klärung des Begriffs der Reife und seiner Relevanz für die Mo-
ral, trotz seiner offensichtlichen Aktualität und Relevanz im alltäglichen  moralischen 
Denken. 
    In dieser Arbeit werden die verschiedenen Bedeutungen des alltäglichen Aus-
drucks der Reife sowohl als die anderer verwandten Ausdrücke analysiert: „Moral“, 
„Sympathie“, „Autonomie“ und „reifes Urteil“. Die Alltagsbedeutungen der Aus-
drücke, die durch den alltäglichen Gebrauch bestimmt werden, werden in der Arbeit 
Common Sense genannt. Diese Methode erinnert an die des sog. „ordinary language 
philosophy“, der Philosophie der Alltagssprache der Oxforder Schule der 50er und 
60er Jahre, aber im Unterschied zur Oxfordschule wird in dieser Arbeit kein Versuch 
unternommen, mit den Mitteln des „ordinary language philosophy“ philosophische 
Probleme zu lösen. Stattdessen bietet die Analyse eine Grundlegung der philosophi-
schen Arbeit an den Begriff der Reife durch eine Analyse dessen Bedeutung und mo-
ralische Relevanz in der Alltagssprache, weshalb diese Studie nicht im strengen Sin-
ne als eine Arbeit in der Tradition des „ordinary language philosophy“ betrachtet 
werden kann. 
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    Die Klärung dieser fünf Alltagsausdrücke und deren sprachlogischen Beziehungen 
erlaubt ein tieferes Verständnis für die Art und Weise wie wir diese Ausdrücke be-
nutzen, sowohl als für ihre Relevanz in unserer täglichen moralischen Praxis. Dazu 
können Analysen des Common Sense unser alltägliches Denken und Sprechen über 
Moral beeinflussen, zugunsten größerer Genauigkeit, was die Alltagsbedeutungen 
der Ausdrücke selber verändern würde. 
    „Reife“ bedeutet in der Alltagssprache ein geistiges Erwachsensein. Wir beurteilen 
die Reife eines Menschen ausgehend von seinem Urteilen und seinem Handeln, und 
was wir damit beurteilen ist sein inneres Leben: „Reife“ wird mit intellektueller und 
emotionaler Entwicklung in Verbindung gebracht, und was wir im Menschen als reif 
oder als unreif beurteilen ist sein Bewusstsein, mit dem wir eine gewisse Art des Ü-
berlegens, Fühlens und Wünschens assoziieren. 
    Wir nennen aber auch einzelne Urteile und Handlungen „reif“ oder „unreif“. Ein 
reifes Bewusstsein zeigt sich im Urteilen und idealerweise auch im Handeln, als gu-
tes, überlegtes und gewolltes Urteilen und Handeln, und solche Urteile und solche 
Handlungen nennen wir auch „reif“. Der reife Mensch erfüllt seine Rolle in der Ge-
sellschaft, was heißt dass er als guter Staatsbürger, als gutes Mitglied der Gesellschaft 
zum Guten der Gemeinschaft und dadurch aller Mitglieder der Gesellschaft beiträgt.  
    In der Alltagssprache wird „Unreife“ mit Introvertiertheit, Selbstsucht und starker 
und sehr wechselhafter Emotionalität in Verbindung gebracht. „Introvertiertheit“ 
bedeutet eine ungemäße Selbstreflexion, wodurch die Reflexion über die Außenwelt 
vernachlässigt wird; die Person beschäftigt sich in ihren Gedanken ungleich stark mit 
ihrem eigenen inneren Leben. „Selbstsucht“ bedeutet dass das Handeln eines Men-
schen von der Absicht, das Gute für einen selber sicherzustellen, bestimmt wird, im 
Bewusstsein davon dass dies zum Nachteil anderer werden kann. Eine starke und 
sehr wechselhafte Emotionalität zeigt sich in Wutausbrüchen, exaltierter Freude, o-
der plötzlichen und gewaltigen Stimmungsveränderungen. Zusammen implizieren 
Introvertiertheit, Selbstsucht und starker und wechselhafter Emotionalität eine Geis-
teshaltung von Sorge um sich selber, d.h. ein Interesse an sich selber mit dem aus-
schließlichen Ziel sich selber zu befördern. Dies nennen wir Selbstzentriertheit. Ein 
solcher Mensch erfüllt nicht seine Rolle in der Gesellschaft, weder als Familienmit-
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glied, noch als Arbeitskollege, Freund oder Mitbürger, was erwartet wird von einem 
Erwachsenen.  
    „Reife“ und „Unreife” sind in der Alltagssprache ein Gegensatzpaar, und diese 
Beschreibung von Unreife deutet darauf hin dass „Reife“ Extrovertiertheit und das 
Fehlen an Selbstsucht, und damit Sorge um Andere impliziert, sowie Gelassenheit. 
Ein solcher Mensch hat gute Intentionen, d.h. Intentionen andere Menschen zu be-
fördern um ihrer selbst willen, und er hat die Fähigkeit gut zu urteilen. Dies, der Ge-
gensatz von Selbstzentriertheit, entspricht einer gewissen Verwendung des Aus-
drucks Sympathie in der Alltagssprache, als Sorge um Andere und als freundschaft-
liche Gefühle von Freude am Umgang mit den Mitmenschen.  
    Diese Art von Sympathie ist eine Voraussetzung dafür dass der Person das Leben 
Anderer und was ihr Leben wertvoll macht wichtig sind, und dadurch dafür dass 
der Person die moralische Handlungssituation wichtig wird. Eine Sympathie dieser 
Art richtet die Aufmerksamkeit der Person auf Andere und macht die Person emp-
fänglich für moralisch relevante Information über die aktuelle Handlungssituation, 
was auf mögliche Handlungsalternative zeigt. Diese Art von Sympathie impliziert 
eine gewisse Bedeutung des Alltagsausdrucks der Autonomie, nämlich eine mora-
lisch relevante Autonomie, eine die es einem ermöglicht nach der Moral zu leben, 
d.h. gut zu urteilen und gut zu handeln.  
    Die Hauptthese der Arbeit ist dass die Reife als eine durch die Sympathie geformte 
Autonomie beschrieben werden kann, was eine moralische Kompetenz, im Urteilen 
sowie im Handeln, ermöglicht. In der Alltagssprache bedeutet „Moral“ verschiedene 
Auffassungen wie man zu leben hat um andere Individuen zu unterstützen, im di-
rekten, persönlichen Umgang sowie indirekt, durch Tätigkeiten zur Unterstützung 
der Gesellschaft als ganzes zugunsten aller ihrer Mitglieder. Die Reife, bezogen auf 
die Moral, ist eine Qualität die die Kompetenz erbringt moralisch zu leben. Sympa-
thie in einer gewissen Bedeutung des Ausdrucks, nämlich als eine kontinuierliche, 
universale Sympathie, ist Interesse an den Anderen um seinetwillen, sowohl als 
freundschaftliche Gefühle. Dies motiviert zu und ermöglicht ein Leben nach der Mo-
ral. Autonomie ist Autorität, d.h. Dominanz, über einen selber, wo das Selbst aus 
Körper und Bewusstsein mit allen ihren Funktionen besteht. Die Autonomie ermög-
licht es, das eigene Leben nach eigenem Willen sozial zu gestalten. Die universale Art 
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der Sympathie ermöglicht eine moralisch relevante Erkenntnis und motiviert dazu, 
die Autorität über einen selber im Dienst der Moral zu stellen. Eine Autonomie die 
von einer universalen Sympathie ermöglicht sowohl als eingeschränkt, d.h. geformt 
wird, erbringt die moralische Kompetenz die das Kennzeichen der Reife ist. Diese 
moralische Kompetenz ist die Fähigkeit, reif zu urteilen und reif zu handeln. Diese 
Urteile sagen entweder dass etwas gut oder schlecht, richtig oder falsch ist, dass je-
mand gewisse Rechte besitzt oder nicht besitzt, oder dass etwas getan oder nicht ge-
tan werden soll. Dadurch dass sie von der Person selber stammen und  das Ergebnis 
kritischer Reflexion und eigener Wahl sind, auf genügend moralisch relevantes Wis-
sen basieren, klar formuliert sind und von der Person selber erklärt werden können, 
den guten Absichten der Person entsprechen, was bedeutet dass ihr Zweck die Un-
terstützung anderer Menschen ist, alle Menschen in betracht ziehen, nur das vor-
schreiben was die Moral verlangt, und dazu revidierbar sind im Angesicht neuer 
moralisch relevanter Informationen, besitzen sie eine gewisse Objektivität. Dies si-
chert eine Zuverlässigkeit im moralischen Urteil, wodurch der reife Mensch als mo-
ralischer Ratgeber Anderer funktionieren kann. 
    Ein Handeln nach diesen reifen Urteilen, ein reifes Handeln, ist ein Handeln das 
die Ziele der Moral verwirklicht, nämlich das Gute aller jetzigen und künftigen Mit-
glieder der Gesellschaft. Dies besteht, nach dem Alltagsausdruck des Guten, im Le-
ben selber und in der Möglichkeit einer persönlichen Selbstverwirklichung, d.h. im 
Erhalten dessen was einem das Leben wertvoll macht. 
Die individuelle Interpretation was anderen Menschen unterstützt ist von den je-
weiligen gesellschaftlichen Sitten abhängig. Alle Menschen haben auch eine indi-
viduelle Persönlichkeit und eine eigene Lebensgeschichte mit individuellen Erfah-
rungen, was ihr Urteil beeinflusst. Aus diesem Grund werden sich die moralischen 
Urteile verschiedener reifer Menschen unterscheiden. Nichtdestotrotz werden die 
Urteile reifer Menschen mit unterschiedlicher kultureller Hintergrund eine gewisse 
Ähnlichkeit aufweisen, weil es gewisse grundlegende menschliche Bedürfnisse gibt, 
und deshalb Interessen und Präferenzen die von den meisten Menschen geteilt wer-
den, vor allem am Leben zu bleiben und sich mit Aktivitäten beschäftigen die einem 
das Leben wertvoll machen. 
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